LIBRARY   OF    THE!    COMMANDERY    OF 
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THE  LIBRARY  OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF 

NORTH  CAROLINA 

AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


ENDOWED  BY  THE 

DIALECTIC  AND  PHILANTHROPIC 

SOCIETIES 


EU75.51 

.D22 

1912 


a     \j\j\jKJd     J/DO/     y 


This  book  is  due  at  the  WALTER  R.  DAVIS  LIBRARY  on 
the  last  date  stamped  under  "Date  Due."  If  not  on  hold  it 
may  be  renewed  by  bringing  it  to  the  library. 


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THE  CAMPAIGN  OF 
GETTYSBURG 


EV75.5/ 

BY 

.09.2 

"MILES" 

1112. 

BOSTON 

SMALL,  MAYNARD  AND  COMPANY 

1912 


c 


/ 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2010  with  funding  from 

University  of  North  Carolina  at  Chapel  Hill 


http://www.archive.org/details/campaignofgettysOOdayw 


PREFACE 

This  book  has  been  written  as  far  as  possible  from 
original  sources.  Of  these  the  most  important  are 
the  "  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate 
Armies,"  containing  the  reports  and  despatches  of 
all  the  principal  actors  on  both  sides ;  also  Vol. 
III.  of  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War," 
which  contains  the  personal  narratives  of  some  forty 
eye-witnesses  of  the  battle.  These  two  authorities 
are  absolutely  invaluable.  Other  works  consulted 
have  been,  Swinton's  "  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,"  Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,"  Longstreet's  "  From  Manassas  to 
Appomattox,"  Col.  Edmonds'  "  American  Civil  War," 
Gordon's  "  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War,"  Fletcher's 
"  History  of  the  American  War,"  White's  "  Life 
of  R.  E.  Lee,"  Long's  "  Memoirs  of  General  Lee," 
Henderson's  "  Stonewall  Jackson,"  and  other  bio- 
graphies, besides  a  number  of  pamphlets  and 
magazine  articles. 

The  plans  of  the  battlefield,  which  accompany  this 
volume,  are  reduced  from  a  large-scale  map,  kindly 
supplied  to  the  writer  by  Lt.-Col.  Cope,  U.S.  Engineers. 
To  him  the  writer  is  indebted  for  much  interesting 
information  and  for  his  general  kindness  and  assistance 
while  visiting  Gettysburg  in  the  autumn  of  1908. 

THE   WRITER. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Preface 


PAGE 

3 


Chapter  I.  Introduction. 

Military  situation  in  Virginia  in  the  spring  of  1863 . .  13 

The  Chancellorsville  campaign    . .  . .  . .  . .  14 

Its  moral  effect  on  the  Union  and  Confederate  armies  14 

Determination    of    the    Confederate    Government  to 

assume  the  offensive     . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  15 

Reasons  for  the  above  decision  . .  . .  . .  . .  15 

State  of  the  war  in  the  West      . .         . .         . .  . .  15 

Critical  situation  of  Vicksburg    . .  . .  . .  . .  16 

The  theatre  of  operations  . .  . .  . .  . .  16 

Importance  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  . .         . .  . .  17 

The  position  of  Washington        . .  . .  . .  . .  17 

Its  effect  on  the  strategy  of  the  campaign       . .  . .  17 

Characteristics  of  Virginia,  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  18 

Attitude  of  the  civil  populations  . .  . .  . .  18 

Dispositions  of  the  Federal  forces  in  May,  1863  . .  18 
Organisation  and  strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 

and  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  . .  . .  19 

Composition  and  character  of  the  American  armies  . .  22 

The  two  armies  compared  . .  . .  . .  . .  24 

Evils  of  the  Federal  system  of  command         . .  . .  25 

Confederate  plan  of  campaign    . .  . .  . .  . .  26 

Possible  lines  of  action  open  to  Lee  and  Hooker . .  . .  26 

Chapter  II.  From  the  Rappahannock  to  the  Potomac. 

Lee's  plan  of  campaign    . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  27 

March  of  Longstreet  and  Ewell  to  Culpepper . .  . .  27 

Confederate  cavalry  massed  at  Culpepper        . .  . .  28 

Hooker  decides  to  attack  Stuart  . .         . .  . .  29 

Battle  of  Brandy  Station  . .         . .         . .  . .  29 

Initial  success  of  the  Federal  cavalry    . .         . .  . .  30 

Its  ultimate  defeat  and  retreat  . .  . .  . .  . .  31 

Criticism  of  Pleasonton's  dispositions    . .  . .  . .  31 

5 


Chapter  II.  (continued). 

March  of  Ewell's  Corps  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley- 
Disposition  of  Federal  troops  in  the  Valley     . . 
Position  of  Federal  force  at  Winchester 
Halleck's  anxiety  for  its  safety 
Disregard  of  his  instructions  by  General  Schenck 
Milroy's  confidence  in  the  strength  of  his  position 
Ewell's  dispositions  to  surround  him 
Rodes'  march  down  the  Valley 
Action  at  Martinsburg,  June  14. . 
Milroy's  ignorance  of  Ewell's  advance 
Action  at  Winchester,  June  13  . . 
Milroy's  decision  to  hold  the  town 
Action  on  the  Romney  road,  June  14  . . 
Winchester  surrounded 
Federal  council-of-war 
Attempt  of  the  garrison  to  break  out 
Dispersal  or  capture  of  Milroy's  force 
Abandonment  of  the  Valley  by  the  Federals  . . 
Success  of  the  Confederate  operations 
Causes  contributing  to  the  above 
Admirable  handling  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
Blame  attached  to  General  Schenck 
Criticism  of  Milroy's  conduct 
Impression  made  by  his  defeat  in  the  North  . . 

Chapter  III.  The  Invasion  of  Pennsylvania. 

Capture  of  Chambersburg,  Pa.,  by  Jenkins'  cavalry 

Conduct  of  the  Confederate  troops 

Panic  in  Pennsylvania 

The  militia  called  out 

Position  of  Confederate  forces,  night  of  June  15 

Boldness  of  Lee's  strategy 

Hooker  refused  permission  to  advance  on  Richmond 

Accuracy  of  Lee's  appreciation  of  the  situation . . 

Richmond  threatened  by  the  Federal  forces  in  the 

Peninsula 
Calmness  of  the  Confederate  Government 
Effect  upon  these  operations  of  Lee's  invasion  of  Penn 

sylvania 
Withdrawal  of  the  Federal  forces  from  Richmond 
Retreat  of  Hooker  to  Centreville 
Cavalry  operations  between  June  16-21 
Objectives  of  Stuart  and  Pleasonton 
Result  and  criticism  of  the  cavalry  engagement 

6 


32 
32 
33 
33 
33 
34 
34 
35 
35 
35 
35 
36 
37 
37 
38 
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43 
43 
43 

44 
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45 
45 

46 
47 

47 
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45 
48 
48 
49 


Chapter  III.  {continued). 

Crossing  of  the  Potomac  by  the  Confederate  army 
Invasion  of  Pennsylvania 
Occupation  of  York  by  Early,  June  28 
Engagement  at  Wrightsville,  June  28  . . 
Occupation  of  Carlisle  by  Ewell,  June  27 
Federal  preparations  to  defend  Harrisburg 
Confederate  concentration  on  Gettysburg 


Lee's  disregard  of  Harper's  Ferry  . .  . .  . .       55 

Hooker's  plan  to  cut  his  communication  with  Virginia      55 

55 
56 


Correspondence  between  Hooker  and  Halleck 

Resignation  of  Hooker 

Meade  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 

Potomac  . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  57 

His  character         . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  57 

Alternative  plans  of  action  open  to  him  . .  . .  58 

He  advances  north  to  relieve  Harrisburg         . .         . .  59 

Operations  of  Confederate  cavalry,  June  25-JuIy  2   . .  59 

Lee's  instructions  to  Stuart         . .  . .  . .  . .  59 

Stuart's  intentions  . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  60 

He  crosses  the  Potomac,  June  27  . .         . .  60 

Position  of  the  Federal  army,  June  28. .  . .  . .  61 

Engagement  at    Hanover  between   Stuart   and    Kil- 

patrick     . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  61 

Stuart  reaches  York,  June  29,  and  Carlisle  July  1  62 

He  countermarches  on  Gettysburg        . .  . .  . .  62 

Results  of  Stuart's  operations     . .  . .  . .  . .  62 

Military  situation,  night  of  June  30  . .  . .  63 

Intentions  of  Lee  and  Meade      . .         . .         . .         . .  64 

Meade's  action  in  advancing  his  left  wing  towards 

Gettysburg         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  65 

Chapter  IV.  Battle  of  Gettysburg. 

Description  of  the  battlefield  of  July  1  . .  66 

Occupation  of  the  town  by  Buford's  cavalry  . .         . .  67 

Advance  of  Heth's  Confederate  division  on  Gettysburg  67 

Commencement  of  the  battle      . .         . .         . .         . .  67 

Arrival  on  the  field  of  Wadsworth's  division  of  the 

First  Corps         68 

First  Confederate  attack  by  Heth's  division    . .  . .  68 

Death  of  General  Reynolds         . .         . .         . .         . .  69 

Repulse  of  the  attack       . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  69 

Arrival  on  the  field  of  Rodes'  and  Pender's  divisions . .  69 

Arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  First  Corps         . .         . .  69 

7 


Chapter  IV.  (continued). 

And  of  General  Howard  and  the  Eleventh  Corps 

Second  Confederate  attack  by  Heth  and  Rodes 

The  First  Corps  enfiladed  from  Oak  Hill 

Repulse  of  the  attack 

Arrival  on  the  field  of  Early's  division 

Third  Confederate  attack 

Rout  of  the  Eleventh  Corps 

Heroic  struggle  of  the  First  Corps 

General  retreat  of  the  Federals  through  Gettysburg 

Rally  of  the  Federal  troops  on  Cemetery  Hill     . . 

Arrival  of  General  Hancock  and  General  Lee 

Lee's  instructions  to  Ewell  to  attack  Cemetery  Hill 

Arrival  of  Slocum's  Twelfth  Corps  on  the  field    . . 

Ewell's  decision  not  to  attack 

Losses  on  both  sides 

Night  of  July  1      . . 

Concentration  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  Gettys 

burg 
Confederate  positions,  night  of  July  1 
Description  of  the  battlefield 
Arrival  of  General  Meade  on  the  field 
His  dispositions  to  hold  the  position 
Alternative  position  suggested  by  Sickles  for  the  Third 

Corps 
Its  advantages  and  disadvantages 
Detailed  descriptions  of  the  ground  on  the  Federal 

left  flank  . 
Dispositions  of  the  Federal  artillery 


69 
71 
71 

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73 
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74 
74 
75 
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76 
76 
76 
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77 
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77 
79 
79 

80 

80 

81 

82 


Strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  morning  of  July  2  82 

Confederate  dispositions  for  the  attack . .         . .         . .  83 

Longstreet's  suggestion  to  manoeuvre  Meade  out  of  his 

position    . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  83 

Lee's  plan  of  attack         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  84 

The  plan  analysed            . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  84 

Longstreet's  dispositions  of  his  corps  to  attack  . .         . .  85 

Positions  of  Hill  and  Ewell  and  the  Confederate  artillery  85 
Strength  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  morning  of 

July  2 87 

Attack  on  the  Federal  centre  and  left  . .         . .         . .  87 

General  Warren  sent  by  Meade  to  reconnoitre  Round 

Top          88 

Vincent's  brigade  detached  by  him  to  secure  Little 

Round  Top         88 

Hood's  attack  on  Round  Top  and  Devil's  Den          . .  89 

8 


Chapter  IV.  (continued). 

Capture  of  Devil's  Den 

Struggle  for  Little  Round  Top 

Capture  of  the  Peach  Orchard  by  McLaws 

Defeat  and  retreat  of  Birney's  division 

Wounding  of  General  Sickles 

Advance  and  repulse  of  Sykes'  Corps 

Defeat  and  retreat  of  Humphreys'  division 

Attack  of  Anderson's  division  on  Cemetery  Ridge 

The  failure  to  support  him 

Ultimate  repulse  of  the  attack 

Disorder  of  Longstreet's  Corps 

The  losses  on  both  sides 

Longstreet's  decision  not  to  renew  the  attack 

Ewell's  orders  to  Rodes,  Early,  and  Johnson  . . 

Withdrawal  of  Slocum's  Corps  from  Culp's  Hill  to  rein 

force  the  Federal  left  flank 
Greene's  brigade  left  to  hold  the  trenches 
Early's  assault  on  Cemetery  Hill 
Repulse  of  the  assault 
Johnson's  attack  on  Culp's  Hill 
Partial  success  of  the  attack 
Fighting  brought  to  an  end  by  darkness 
Retention  of  the  captured  trenches  by  Steuart's  brigad 
Disjointed  character  of  the  Confederate  attacks 
Reasons  for  the  above 
Losses  on  both  sides 
Situation  on  the  Union  right  flank  at  nightfall 

Chapter  V.  Battle  of  Gettysburg  (continued). 

Night  of  July  2 

Federal  council-of-war 

Decision  to  remain  at  Gettysburg 

Federal  preparations  to  attack  Johnson  at  Culp's  Hill 

Condition  of  the  Confederate  army  on  July  3 . . 

Council-of-war  held  by  General  Lee 

His  plan  of  attack 

The  plan  criticised 

Renewal  of  the  fighting  at  Culp's  Hill 

Confederate  attack  repulsed 

Withdrawal  of  Johnson's  division  behind  Rock  Creek 

Losses  on  both  sides  at  Culp's  Hill        . . 

Longstreet's  dispositions  to  attack  Cemetery  Ridge 

Positions  of  the  Confederate  artillery 

Mingling  of  units  in  the  Federal  Army 

9 


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111 


P.\GK 


Chapter  V.  (continued). 

General  Hunt's  disposition  of  the  Union  artillery  . .     112 
Description  of  the  position  held  by  Hancock's  Corps     112 

The  artillery  duel 113 

Longstreet's  instructions  to  Colonel  Alexander  ..     115 

Extracts  from  Alexander's  narrative   ..         ..  ..     116 

Assault  on  Cemetery  Ridge        . .         . .         . .  116 

Repulse  of  Pettigrew  and  Trimble         . .         . .  . .     118 

Capture  of  the  stone  wall  by  Pickett's  division . .  . .     119 

Failure  to  send  him  support       . .          . .          . .  120 

Struggle  for  possession  of  the  stone  wall          . .  . .      120 

Final  repulse  of  Pickett's  division          . .          . .  . .     121 

Advance  of  Wilcox  and  Perry    . .          . .          . .  121 

Losses  of  Pickett's  division         . .          . .          . .  122 

Critical  position  in  the  Confederate  centre          . .  . .     122 

Confidence  restored  by  General  Lee         . .          . .  . .     122 

Meade's  failure  to  make  any  counter-attack     . .  . .     123 

Cavalry  action  on  the  Confederate  right  flank  . .     123 

Death  of  Farnsworth        . .         . .         . .         . .  124 

Cavalry  action  between  Stuart  and  Pleasonton . .  . .     125 

The  result  indecisive         . .         . .         . .         . .  126 

Losses  of  the  cavalry       . .         . .         . .         . .  126 

Confederate  withdrawal  to  Seminary  Ridge     . .  . .     127 

End  of  the  battle " 127 

Losses  on  both  sides         . .         . .         . .         . .  . .     127 

Casualties  among  the  senior  officers      . .         . .  . .     128 

Percentage  of  loss  in  different  units      . .         . .  . .     129 

Chapter  VI.  The  Confederate  Retreat. 

Situation,  night  of  July  3           . .         . .         . .  130 

Dangerous  position  of  the  Confederate  army  . .  . .     131 

Lee's  preparations  to  retreat      . .         . .         . .  132 

Movement  of  Confederate  trains  to  Williamsport  . .     133 

Retreat  of  the  main  body           . .          . .          . .  134 

Meade's  movements  in  pursuit   . .          . .          . .  . .     134 

Burning  of  the  bridge  over  the  Potomac  at  Williams- 
port          134 

Movements  of  the  Federal  Cavalry        . .         . .  . .     135 

Stuart's  movements  to  protect  the  Confederate  trains      136 

Capture  of  a  convoy  by  Kilpatrick  at  Monterey . .  . .     136 

Cavalry  action  at  Hagerstown    . .          . .          . .  137 

Attack  on  the  Confederate  trains  at  Williamsport  . .     137 

Repulse  of  the  attack      . .         . .         . .         . .  138 

Arrival  of  the  Confederate  army  at  Williamsport  . .     139 

The  Potomac  in  flood 139 

Lee's  preparations  to  cross  it                 . .         . .  139 

10 


Chapter  VI.  (continued).  PAGE 

Meade's  slow  advance  on  Williamsport            . .  . .  140 

Explanation  of  his  caution          . .          . .          . .  . .  141 

His  hesitation  to  attack  the  Confederate  lines  . .  142 

Crossing  of  the  Potomac  by  the  Confederate  army  . .  143 

Movements  of  both  armies  to  the  Rappahannock  . .  143 

End  of  the  Campaign       . .          . .          . .          . .  . .  144 

Chapter  VII.  Review  op  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg. 

The  battle  of  July  1         145 

Example  of  a  battle  brought  on   by  the  accidental 

encounter  of  two  armies  on  the  march         . .  . .  145 

Characteristic  features  of  such  battles  . .          . .  . .  145 

Doubleday's  action  in  not  withdrawing  to  Cemetery 

Hill          146 

His  explanation  criticised            . .          . .          . .  . .  146 

Blame  attached  to  General  Buford        . .          . .  . .  147 

Luck  largely  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates     . .  . .  147 

Their  failure  to  push  on  and  seize  Cemetery  Hill  . .  148 

Criticism  of  Lee's  action  . .          . .          . .          . .  . .  148 

His  decision  an  error  of  judgment         . .          . .  . .  149 

Heroic  conduct  of  Reynolds'  Corps       . .         . .  . .  149 

Bad  behaviour  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  . .          . .  . .  150 

Battle  of  July  2 150 

Lee's  decision  to  renew  the  attack  on  Meade  . .  150 

The  alternatives  open  to  him      . .          . .          . .  . .  150 

The  advantages  of  a  rapid  renewal  of  the  attack  . .  152 

Analysis  of  the  Federal  position            . .          . .  . .  153 

Lee's  plan  of  attack  on  July  2  . .         . .         . .  155 

Unfortunate  results  of  Longstreet's  dilatoriness  . .  155 

Disjointed  character  of  the  Confederate  attacks  . .  156 

Reasons  for  the  above      . .          . .          . .          . .  156 

Lee's  plan  on  July  3        . .         . .         . .         . .  . .  156 

His  instructions  to  Longstreet  and  Hill           . .  . .  157 

Failure  of  Hill  to  execute  his  orders     . .          . .  . .  157 

Boldness  of  Lee's  tactics             . .          . .          . .  158 

His  conduct  of  the  battle            . .          . .          . .  . .  158 

Meade's  handling  of  his  army  at  Gettysburg  . .  . .  159 

The  intermingUng  of  units           . .          . .          . .  161 

The  Meade-Sickles  controversy  . .         . .         . .  160 

Meade's  failure  to  assume  the  offensive           . .  . .  161 

Its  effect  on  the  duration  of  the  war    . .          . .  . .  161 

Chapter  VIII.  Review  op  the  Campaign. 

Analysis  of  the  campaign            . .         . .         . .  162 

Its  objects  and  results      . .         . .         . .         . .  . .  163 

11 


Chapter  VIII.  (continued).  PAGE 

Lee's  strategy        . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  . .  164 

Brilliant  opening  of  the  campaign         . .         . .  . .  164 

Secrecy  of  the  Confederate  movements            . .  . .  164 

Extraordinary  boldness  of  Lee's  strategy            ..  ..  165 

His  abandonment  of  his  communications            ..  ..  165 

Why  they  were  never  interrupted          . .          . .  . .  165 

His  plans  upset  by  the  absence  of  his  cavalry. .  . .  166 

His  unmolested  retreat    . .         . .         . .         . .  167 

Federal  conduct  of  the  campaign           . .         . .  . .  168 

Confusion  in  the  channels  of  command             . .  . .  169 

Hostility  between  Hooker  and  Halleck            . .  . .  170 

Lincoln's  mistakes             . .          . .          . .          . .  170 

Meade's  strategy    . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  171 

His  excessive  caution       . .         . .         . .         . .  171 

His  error  in  pushing  Reynolds  forward  to  Gettysburg  172 

The  serious  consequences  that  followed            . .  . .  172 

Their  effect  upon  Meade's  plans            . .         . .  . .  172 

His  cautious  pursuit  after  the  battle     . .         . .  . .  1 73 

His  failure  to  attack  at  Williamsport   . .         . .  . .  173 

His  request  to  be  relieved  of  the  command     . .  . .  173 

Comparison  between  Lee  and  Meade     . .         . .  . .  174 

The  cavalry  operations     . .         . .         . .         . .  174 

Comparison  between  the  Union  and  Confederate  cavalry  175 

Stuart's  raid           . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  . .  175 

Lee's  instructions  to  Stuart  and  Robertson      . .  . .  176 

Their  failure  to  observe  these  instructions         . .  . .  177 

Conduct  of  the  Federal  cavalry              . .          . .  . .  178 

Combination  of  fire  and  shock  tactics  . .         . .  . .  179 

The  militia  forces  in  the  field     . .          . .          . .  180 

Quotations  from  Federal  despatches     . .         . .  . .  180 

The  Federal  militia  at  Wrightsvilla,  Pa 181 

Stone's  Pennsylvanian  brigade  at  Gettysburg. .  . .  181 

The  danger  of  relying  upon  untrained  troops  . .  . .  182 

Conclusion  . .         . .         . .         . .         . .         . .  . .  182 

Appendix  A. 

Organisation  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  of  the 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  Gettysburg  . .  . .  185 

Appendix  B. 

Details  of  the  casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and 

the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  Gettysburg  . .  190 

Appendix  C. 

Longstreet's  conduct  at  Gettysburg      . .         . .  . .  194 

Index 197 

12 


THE 

CAMPAIGN    OF    GETTYSBURG 

CHAPTER   I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

1.  The  Military  Situation. 

In  the  spring  of  1863  the  War  of  Secession  had  been 
in  progress  for  nearly  two  years.  During  this  time 
the  struggle  had  been  carried  on  with  the  greatest 
gallantry  and  determination  by  both  sides,  but  with 
a  result  little  commensurate  with  the  efforts  put 
forth,  or  with  the  terrible  sacrifice  of  men  and  money. 
The  objective  of  the  Northern  forces,  operating  in 
the  Eastern  theatre  of  war,  was  the  capture  of  Rich- 
mond, the  Confederate  capital  and  seat  of  Govern- 
ment. Two  lines  of  advance  were  available ;  one 
overland  from  Washington  by  way  of  Gordonsville 
or  Fredericksburg,  the  other  by  sea  to  Fortress  Monroe 
in  the  Yorktown  Peninsula,  a  point  in  the  possession 
of  the  Federal  forces,  and  thence  up  the  Peninsula 
towards  Richmond.  Both  lines  had  already  been  tried, 
the  first  three  times,  the  second  once.  All  these  attempts 
had  failed  disastrously.  In  April,  1863,  a  fourth  effort 
to  reach  the  enemy's  capital  by  the  overland  route 
was  made  by  General  Joseph  Hooker,  in  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  His  army,  130,000 
strong,  was  facing  the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern 

13 


Virginia  under  General  Robert  Lee,  numbering  about 
60,000,  at  Fredericksburg,  on  the  opposite  bank  of 
the  River  Rappahannock.  He  formed  the  plan  of 
holding  the  Confederate  general  to  his  lines  with  a 
portion  of  his  own  force,  and  of  marching  with  the 
remainder  up  the  river,  crossing  by  the  upper  fords, 
and  so  taking  the  enemy's  fortified  works  at  Fred- 
ericksburg in  rear.  This  movement  was  successfully 
effected,  and  on  April  30,  Hooker  with  70,000  men 
seized  the  Chancellorsville  House  in  Lee's  rear, 
confident  that  his  adversary  had  now  no  choice 
between  either  surrender  or  an  ignominious  retreat. 
But  Lee's  marvellous  skill,  backed  by  the  admirable 
fighting  powers  of  the  force  under  his  command,  was 
equal  to  the  situation.  Seizing  advantage  of  his 
central  position  to  deal  with  his  enemies  in  detail, 
he  held  the  one  in  check  with  a  small  portion  of  his 
own  force,  and  concentrated  all  his  strength  against 
the  other.  On  May  5  Hooker  was  forced  to  recross 
the  Rappahannock  and  to  acknowledge  defeat.  The 
result  was  a  grave  disaster  to  the  Union  army,  the 
loss  of  17,000  men,  and  the  complete  shattering  of 
all  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  troops  in  the  ability 
of  their  commander.  On  the  other  hand  so  brilliant 
a  victory,  won  over  such  heavy  odds,  raised  the 
morale  of  the  Confederate  troops  to  the  very  highest 
pitch,  and  confirmed  their  admiration  and  regard 
for  their  great  leader. 

Such  then  was  the  situation  in  Virginia  in  May, 
1863.  The  effect  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville 
was  to  destroy  for  a  time  the  power  of  offensive 
action  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  troops 
were  sullen  and  dispirited.  Certain  of  the  senior 
officers  were  bitterly  incensed  with  General  Hooker,1 
whose  manner  to  his  subordinates  was  curt  and  much 

1  Notably  General  Couch,  who  declined  to  serve  under  him 
any  longer. 

14 


lacking  in  tact.  In  addition  President  Lincoln  and 
his  military  adviser.  General  Halleck,  had  lost  all 
confidence  in  his  ability,  and  were  anxious  to  relieve 
him  of  the  command  as  soon  as  possible.  On  the 
other  side  the  result  of  the  victory  was  to  confirm 
the  Confederate  Government  in  its  opinion  that  the 
time  had  come  to  change  the  defensive  policy  of  the 
Confederacy  in  Virginia,  and  to  carry  the  war  into 
the  enemy's  country.  The  reasons  influencing  this 
decision  were  many,  but  they  may  be  briefly  sum- 
marised into  two,  firstly  the  conditions  under  which 
the  Confederacy  was  sustaining  the  burden  of  the 
struggle,  and  secondly  the  state  of  affairs  in  the 
Western  theatre  of  war. 

Firstly  :  It  is  a  recognised  maxim  of  war  that 
decisive  results  can  never  be  obtained  by  the  main- 
tenance of  a  simple  defensive.  As  the  war  went  on, 
the  people  of  the  Northern  States  showed  a  deter- 
mination and  constancy  of  purpose,  for  which  their 
opponents  had  not  formerly  given  them  credit,  and 
it  was  now  manifest  that  their  resolution  to  compel 
the  submission  of  the  seceded  States  would  never 
slacken,  until  their  last  dollar  had  been  spent,  and 
their  last  man  put  into  the  field.  The  wealth  of  the 
North  was  boundless,  her  resources  immense.  In  a 
contest  of  endurance  the  South  must  inevitably  be 
beaten.  Her  only  chance  lay  in  striking  some 
staggering  blow  at  her  opponent,  such  as  the  capture 
of  Washington,  or  the  destruction  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  which  would  convince  the  North  that 
the  struggle  was  hopeless,  and  would  force  her  to 
come  to  terms.  To  achieve  this  result  an  offensive 
campaign  was  necessary. 

Secondly :  While  the  recent  events  in  Virginia  had 
been  uniformly  favourable  to  the  Southern  arms,  the 
situation  in  the  Western  theatre  of  war  was  very 
gloomy.  Vicksburg,  the  great  Confederate  fortress 
on  the  Mississippi,  was  closely  besieged  by  the  Federal 

15 


forces  under  General  Grant.  Attempts  to  relieve  it 
from  the  East  by  General  Johnston  and  from  the  trans- 
Mississippi  States  by  Kirby  Smith  had  failed,  and  it 
was  now  evident  that  unless  a  diversion  could  be 
made  Vicksburg  must  fall.  This  might  be  effected 
by  an  invasion  of  Maryland  or  Pennsylvania,  so  as 
to  threaten  Washington  and  Baltimore.  Both  Presi- 
dent Davis  and  General  Lee  knew  well  how  sensitive 
the  Federal  Cabinet  was  in  regard  to  the  safety  of 
the  Capital,  and  a  Confederate  victory  on  Northern 
soil  would  almost  certainly  force  the  President  to 
draw  large  reinforcements  from  the  Western  armies, 
and  so  relieve  the  pressure  on  Vicksburg. 

2.  The  Theatre  of  Operations. 

The  theatre  of  operations  in  the  Eastern  States  may 
be  considered  to  be  bounded  on  the  North  by  the 
River  Susquehanna,  on  the  east  by  Chesapeake  Bay, 
on  the  South  by  the  River  James,  and  on  the  West  by 
the  Shenandoah  and  Tuscarora  Mountains.  In  order 
to  grasp  the  significance  of  the  military  movements, 
four  special  features  of  the  terrain  should  be  carefully 
noted.     These  are  : — 

1.  The  Potomac,  flowing  south-east  and  dividing 
the  strategic  area  into  two  portions. 

2.  The  Shenandoah  Valley,  stretching  along  its 
western  side. 

3.  The  Blue  Ridge  Mountains,  and  their  continuation 
north  into  Maryland. 

4.  The  position  of  Washington,  the  Northern 
Capital. 

The  Potomac,  which  rises  in  the  Alleghanies,  flows 
first  north  and  then  eastwards,  finally  breaking 
through  the  mountains  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  entering 
the  plain  of  Virginia.  Below  this  point  it  is  unford- 
able,  and  constitutes  a  formidable  obstacle  to  the 
passage  of  an  army.     The  Shenandoah  Valley  affords 

16 


admirable  facilities  to  a  force  wishing  to  invade 
Maryland,  or  to  turn  the  flank  of  an  enemy's  army  in 
Northern  Virginia.  This  facility  is  afforded  in  virtue 
of  the  Blue  Ridge,  which  forms  the  eastern  wall  of  the 
Valley,  and  is  impassable  for  troops  except  at  the 
defiles,  or  "  gaps."  Thus  a  small  force  holding  the 
gaps  can  entirely  protect  the  flank  and  rear  of  an 
army  moving  down  the  Valley  until  it  crosses  the 
Potomac,  when  a  similar  protection  is  afforded  by 
South  Mountain.  The  importance  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
situated  at  the  debouchure  of  the  Valley,  is  self- 
evident.  The  town  itself,  which  stands  on  a  bluff 
at  the  junction  of  the  Shenandoah  and  Potomac,  is 
commanded  by  the  surrounding  hills  and  is  inde- 
fensible, but  a  position  had  been  selected  and  fortified 
on  the  Maryland  Heights,  opposite  the  town,  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Potomac.  Sixty  miles  below 
Harper's  Ferry  stands  Washington,  situated  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Potomac,  at  the  point  where  that 
river  broadens  out  and  becomes  a  wide  estuary. 
The  position  of  Washington,  so  close  to  the  scene  of 
hostilities,  was  bound  to  exercise  a  powerful  influence 
on  the  course  of  operations.  The  safety  of  the 
national  capital  was  a  factor,  which  could  never  be 
disregarded  by  the  Federal  commanders ;  and  it  is 
only  by  keeping  this  constantly  in  mind  that  the 
causes  governing  the  movements  of  both  sides  during 
the  campaign  can  be  properly  understood. 

Northern  Virginia,  considered  as  a  whole,  was 
eminently  unsuited  to  military  operations,  the  country 
being  sparsely  populated,  wild  and  wooded,  and  the 
roads  few  and  bad.  Fredericksburg  is  the  only  town 
of  any  importance  between  Richmond  and  Washing- 
ton. It  stands  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock, a  small  stream  which  takes  its  rise  in  the  Blue 
Ridge,  and  flowing  through  a  very  wild  and  thinly 
populated  district,  unites  with  the  Rapidan  a  few  miles 
above  Fredericksburg.  Both  streams  can  be  crossed 
b  17 


at  numerous  points  in  these  parts  of  their  course, 
but  below  the  town  the  Rappahannock  is  tidal  and 
unfordable.  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  are  very 
suitable  for  military  operations,  and  being  as  yet 
untouched  by  war  could  support  a  considerable 
army  living  on  the  country.  Of  the  railways  the 
principal  ones  to  note  are  :  the  line  from  Washington 
to  Gordonsville,  that  from  Richmond  to  Fredericks- 
burg and  Aquia  Creek,  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  which  formed  the  principal  line  of  com- 
munication between  Washington  and  the  West.  The 
only  fortified  towns  in  the  strategic  arena  were  Wash- 
ington, Richmond,  and  Harper's  Ferry.  The  defences 
of  Washington  were  very  formidable  and  required  a 
permanent  garrison  of  over  30,000  men  to  hold  them. 
Those  of  Richmond  consisted  only  of  redoubts  for 
infantry  of  a  semi-permanent  nature,  sufficient  to 
secure  the  city  from  a  sudden  attack  by  a  small 
force. 

The  civil  population  of  Northern  Virginia  was 
devoted  to  the  Confederacy,  that  of  Pennsylvania 
equally  strongly  in  favour  of  the  Union.  In  Maryland 
sentiment  was  divided,  but  on  the  whole  inclined  to 
the  South,  this  feeling  being  strongest  in  the  eastern 
portion  of  the  State,  and  especially  in  Baltimore. 

3.  Organisation  of  the  Union  and  Confederate 

Armies. 

At  the  beginning  of  May,  1863,  the  Northern  armies 
in  Virginia  and  Maryland  were  distributed  as  follows  : 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  effective  strength, 
97,000*,  under  Maj. -General  Hooker,  at  Falmouth,  on 
the  Rappahannock,  opposite  Fredericksburg. 

In  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  The  Eighth  Federal 
Army  Corps,   strength   19,000,    under    Maj. -General 

1  The  nominal  strength  was  111,000. 
18 


Schenck,  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  Winchester,  including 
a  detachment  of  3000  men  at  Frederick  City,  Mary- 
land. 

At  Washington — 36,000  men  under  Maj. -General 
Heintzelmann,  forming  the  permanent  garrison. 

In  the  Yorktown  Peninsula — 20,000  men  under 
Maj. -General  Dix  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  Norfolk. 

In  Western  Virginia — 5000  men  at  Romney  and 
New  Creek. 

Total  Union  forces,  actually  effective,  in  Virginia 
and  Maryland,  approximately,  177,000. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  organised  into  six 
corps  as  follows  : — 


First  Corps 
Second  Corps 
Third  Corps 
Fifth  Corps 
Sixth  Corps 


Maj. -General  Reynolds. 
Maj. -General  Hancock. 
Maj. -General  Sickles. 
Maj. -General  Meade. 
Maj. -General  Sedgwick. 


Eleventh  Corps  . .     Maj. -General  Howard. 

Twelfth  Corps  . .         . .     Maj. -General  Slocum. 

Army  Troops. 

Provost  Guard  . .  Brig. -General  Patrick. 

Engineer  Brigade;  . .  Brig. -General  Benham. 

Reserve  Artillery  . .  Brig.-General  Hunt. 

Cavalry  Corps  : — Maj. -General  Pleasonton. 
First  Division  . .         . .     Brig.-General  Buford. 
Second      „  . .         „  „      Gregg. 

Third        „       . .         . .     Col.  Duffie. 

Each  Corps  was  composed  of  either  two  or  three 
divisions  and  the  divisions  of  two,  three  or  four  brig- 
ades. To  each  Corps  was  attached  an  artillery 
brigade  of  five  batteries.  The  effective  strength  of 
the  different  corps  varied  from  13,000  to  9000  men. 
The  cavalry  divisions  numbered  approximately  4000 
men  each.  The  Reserve  Artillery  was  organised 
into  five  brigades,  of  four  or  five  batteries  each,  a 

19 


total  of  23  batteries  and  110  guns.  Two  brigades  of 
horse  artillery,  each  consisting  of  five  batteries,  a 
total  of  50  guns,  were  attached  to  the  cavalry.  The 
following  is  a  summary  of  the  whole  of  the  artillery 
attached  to  the  army. 


4J-in. 

Rifled  8 

Ordnance 

Smooth  bore 
Ordnance. 


20-pr.  Parrotts.     3-in.       10-pr.  Parrotts.    Total. 

.6     ..     148     ..     60     ..     222 


12-pounders. 

..   136 


6-pounders. 

4      . 


Grand  Total 


140 
362 


The  army  was  based  on  Aquia  Creek  on  the  lower 
Potomac.  All  its  supplies  came  by  water  to  this 
point,  and  thence  by  rail  for  a  distance  of  15  miles 
to  Falmouth,  General  Hooker's  headquarters  on  the 
Rappahannock.1 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  organised  into 
three  Army  Corps  as  under  : — 

First  Corps       . .         . .     Lieut.-Gen.  James  Long- 
street. 
First  Division  . .  . .      Maj  .-General  McLaws. 

Second     „        . .  . .        ,,         „          Pickett. 

Third       „        . .  . .        ,,         ,,         Hood. 


Second  Corps 

First  Division 
Second     „ 
Third       „ 

Third  Corps 

First  Division 
Second     ,, 
Third       ., 


Lieut.-Gen.   Richard     S. 

Ewell. 
Maj. -General  Eodes. 
Early. 
,,         ,,  Johnson. 

Lieut.-Gen.  Ambrose    P. 
Hill. 

Maj. -General  Heth. 
„         „          Anderson. 
.,         „  Pender. 


1  For  details  of  the  organisation  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
see  Appendix  A. 

20 


Cavalry  Division 

.     Maj  .-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart 

First  Brigade   . . 

Brig.-Gen.  Wade  Hampton. 

Second     „ 

,,        ,,     Robertson. 

Third       „ 

„        „     Fitzhugh  Lee. 

Fourth     ,, 

„     W.  H.  F.  Lee. 

Fifth        „ 

„        ,,     Jenkins. 

Sixth        ,, 

,,        ,,     Jones. 

Each  infantry  division  was  organized  into  four 
brigades,  except  those  of  Rodes  and  Anderson,  which 
had  five.  The  average  strength  of  divisions  was 
about  7000  men,  including  the  divisional  artillery 
of  four  batteries.  Two  artillery  battalions  of  four 
batteries  each  constituted  the  Corps  artillery  of  each 
Army  Corps.  There  was  no  general  artillery  reserve. 
Six  horse  artillery  batteries  were  attached  to  the 
cavalry  division.  The  aggregate  effective  strength 
of  the  army  at  the  end  of  May,  1863,  was  80,500  of 
all  arms,  and  257  guns.  It  occupied  a  strongly 
fortified  position  about  six  miles  long,  on  a  range 
of  hills  behind  the  town  of  Fredericksburg,  with 
cavalry  piquets  watching  the  river  both  above  and 
below.  Richmond,  fifty  miles  to  the  south,  formed 
its  base,  supplies  being  brought  up  by  the  Fredericks- 
burg and  Richmond  Railroad.  A  considerable 
amount  of  supplies  was  also  drawn  from  the  fertile 
Shenandoah  Valley.1 

A  small  Confederate  cavalry  force  under  General 
Imboden,  about  2000  strong,  was  operating  in  the 
mountains  of  Western  Virginia.  With  this  exception 
the  whole  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  field,  north 
of  the  James,  were  represented  by  the  army  com- 
manded by  General  Lee.  The  defences  of  Richmond 
were  manned  by  the  town  militia  and  five  brigades  of 
enlisted  troops,  viz.  those  of  Cooke,  Ransom,  Jenkins, 
Wise,  and  Corse. 


1  For  details  of  organisation  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
see  Appendix  A. 

21 


4.  Character  of  the  American  Armies. 

A  few  remarks  on  the  composition  and  character 
of  the  American  armies  may  be  useful  to  those 
unacquainted  with  the  previous  history  of  the  war. 

The  forces  on  both  sides  were  raised  almost  entirely 
by  voluntary  enlistment.1  The  type  of  recruit 
obtained  was  excellent,  and  the  quality  of  the  Union 
and  Confederate  troops  was  at  this  period  of  the  war 
very  high  indeed.  On  the  Union  side  two  years  of 
strenuous  fighting  had  weeded  out  all  those  whose 
hearts  were  not  in  the  business  ;  and  the  subsequent 
feelings  of  disgust  and  weariness  of  the  war,  for  which 
the  dreadful  slaughter  of  Grant's  '64  Campaign  was 
chiefly  responsible,  had  not  yet  supervened  to  choke 
the  steady  supply  of  recruits,  required  to  make  good 
the  enormous  wastage  of  the  armies  at  the  front. 
Later  on  this  supply  dried  up  ;  and  the  many  incidents 
at  the  siege  of  Petersburg,  which  disgraced  the  previous 
proud  record  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  were  the 
direct  result  of  the  large  infusion  of  an  inferior  foreign 
element  into  that  of  native-born  Americans,  who 
at  this  period  constituted  the  bulk  of  the  men  in 
the  ranks.2  It  may  be  said  therefore  that  in  the 
year  1863  the  Union  armies  generally  were  at  a  higher 
pitch  of  excellence  than  at  any  other  period  of  the 
war.  The  same  is  true  of  their  opponents.  Never 
before  or  after  had  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
such  perfect  confidence  of  ultimate  victory  as  at  the 
opening  of  this  campaign.  In  fighting  qualities  there 
was  little  to  choose  between  the  soldiers  on  either  side. 
The  Confederate  infantry  certainly  showed  greater 

1  A  Conscription  Act  was  passed  by  the  Confederate  Govern- 
ment in  the  early  days  of  the  war,  but  its  provisions  were  not 
strictly  enforced.  Conscription  was  not  resorted  to  in  the  North 
until  1864. 

2  An  exception  must  be  made  in  favour  of  the  Irish,  who  were 
universally  acknowledged  to  be  second  to  none  in  the  Union 
armies. 

22 


klan  in  the  attack ;  the  fury  of  their  charges 
was  extraordinary,  and  may  well  bear  comparison 
with  that  of  the  French  infantry  under  Napoleon. 
But  on  the  defensive  the  Union  troops  showed  a 
stubborn  determination  equally  great,  combined  with 
a  capacity  to  recover  quickly  from  even  the  most 
signal  disasters,  which  more  than  once  surprised  and 
disconcerted  their  opponents.  The  intelligence  of 
the  rank  and  file  was  very  high,  and  the  readiness 
with  which  the  men  appreciated  and  adopted  the 
methods  of  fighting  most  suited  to  the  country,  proved 
a  cause  of  surprise  to  many  foreign  critics.  The 
infantry  were  armed  with  a  long-ranging  muzzle- 
loaded  rifle,  and  bayonet.  Regiments  usually  went 
into  action  in  two  fines,  with  a  third  line  of  skirmishers 
thrown  out  in  front.  At  decisive  range  the  skir- 
mishers withdrew  to  the  flanks,  and  took  part  in  the 
charge.  Fire  discipline  was  generally  indifferent. 
Bayonets  were  seldom  fixed,  for  fire  action  alone 
nearly  always  decided  the  issue  of  an  attack.  The 
artillery  on  both  sides  was  excellent  as  regards  the 
personnel,  but  the  Federals  had  a  great  advantage 
in  equipment ;  while  as  regards  the  transport  and 
supply  services  of  the  army,  the  Confederates  were 
deplorably  deficient.  As  regards  the  cavalry,  great 
improvement  had  been  made  in  this  branch  of  the 
Federal  army  since  the  early  days  of  the  war.  The 
men  had  had  time  to  learn  their  work,  and  junior 
officers,  with  real  aptitude  for  this  arm  of  the  service, 
were  beginning  to  come  to  the  front.  The  Confederate 
cavalry,  commanded  by  Stuart,  formed  an  admirable 
force,  and  their  leader's  name  is  of  course  world- 
famous.  The  cavalry  on  both  sides  were  armed  with 
carbine  and  sabre.  Dismounted  fire-action  was  very 
frequently  employed,  and  in  this  work  the  American 
troopers  excelled  ;  but  they  were  also  trained  in  shock 
action,  and  showed  on  numerous  occasions  that  they 
could  charge  home,  when  called  upon  to  do  so. 

23 


Discipline,  judged  by  European  standards,  was  lax. 
As  a  rule,  officers  of  tried  capacity,  who  had  won  the 
confidence  of  their  men,  found  it  easy  to  enforce 
discipline,  whereas  incapable  or  unlucky  commanders 
found  the  task  correspondingly  difficult.  The  chief 
evil,  that  resulted  from  this  slackness  of  discipline, 
was  straggling.  This  sometimes  reached  enormous 
proportions,  and  nothing  proved  adequate  to  stop 
it.  It  is  only  fair  to  say,  however,  that  at  this  period 
of  the  war  such  straggling  occurred  almost  entirely 
on  the  line  of  march ;  in  the  actual  presence  of  the 
enemy,  no  troops  in  the  world  behaved  better. 

Among  the  junior  ranks  of  the  officers  there  was 
little  to  choose  between  either  side.  The  incapable 
had  been  weeded  out  long  ago,and  those  that  remained 
proved,  with  very  few  exceptions,  capable,  intelligent, 
and  devoted  to  their  duty.  In  the  higher  ranks  the 
balance  of  talent  was  distinctly  on  the  side  of  the 
Confederacy.  Among  the  Corps  Commanders  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  there  were  able  men  and  stub- 
born fighters,  but  none  whose  talents  or  reputation 
could  compare  with  those  of  Stuart,  Longstreet,  Hill, 
or  Ewell.  General  Lee's  character  is  too  well-known 
to  require  any  description.  He  was  at  this  moment 
at  the  crowning  point  of  his  military  career.  His 
opponent,  General  Joseph  Hooker,  possessed  courage, 
determination,  and  sound  military  judgment ;  he 
was  in  addition  a  popular  hero,  known  to  the  Northern 
public  as  "  Fighting  Joe "  Hooker.  As  a  Corps 
Commander  he  won  golden  opinions  ;  but  more  than 
this  was  needed  to  overcome  his  great  opponent,  and 
in  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  Hooker  had  miser- 
ably failed  to  justify  the  high  hopes  reposed  in  him 
by  the  army  and  the  country.1 

1  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  composition,  character  and 
training  of  the  American  armies  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
admirable  description  given  in  Henderson's  "  Campaign  of 
Fredericksburg,"  from  which  the  above  summary  is  largely  taken. 

24 


5.  The  Confederate  Plan  of  Campaign. 

It  must  be  acknowledged  that  in  determining  to 
assume  the  offensive,  General  Lee  had  undertaken 
a  very  formidable  task.  His  own  army,  augmented 
to  the  utmost,  was  barely  80,000  strong,  and  he  had 
opposed  to  him  double  that  number,  backed  by  the 
vast  resources  of  the  North  in  men  and  money.  Lee 
had  behind  him  an  impoverished  country  and  a 
bankrupt  Government.  Yet  there  were  many  factors 
in  his  favour.  The  disparity  of  force  was  more 
apparent  than  real.  The  Federal  forces  were  dis- 
persed into  isolated  bodies,  separated  by  long  distances, 
and  were  acting  independently  of  one  another  without 
reference  to  a  general  plan.  The  several  generals 
were  responsible  for  their  actions  to  the  General- 
in-Chief  at  Washington  and  to  him  alone.  The 
Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  by  far  the 
largest  and  most  important  force  in  the  field,  had  no 
power  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  armies  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  or  in  the  Peninsula,  so  as  to  assist 
his  own  operations.  This  evil  system  had  been  rich 
with  disaster  in  the  past,  and  was  destined  to  lead  to 
further  calamities  in  the  future.  The  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  temporarily  disorganised  by  its  recent 
defeat  at  Chancellorsville,  and  its  commander  was 
distrusted  by  his  troops  and  disliked  by  the  Govern- 
ment. Finally  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was 
filled  with  supreme  confidence  in  its  powers,  and  of 
contempt  for  an  enemy  who  had  been  so  disgracefully 
beaten,  while  Lee's  own  matchless  genius  was  a  factor 
worth  many  thousands  of  bayonets  to  the  army  which 
he  commanded. 

To  dislodge  Hooker  from  his  position  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock was  a  difficult  task.  A  frontal  attack  was 
out  of  the  question,  and  his  lines  of  communication, 
running  to  Aquia  Creek,  only  15  miles  away,  were 
unassailable.  Two  things  only  could  move  him,  a 
threat  against  Washington  or  an  invasion  of  Pennsyl- 

25 


vania.  In  order  to  effect  either,  it  would  be  necessary 
for  Lee  first  to  disengage  his  army  from  that  of 
Hooker,  and  then  to  throw  it  across  the  Potomac 
before  his  opponent  could  have  time  to  grasp  the 
meaning  of  the  movement.  The  easiest  route  from 
Fredericksburg  to  Maryland  under  the  circumstances 
was  by  way  of  Culpepper  Court  House,  Chester  Gap, 
and  thence  down  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  By  this 
route  his  march  would  be  screened,  first  by  the  Rappa- 
hannock, and  then  by  the  Blue  Ridge.  If,  however, 
his  opponent  ascertained  early  what  was  in  the  wind, 
he  could,  by  rapid  marching,  reach  Harper's  Ferry 
by  way  of  Warrenton  and  Centreville  before  his 
opponent,  for  whereas  Lee's  route  formed  the  arc  of 
a  circle,  Hooker  would  be  marching  along  the  chord. 
Moreover  by  moving  towards  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
Lee  would  necessarily  have  to  uncover  the  direct 
route  to  Richmond,  and  a  rapid  march  by  Hooker 
on  the  Confederate  Capital  would  automatically 
force  Lee  to  abandon  his  plans  and  fall  back  to  protect 
his  communications.  On  the  other  hand  if  Lee  were 
to  succeed  in  placing  his  army  across  the  Potomac 
in  a  position  to  threaten  Washington  before  Hooker 
could  make  up  his  mind  to  move,  then  it  was  morally 
certain  that  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  would  force 
the  Federal  Commander  to  retreat  to  the  defence  of 
the  Capital,  although  not  a  single  man  might  be 
standing  between  his  army  and  Richmond. 


25 


CHAPTER  II. 

FROM  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK  TO  THE 
POTOMAC. 

1.  Opening  Movements  of  the  Campaign. 

The  plan  by  which  General  Lee  proposed  to  disengage 
his  army  from  that  of  Hooker  and  to  throw  it  north  of 
the  Potomac  was  as  follows  :  The  Corps  of  Long- 
street  and  Ewell  were  to  march  from  their  lines  on 
the  Rapidan  and  Rappahannock  to  Culpepper  Court 
House,  and  thence  towards  Chester  Gap  in  the  Blue 
Ridge,  their  right  flank  being  covered  during  this 
movement  by  the  cavalry  force  under  General 
Stuart.  The  Corps  of  A.  P.  Hill  was  to  hold  the 
fortified  lines  on  the  hills  behind  Fredericksburg, 
concealing  as  far  as  possible  the  departure  of  the 
remainder  of  the  army,  until  such  time  as  the  move- 
ment should  be  fully  developed.  It  was  then  to 
follow  in  the  track  of  the  other  Corps. 

On  June  3,  the  first  move  of  the  campaign  was 
made.  McLaws'  division  of  Longstreet's  Corps 
received  orders  to  march  from  Fredericksburg  to  Cul- 
pepper, and  Hood's  division  on  the  Rapidan  was 
given  the  same  direction.  At  the  same  time  Jenkins' 
cavalry  brigade  moved  forward  from  Brandy  Station 
towards  the  Shenandoah  Valley  as  an  advance  guard. 
Imboden's  brigade,  which  was  then  at  Staunton,  110 
miles  up  the  Valley  from  Harper's  Ferry,  was  ordered 
towards  Romney,  a  village  among  the  mountains 
north-west  of  Winchester,  with  instructions  to  break 

27 


up  the  communications  between  that  place  and  the 
west.  On  June  4,  Ewell's  Corps  began  to  follow 
Longstreet   towards   Culpepper.1 

The  Federal  piquets  were  not  slow  to  notice  that  a 
movement  of  some  sort  was  in  progress  in  the  enemy's 
lines,  and  at  once  reported  this  information  to 
Hooker.  With  the  object  of  ascertaining  if  Lee's 
army  was  still  in  position  behind  Fredericksburg, 
Hooker  directed  Sedgwick  to  throw  a  pontoon  bridge 
across  the  river  below  the  town,  and  send  a  force  across 
to  attack  the  heights.  On  June  6,  Howe's  division 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  crossed  the  bridges  and  began  to 
feel  the  Confederate  position.  Some  sharp  skirm- 
ishing took  place,  the  lines  seemed  to  be  strongly 
held,  and  Sedgwick  reported  to  Hooker  that  the  enemy 
was  still  there  in  force.  Yet  so  delicate  was  the 
operation  on  which  the  Confederate  Commander  was 
now  engaged,  that  Sedgwick's  slight  demonstration 
was  sufficient  to  cause  a  check  to  the  whole  move- 
ment. The  Corps  of  Longstreet  and  Ewell  were  both 
halted,  and  held  in  readiness  to  move  back,  if  Hooker 
developed  a  serious  attack.  Then,  when  Sedgwick's 
crossing  was  seen  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  reconnais- 
sance only,  the  movement  was  resumed,  both  Corps 
reaching  Culpepper  on  June  8.  At  this  point  was 
concentrated  the  cavalry  force  under  General  Stuart, 
numbering  about  11,000  sabres,  ready  to  cross  the 
Rappahannock,  and  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  army 
in  its  further  advance  towards  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
The  presence  of  this  large  body  of  hostile  cavalry 
at  Culpepper,  swelled  as  it  was  by  rumour  to  far 
more  than  its  actual  strength,2  caused  Hooker  much 
uneasiness.  He  believed  that  Stuart  was  preparing 
to  make  a  raid  on  his  communications,  similar  to  that 


1  Lee's  report. 

2  See  Hooker  to  Halleck,  June  5,  in  which  he  reports  that  his 
cavalry  estimate  Stuart's  strength  at  20,000. 

28 


which  he  had  carried  out  against  McClellan  in  the 
Peninsular  Campaign  of  1862.1  He  therefore  deter- 
mined to  clear  up  the  uncertainty  by  striking  the  first 
blow  himself,  and  on  June  7  ordered  General  Pleas- 
onton,  in  command  of  the  Federal  cavalry,  to  cross 
the  Rappahannock,  attack  Stuart,  and  gather  all 
the  information  possible  as  to  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  in  that  quarter. 

2.  Cavalry  Engagement  at  Brandy  Station. 

Pleasonton's  force  was  concentrated  at  Warrenton 
Junction,  watching  Hooker's  right  flank,  and  con- 
sisted of  three  very  weak  divisions  under  Buford, 
Duffle,  and  Gregg,  numbering  all  told  about  7500 
sabres  with  six  batteries  of  horse-artillery.  His  com- 
mand had  been  strengthened  by  the  addition  of  two 
infantry  brigades,  under  Ames  and  Russell,  from  the 
Sixth  Corps.  He  decided  to  divide  his  force  into  two 
portions,  Buford  and  Ames  to  cross  the  Rappahannock 
at  Beverly  Ford,  Gregg,  Duffle  and  Russell  at  Kelly's 
Ford,  seven  miles  below  Both  columns  were  then 
to  move  on  Brandy  Station,  where  they  would  unite, 
and  the  whole  was  then  to  advance  on  Culpepper. 

On  the  night  of  June  8,  both  columns  moved  quietly 
down  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  opposite 
their  respective  crossing  points,  and  waited  for 
daylight.  On  the  Confederate  side  there  seems  to 
have  been  no  anticipation  of  an  attack.  The  brigades 
of  Hampton,  W.  H.  F.  Lee  and  Robertson  were 
camped  at  Brandy  Station,  Jones'  brigade  was 
watching  Beverly  Ford,  and  Fitzhugh  Lee  was  higher 
up  the  river.  At  dawn  on  June  9,  Buford  pushed 
across  the  ford,  surprised  the  Confederate  piquets, 
which  cannot  have  been  very  vigilant,  and  burst 
into  Jones'  camp,  scattering  the  Confederate  cavalry, 
and  capturing  a  number  of  important  despatches. 

1  See  Hooker  to  Halleck,  June  5. 
29 


Leaving  Ames  to  hold  the  ford,  Buford  pushed  on, 
driving  Jones'  brigade  before  him  in  disorder  as  far 
as  St.  James'  Church,  a  short  distance  from  Brandy 
Station.  Here  Jones  succeeded  in  rallying  his  com- 
mand and  making  some  sort  of  a  stand.  In  a  short 
time  assistance  reached  him,  Stuart  in  person  hast- 
ening up  with  the  brigades  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee  and 
Hampton  to  his  support.  Stuart's  batteries  were 
most  judiciously  placed,  and  in  spite  of  the  most 
determined  efforts  on  Buford's  part,  the  enemy's 
further  advance  on  this  side  was  checked.  In  the 
meantime  Gregg  had  crossed  at  Kelly's  Ford  un- 
opposed, and  had  advanced  on  Stevensburg,  detaching 
Duffie  to  watch  his  left  flank.  He  had  not  gone 
far  before  he  came  in  contact  with  Robertson's 
Confederate  brigade,  sent  by  Stuart  to  secure  Kelly's 
Ford.  Gregg  was  pressing  him  slowly  back  towards 
Stevensburg,  when  the  heavy  firing  from  the  direc- 
tion of  Brandy  Station  warned  him  that  Buford  was 
hotly  engaged.  Sending  word  to  Dufhe  to  follow 
him,  Gregg  moved  rapidly  by  his  right  flank  on 
Brandy  Station,  to  effect  the  pre-arranged  junction 
with  the  other  column.  He  met  with  no  opposition 
until  he  was  approaching  Fleetwood  Hill,  which 
overlooks  Brandy ;  but  here  a  section  of  artillery  had 
been  posted  by  Stuart,  which,  although  quite  unsup- 
ported, opened  fire  in  the  most  plucky  manner. 
Stuart  had  already  ordered  up  Fitzhugh  Lee's  brigade 
to  strike  Buford  in  flank,  and  now,  leaving  W.  H.  F. 
Lee  to  hold  him  in  front,  he  hurried  with  Jones  and 
Hampton  to  meet  Gregg.  The  leading  regiment  of 
Jones'  brigade  reached  Fleetwood  Hill  barely  fifty 
yards  ahead  of  the  enemy.  Without  halting  to  dress 
their  lines,  the  Confederate  cavalry  advanced  to  the 
charge,  and  flung  their  opponents  back.  The  Federals 
rallied  and  returned  to  the  attack,  and  a  desperate 
hand-to-hand  struggle  ensued  for  the  possession  of 
the  hill.     The  arrival  of  Hampton's  brigade  decided 

30 


the  issue.  A  vigorous  charge  by  this  fresh  body  of 
cavalry  routed  the  already  wavering  Federals,  who 
were  driven  entirely  from  the  field  with  a  loss  of  three 
guns,  three  hundred  prisoners,  and  several  colours. 
At  this  moment  Buford  renewed  his  attack  from  St. 
James'  Church,  but  W.  H.  F.  Lee  kept  him  in  check 
by  repeated  charges,  until  Stuart,  having  disposed 
of  Gregg,  was  able  to  come  to  his  relief .  Fitzhugh  Lee 
was  now  threatening  Buford's  right  flank,  and  the 
latter,  realizing  that  his  attempted  combination  had 
failed,  determined  to  fall  back  on  Beverly  Ford. 
In  the  meantime  Gregg,  having  been  joined  by  Duffle, 
was  thankful  to  be  able  to  effect  his  retreat  to  Kelly's 
Ford  unmolested.  The  whole  of  Pleasonton's  force 
then  fell  back  across  the  Rappahannock,  covered 
by  the  infantry,  the  Confederates  making  no  attempt 
to  harass  them  in  their  retirement.  The  action  had 
lasted,  off  and  on,  all  day.  The  Federals  lost  three 
guns,  484  killed  and  wounded  and  382  missing,  a 
total  of  866  casualties.  Stuart's  loss  was  301  killed 
and  wounded,  and  184  missing,  among  the  wounded 
being  W.  H.  F.  Lee.1  The  general  result  of  the 
engagement  was  a  Confederate  victory.  The  pre- 
liminary advantage  won  by  the  Federal  Cavalry  over 
Jones'  brigade  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by 
the  severe  punishment  inflicted  on  Gregg's  division  by 
Stuart.  In  his  plan  of  attack  Pleasonton  committed 
the  common  error  of  selecting  for  the  junction 
of  his  two  detachments  a  point  which  was  in  the 
immediate  presence  of  the  enemy.  What  actually 
happened  was  that  this  point  was  found  to  be  occupied 
by  the  Confederates  ;  Gregg  and  Buford  were  unable 
to  make  their  junction,  and  Stuart,  from  his  central 
position,  was  able  first  to  check  Buford,  and  then 

1  The  command  of  his  brigade  passed  to  Colonel  Chambliss. 
See  Stuart's  report,  "  Official  Records,"  Vol.  27,  No.  565,  for 
details  of  this  action.  Also  Pleasonton,  ibid.,  and  Henderson, 
"  The  Science  of  War." 

31 


turn  upon  Gregg.  No  use  was  made  of  the  Federal 
infantry  beyond  guarding  the  fords,  a  serious  error, 
as  the  presence  of  these  troops  would  probably 
have  turned  the  scale  in  favour  of  the  Union  Cavalry. 

3.  Operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.1 

The  despatches  which  Pleasonton  had  captured  in 
this  foray  across  the  Rappahannock  proved  beyond 
doubt  that  an  important  movement  of  some  kind 
was  in  contemplation  by  the  enemy,  but  its  exact 
nature  was  still  uncertain.  Hooker  moved  the 
Third  Corps  up  to  Rappahannock  Station  to  dispute 
any  attempt  at  a  crossing  at  that  point,  and  requested 
permission  from  Washington  to  move  with  all  the 
rest  of  his  force  across  the  river,  and  attack  Lee's 
communications  with  Richmond.2  But  in  the  mean- 
time the  latter  was  acting.  The  tentative  nature 
of  his  first  moves  was  due  to  the  necessity  of  watching 
closely  to  see  what  his  opponent  would  do  in  reply. 
Now  that  his  operations  were  fairly  launched  the 
faster  they  moved  the  better,  and  on  June  10  Ewell 
received  orders  to  march  with  all  possible  speed  into 
the  Valley,  and  fall  upon  the  enemy's  force  holding 
Winchester. 

The  Federal  troops  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  were 
disposed  thus.  At  Harper's  Ferry  were  6300  men 
under  Brig. -General  Kelley  and  a  detachment  of 
3000  men  and  six  guns  under  Colonel  Tyler  at  Martins- 
burg.  At  Winchester  was  Maj. -General  Milroy 
with  a  force  of  about  7000  effective  men,  including 


1  The  best  authority  on  the  operations  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  is  afforded  by  the  record  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  on  the 
Evacuation  of  Winchester,  in  which  every  detail  is  clearly  eluci- 
dated. Doubleday  gives  a  good  account  from  the  Northern  stand- 
point. 

2  Hooker  to  Halleck,  June  10. 

32 


a  brigade  under  Colonel  McRennolds  posted  at  Berry- 
ville.  The  whole  was  under  Maj  .-General  Schenck, 
commanding  the  Eighth  Army  Corps,  under  whom 
were  also  the  forces,  about  5000  strong,  at  Romney 
and  New  Creek  in  Western  Virginia.  Since  its 
evacuation  by  Jackson  in  November,  1862,  Winches- 
ter had  been  occupied  by  the  Federals,  who  had 
fortified  it  by  a  ring  of  redoubts,  built  on  the  hills 
that  encircle  the  town.  The  country  round  Winches- 
ter forms  one  of  the  most  fertile  portions  of  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  and  the  occupation  of  the 
town  by  the  Federals  had  the  effect  of  depriving  the 
enemy  of  the  rich  resources  of  the  district  for  the 
supply  of  their  armies  in  Virginia.  Nevertheless 
Milroy's  position  was  strategically  unsound.  He 
was  too  far  off  to  receive  effective  support  from  Kelley 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  his  small  force  was  liable  to  be 
overwhelmed  by  superior  numbers.  This  fact  was 
clearly  seen  by  General  Halleck,  who  was  personally 
strongly  averse  to  the  retention  of  Winchester.  In 
a  series  of  despatches  and  telegrams  to  General 
Schenck  between  January  and  June,  he  repeatedly 
urged  the  latter  to  keep  his  troops  well  closed  up,  to 
expose  no  large  force  in  advanced  positions,  where 
it  was  liable  to  be  cut  off,  and  particularly  to 
leave  nothing  but  a  small  observing  post  at  Winches- 
ter.1 However,  General  Schenck  saw  fit  to  disregard 
these  instructions,  being  influenced  in  this  course  of 
action  partly  by  reluctance  to  abandon  a  position  upon 
which  much  money  and  labour  had  been  expended 

1  Halleck  to  Schenck,  June  11  : — "  Harper's  Ferry  is  the  im- 
portant place.  Winchester  is  of  no  importance  except  as  a 
look-out.  The  Winchester  troops,  excepting  enough  to  serve  as 
an  out-post,  should  be  withdrawn  to  Harper's  Ferry." 

Do.,  do.,  June  14  : — "  If  you  have  not  executed  my  orders  to 
concentrate  at  Harper's  Ferry,  you  will  do  so  immediately. 
Unless  there  is  a  more  prompt  obedience  of  orders,  there  must 
be  a  change  in  the  commanders.     See  to  this  immediately." 

c  33 


in  fortifying  it,  and  partly  by  the  repeated  assur- 
ance of  General  Milroy  that  he  could  hold  the  town 
against  any  force  which  the  enemy  was  likely  to  bring 
against  him.1  A  cavalry  raid  by  Stuart  or  Imboden 
was  the  most  that  Milroy  considered  he  had  to  fear. 
The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  did  not  enter  into  his 
calculations.  Winchester  was  in  telegraphic  com- 
munication with  Falmouth  by  way  of  Washington, 
and  it  seemed  impossible  to  suppose  that  Lee  could 
detach  any  large  force  towards  the  Valley  without 
its  departure  becoming  known  to  Hooker  in  ample 
time  for  the  later  to  send  warning  to  Milroy.  Never- 
theless this  was  the  thunder-bolt  that  was  about  to 
burst  upon  the  unsuspecting  Union  forces. 

The  task  before  Ewell  was  a  somewhat  difficult 
one.  A  direct  advance  upon  Winchester  would 
indeed  give  the  town  into  his  hands,  for  Milroy 's 
small  force  could  not  hold  it  against  his  entire  corps 
of  22,000  men.  But  the  latter,  after  evacuating 
Winchester,  would  probably  fall  back  on  Kelley  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  united  Federal  forces,  16,000 
strong,  would  be  able  to  oppose  a  formidable  barrier 
to  any  attempt  to  cross  the  Potomac.  Ewell  there- 
fore determined  to  intercept  Milroy 's  retreat  to 
Harper's  Ferry,  pen  him  into  Winchester,  and  destroy 
him  there.  On  June  12th,  the  head  of  his  corps, 
preceded  by  Jenkins'  cavalry,  passed  through  Chester 
Gap  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  reached  Front 
Royal  by  evening.  On  the  morning  of  the  13th, 
Ewell  ordered  Rodes  and  Jenkins  to  march  north, 
and  cut  the  enemy's  communications  with  Harper's 
Ferry.  Jenkins  encountered  McRennolds'  Brigade 
at  Berry ville  about  noon,  and  after  a  sharp  engage- 
ment  the   Federals   withdrew   towards   Winchester. 


1  See  Milroy  to  Schenck,  June  11  : — "I  have  the  place  well 
fortified,  and  am  well  prepared  to  hold  it.  .  .  .  against  any 
force  the  rebels  can  afford  to  bring  against  me." 

34 


MeaDwhile  Rodes  was  pressing  forward  down  the 
Valley.  On  the  afternoon  of  June  14  he  appeared 
before  Martinsburg,  and  attacked  the  garrison  of 
3000  men  under  Colonel  Tyler.  The  engagement 
lasted  till  dusk,  when  the  Federal  commander 
succeeded  in  effecting  his  retreat  across  the  Potomac 
at  Shepherdstown,  and  marching  down  the  left  bank 
of  the  river  joined  Kelley's  division  at  Harper's 
Ferry.  His  artillery,  however,  was  less  fortunate. 
In  an  endeavour  to  escape  north  along  the  road 
to  Williamsport  it  was  vigorously  pursued,  and 
five  out  of  the  six  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Confederates. 

It  can  hardly  be  believed  that  on  the  morning  of 
June  13,  General  Milroy  was  still  in  ignorance  of  the 
fact  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  left  its 
lines  on  the  Rappahannock  !  Yet  such  was  the  fact. 
On  June  12,  he  had  sent  out  strong  patrols  along  the 
Strasburg  and  Front  Royal  roads.  The  former  found 
nothing  beyond  a  few  outposts.  The  latter  encoun- 
tered Ewell's  advance-guard,  and  on  its  return  to 
Winchester,  about  3  p.m.,  reported  the  presence  of  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and  cavalry  on  the 
Front  Royal  road.  This  was  significant  enough. 
But  so  firmly  convinced  was  Milroy  that  he  could  not 
be  attacked  by  Lee's  army  without  receiving  due 
notice  of  its  approach,  that  he  disregarded  this 
report,  considering  it  inaccurate  or  exaggerated.1 
He  still  clung  obstinately  to  his  belief  that  he  had 
only  to  deal  with  Imboden,  or  possibly  a  cavalry 
raid  by  Stuart.  On  June  13  Ewell,  with  the  divisions 
of  Johnson  and  Early,  moved  from  Front  Royal 
direct  on  Winchester.  Some  skirmishing  occurred 
with  the  Federal  patrols,  but  darkness  intervened, 
and  Ewell  determined  to  defer  his  attack  till  the 
following    day,    when    his    dispositions    would    be 

1  See  Milroy's  report,  "  Official  Records,"  Vol.  27,  No.  383. 

35 


complete.  Johnson  was  ordered  to  form  his  division 
facing  the  redoubts  on  the  south-east  side  of  the  town, 
while  Early  was  directed  to  march  round  behind  the 
cover  of  the  hills  to  the  north-east,  and  deliver  his 
attack  when  the  enemy  should  be  engaged  with  John- 
son.1 The  skirmish  on  the  13th  had  one  important 
result.  From  a  captured  prisoner  Milroy  learnt  the 
startling  news  that  the  troops  in  front  of  him  were  not 
cavalry  merely,  but  EwelTs  army  corps,  and  that 
Longstreet  was  not  far  behind.  The  statement 
received  confirmation  when  late  that  night  McRen- 
nold's  brigade  marched  in,  tired  and  foot-sore,  having 
covered  30  miles  since  mid-day.  He  reported  that 
a  large  force  of  infantry  was  now  in  rear  of  Winchester, 
between  the  Federals  and  Harper's  Ferry.  Milroy 's 
true  position,  thus  suddenly  revealed,  was  extremely 
critical.  He  was  vastly  outnumbered  and  almost 
surrounded.  Why  then  did  he  not  retreat,  while 
there  was  still  time  to  do  so  ?  The  explanation  is 
that  Milroy  still  could  not  bring  himself  to  realise 
that  Lee  had  stolen  a  march  of  five  days  over  his 
opponent,  and  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  still 
in  its  old  lines  on  the  Rappahannock.  A  forced 
march  to  Harper's  Ferry  would  necessarily  involve 
the  abandonment  of  his  sick,  stores,  and  artillery; 
and  this  he  considered  too  great  a  sacrifice.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  he  could  hold  out  at  Winchester  for 
twenty-four  hours,  he  confidently  believed  that 
Hooker  would  by  then  be  up  to  his  relief .  He  there- 
fore determined  to  hold  the  town,  and  his  troops  made 
hurried  preparations  for  the  inevitable  attack  on  the 
morrow.2 


1  See  Ewell's  report,  "  Official  Kecords." 

2  Milroy 's  report : — "  I  still  hoped  that  there  had  been  some 
corresponding  action  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  if 
I  could  sustain  myself  for  twenty-four  hours  I  would  be 
relieved." 

36 


4.  Defeat  of  Milroy. 

At  daylight  on  June  14,  Johnson  opened  the 
attack.  After  some  stubborn  fighting  his  troops 
effected  a  lodgment  in  the  suburbs,  but  the  fire  of  the 
redoubts  compelled  them  to  relinquish  what  advan- 
tage they  had  gained.  But  Johnson's  movements 
were  only  a  feint.  The  real  attack  was  about  to  come 
from  a  very  different  direction.  On  a  ridge  to  the 
west  of  the  town,  outside  the  ring  of  forts,  a  fine  of 
earthworks  had  been  thrown  up  by  the  garrison  to 
command  the  Romney  road.  This  was  held  by  two 
regiments  of  infantry  and  a  field  battery.  A  patrol, 
sent  out  by  Milroy  in  the  early  morning,  reported 
on  its  return  that  no  enemy  was  in  sight  to  the  west, 
and  in  consequence  the  troops  holding  the  fine  of 
earthworks  had  no  suspicion  of  the  presence  of  a 
hostile  force.  Suddenly,  about  2  p.m.,  out  of  the 
woods  in  their  front,  a  masked  battery  opened  on 
the  works  with  deadly  effect.  For  nearly  an  hour 
the  bombardment  was  continued  with  such  force  and 
accuracy  that  the  Federal  infantry  were  unable  to 
raise  their  heads  above  the  parapets.  Under  cover 
of  this  fire  a  Confederate  column,  advancing  with  a 
loud  yell,  carried  the  entrenchments  with  a  rush, 
driving  the  defenders  headlong  back  on  the  main 
forts.  It  was  Early's  division,  which  had  marched 
round  the  town  under  cover  of  the  hills,  and  had 
quietly  deployed  for  the  assault  without  awakening 
a  suspicion  of  its  presence  in  the  minds  of  the  garrison. 
A  fierce  artillery  duel  was  maintained  between  the 
forts  and  the  Confederate  batteries  until  night 
put  an  end  to  the  action,  but  no  further  attack  was 
made  by  the  infantry.  Ewell  had  gained  his  end. 
The  Federal  army  was  now  shut  in  on  all  sides  except 
the  north,  and  as  darkness  fell  Johnson  closed  Milroy 's 
last  avenue  of  escape  by  placing  three  brigades  across 
the  road  to  Charlestown. 

During  the  night  Milroy  summoned  his  officers  to  a 

37 


hasty  council  of  war.  The  situation  seemed  desperate. 
The  redoubts  indeed  were  intact,  and  so  long  as  they 
were  held,  the  town  could  still  be  defended,  but  a 
prolonged  resistance  was  impossible,  for  there  was 
not  more  than  one  day's  supply  of  rations  for  the 
troops.  Not  a  sign  was  to  be  seen  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  or  of  any  other  succour  for  the  hard- 
pressed  garrison.  Only  one  other  course  remained 
— to  abandon  sick,  stores,  and  guns,  and  endeavour 
to  cut  a  way  through  the  enemy  to  Harper's  Ferry. 
This  Milroy  resolved  to  attempt.  During  the  night 
the  guns  were  spiked,  the  ammunition  thrown  into 
the  wells,  and  the  public  property  destroyed  as  far 
as  possible  without  noise.  The  redoubts  were  silently 
evacuated,  and  the  troops  formed  up  for  the  march. 
On  June  15,  at  2  a.m.,  the  column  filed  quietly  out  of 
the  town,  and  took  the  Charlestown  road.  Four 
miles  out  the  advance-guard  struck  Johnson's  division, 
drawn  up  across  the  turnpike.  Milroy  deployed  his 
troops  for  the  attack,  and  the  men,  knowing  the 
desperate  position  that  they  were  in,  and  that  all 
depended  on  their  overcoming  the  force  in  their 
front,  advanced  with  resolution  against  the  Confeder- 
ate line.  Some  of  Johnson's  troops  gave  way,  but 
his  reserve  soon  restored  the  battle,  and  the  Federals, 
dispirited  and  disheartened,  broke  up  in  disorder. 
Ewell  had  already  discovered  the  retreat,  the  informa- 
tion being  conveyed  to  him  no  doubt  by  the  civil 
population,  who  were  wild  with  exultation  at  the 
disaster  that  had  befallen  the  invaders.  Milroy 's 
horse  was  shot  beneath  him,  and  in  the  darkness  and 
confusion  all  order  was  lost.  Some  of  the  Federals 
struck  off  to  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  some  to  the 
left.  Both  these  parties,  minus  many  stragglers, 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  Potomac,  and  crossed  safely 
into  Maryland  with  the  commanding  general,  but  the 
greater  part  of  Elliott's  and  McRennolds'  brigades 
were  intercepted  and   captured.    Ewell  took  4000 

38 


prisoners,  and  all  Milroy's  stores  and  artillery  also 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors.  Had  Rodes  left 
a  brigade  at  Charlestown  when  he  advanced  on 
Martinsburg,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  single  man 
could  have  escaped  from  the  disaster  at  Winchester. 
But  in  any  case  the  scattered  remnants  of  Milroy's 
force,  a  mob  of  fugitives  without  order  or  morale, 
proved  of  little  further  value  during  the  campaign. 
His  force  had  been  blotted  out  of  existence.1 

Ewell  was  not  the  man  to  waste  valuable  time  after 
a  victory.  Leaving  Early  to  collect  the  captured 
stores  and  send  the  prisoners  to  Richmond,  he  com- 
menced his  march  down  the  Valley  the  same  day, 
arriving  at  Martinsburg  by  evening.  Jenkins  had 
already  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Maryland  at 
Williamsport.  Kelley,  not  wishing  to  share  the  same 
fate  as  the  unfortunate  General  Miles  during  Lee's 
former  invasion,  had  already  evacuated  the  town  of 
Harper's  Ferry,  which  is  indefensible,  and  had  fallen 
back  to  the  Maryland  Heights  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  Potomac.  Not  a  single  Federal  soldier  remained 
in  the  Valley. 

5.  Review  of  the  Opekations  in  the  Shenandoah 

Valley. 

Thus  with  brilliant  success  closed  the  first  phase  of 
General  Lee's  campaign.  The  Valley  had  been  cleared 
of  Union  troops  from  end  to  end,  4000  prisoners,  28 
guns,  and  large  quantities  of  stores  and  transport 
had  been  captured,  all  at  a  cost  of  less  than  300 
casualties.2  Several  causes  contributed  to  this  re- 
markable success.  Chief  among  them  was  the  extra- 
ordinary  secrecy  and  rapidity   of   the   Confederate 

1  See  General  French's  report  to  Halleck  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
dated  June  30  : — "  I  leave  over  3000  men  who  came  from  Win- 
chester, ready  to  take  the  rear  at  the  first  alarm." 

2  Lee's  report. 

39 


movements.  The  march  of  Lee's  army  from  Fred- 
ericksburg to  the  Valley,  a  distance  of  60  to  70  miles, 
was  conducted  unknown  to  Hooker  or  Halleck,  until 
the  moment  when  Ewell  and  Milroy  came  into  actual 
collision  at  Winchester.  It  was  not  until  June  14, 
when  that  place  was  already  surrounded,  that  Hooker 
telegraphed  to  Washington  the  all-important  informa- 
tion that  Ewell  and  Longstreet  had  passed  through 
Culpepper  towards  the  Valley.1  This  astonishing 
ignorance  was  due,  partly  to  the  skilful  manner  in 
which  Stuart  handled  his  cavalry  so  as  to  conceal 
the  march  of  the  Confederate  columns,  partly  to  the 
supineness  of  the  Federal  cavalry  force,  which, 
since  the  severe  handling  it  had  received  at  Culpepper 
on  June  9,  had  remained  concentrated  about  Warren- 
ton,  doing  nothing.  General  Ewell  showed  both  skill 
and  energy  in  his  conduct  of  the  operations  in  the 
Valley,  which  brought  about  Milroy 's  defeat,  and  his 
orders  were  promptly  and  ably  executed  by  his 
lieutenants. 

Turning  to  the  Federal  side,  the  chief  responsibility 
for  the  disaster  must  rest  undoubtedly  upon  General 
Schenck.  It  was  due  to  him  that  Milroy's  division 
remained  in  its  exposed  position  at  Winchester,  in 
spite  of  the  repeated  directions  of  General  Halleck 
for  the  force  to  be  withdrawn.  General  Schenck 
took  it  upon  himself  to  disobey  the  orders  of  his 
commanding  officer,  and  when  the  disaster  occurred, 
sought  to  excuse  himself  on  the  flimsy  pretext  that 
he  regarded  these  orders  as  suggestions  rather  than 
commands.2  Such  conduct  could  not  fail  to  have  a 
most  prejudicial  effect  upon  the  discipline  of  the 


1  See  Halleck  to  Schenck,  June  14  : — "  It  is  reported  that 
Longstreet's  and  Ewell's  Corps  have  passed  through  Culpepper 
to  Sperryville,  towards  the  Valley."  See  also  Hooker  to  Lincoln, 
same  date. 

2  See  Proceedings  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  on  the  Evacuation 
of  Winchester,  "  Official  Records,"  Vol.  27,  No.  400. 

40 


Army.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  General 
Schenck  was  not  called  upon  immediately  to  explain 
his  conduct  before  a  court-martial,  and  this  would 
probably  have  been  done  had  he  not  with  considerable 
"  slimness "  diverted  the  blame  from  himself  by 
throwing  it  upon  his  subordinate,  General  Milroy, 
whom  he  placed  in  arrest  immediately  after  his 
arrival  in  Maryland.  No  possible  blame  can  be 
attached  to  Milroy  for  not  evacuating  Winchester 
previous  to  June  13.  His  was  not  an  independent 
command.  He  was  bound  to  remain  at  his  post  until 
ordered  to  leave  it,  and  up  to  the  end  he  received  no 
such  order.1  On  the  other  hand,  his  own  reports 
gave  his  superiors  a  totally  false  idea  of  his  situation. 
His  fatal  error  lay  in  disregarding  the  report,  which 
his  patrols  sent  in  on  June  12,  of  the  presence  of 
Confederate  infantry  on  the  Front  Royal  road.  It 
forms  a  curious  example  of  the  way  in  which  a  general 
can  be  misled,  when  he  ignores  all  reports  which  fail 
to  square  with  his  preconceived  ideas  of  the  enemy's 
movements.  Milroy  was  so  sure  that  he  could  not  be 
attacked  by  Lee  without  warning,  that  he  refused  to 
believe  any  evidence  to  the  contrary,  until  the  Confede- 
rate bayonets  were  actually  glittering  on  every  road 
round  Winchester.2  In  the  subsequent  retreat  and 
rout  of  his  command,  he  did  all  that  was  possible  under 

1  On  the  evening  of  June  13,  instructions  to  evacuate  Winches- 
ter were  sent  by  General  Schenck,  but  by  that  time  the  wires  had 
been  cut,  and  the  order  never  reached  Milroy. 

2  See  Milroy 's  official  report : — "  I  believed  that  Lee  could  not 
move  his  large  army  with  its  immense  artillery  and  baggage  trains 
and  perform  a  six-days'  march  in  my  direction  unless  I  received 
timely  notice  of  this  important  fact.  The  immense  cavalry 
force  at  the  disposal  of  General  Hooker  strengthened  this  confi- 
dence. Therefore  on  Friday,  when  I  perceived  indications  of  the 
approach  of  the  enemy  in  some  force  on  the  Front  Royal  road, 
I  felt  confident  that  it  was  composed  of  the  forces  which  I  had 
faced,  or  that  the  expected  cavalry  expedition  of  General  Stuart 
was  in  progress." 

41 


the  circumstances,  and  he  was  acquitted  of  blame  by 
the  Court  of  Inquiry,  held  subsequently  to  investigate 
the  causes  of  the  disaster.  Nevertheless  in  the  eyes 
of  the  people  he  remained  the  chief  culprit.  His 
defeat  made  a  deep  impression  in  the  North.  S  win- 
ton's  comment,  unjust  though  it  is  to  a  brave  but 
unfortunate  soldier,  aptly  expresses  the  feeling  of 
the  people :  "  His  defence  of  the  post,  entrusted  to 
his  care,  was  infamously  feeble,  and  was  the  worst 
of  that  long  train  of  misconduct  that  made  the  Valley 
of  the  Shenandoah  to  be  called  the  '  Valley  of  Humilia- 
tion/ '* 

1  Swinton — "  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac." 


42 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE   INVASION   OF   PENNSYLVANIA. 

1.  Hooker  Retreats  to  Centre ville.    Operations 
round  Richmond. 

Before  turning  to  consider  the  movements  of  Hooker 
and  Lee,  we  must  follow  shortly  the  career  of  Jenkins 
in  his  triumphant  march  into  Pennsylvania.  Jenkins 
had  crossed  the  Potomac  with  his  brigade  at  Williams- 
port  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  at  the  moment  when 
Milroy's  ill-fated  force  was  disintegrating  into  frag- 
ments at  Winchester.  By  the  evening  of  the  same 
day  he  had  entered  Chambersburg.  His  advance 
created  the  utmost  consternation  and  dismay  among 
the  farmers  of  Pennsylvania,  who  were  now  to  feel 
the  horrors  of  war  on  their  native  soil  and  in  their 
own  houses.  The  Confederate  troopers,  riding  far  and 
wide  through  the  country,  levied  heavy  tolls  on  the 
farmers  in  the  shape  of  horses,  cattle  and  provisions, 
which  were  collected  and  sent  south  to  Rodes  at 
Williamsport.  But  the  conduct  of  the  troops  was 
exemplary.  The  personal  effects  of  the  inhabitants 
were  scrupulously  respected,  pillaging  of  any  descrip- 
tion was  sternly  put  down,  and  the  good  discipline 
and  self-restraint  of  Jenkins'  troopers,  let  loose  for 
the  first  time  on  a  hostile  and  helpless  population, 
won  the  unstinted  admiration  of  their  enemies  them- 
selves. The  panic  everywhere  was  intense.  Thous- 
ands of  terrified  farmers  were  flying  across  the 
Susquehanna,  driving  before  them  their  sheep  and 

43 


cattle.  Fortifications  were  commenced  at  Harrisburg, 
which  lay  directly  in  the  path  of  the  invading  army, 
and  General  Couch,  to  whom  had  been  hastily 
assigned  the  defence  of  the  Susquehanna,  called  out 
the  local  militia.  But  these  hasty  levies,  without 
discipline  or  experience  of  war,  offered  but  a  feeble 
barrier  against  the  march  of  Ewell's  veterans.  The 
real  defence  of  Pennsylvania  rested  on  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  far  away  to  the  South,  in  its  old  lines  at 
Centreville,  waiting  patiently  till  its  commander 
could  make  up  his  mind  what  to  do. 

The   positions  of   the    Confederate  forces  on   the 
night  of  the  15th  were  as  follows  : — 

Jenkins"  brigade  at  Chambersburg. 

Rodes'  division  at  Williamsport. 

Imboden's  brigade  west  of  Winchester. 

Early  and  Johnson's  divisions  at  Winchester. 

Longstreet's  corps  at  Culpepper. 

Hill's  corps  at  Fredericksburg. 

Stuart,  with  the  independent  cavalry,  at  Cul- 
pepper. 
Lee's  army  was  thus  spread  over  a  front  of  nearly 
100  miles,  with  the  enemy's  force  concentrated  within 
striking  distance  of  one  extremity  of  his  extended  line. 
It  would  seem  as  though  on  this  occasion  he  was  acting 
with  a  rashness  that  no  success  could  justify ;  but  a 
careful  study  of  the  situation  will  show  that  the 
position  was  not  nearly  so  dangerous  as  it  seems,  and, 
as  usual,  Lee  had  based  his  movements  on  a  far-seeing 
comprehension  of  the  whole  situation.  Hooker  was 
aware  on  the  13th  that  Ewell  had  entered  the  Valley, 
and  he  had  just  learnt  that  Longstreet  had  left 
Culpepper.  The  inference  was  that  the  force  in  his 
immediate  front  could  not  be  very  large,  and  the 
situation  seemed  to  offer  an  excellent  opportunity  for 
an  effective  blow.  As  early  as  the  5th  he  had  tele- 
graphed to  Halleck  that  if  the  enemy  moved  in  the 
direction  of  Culpepper,  it  would  offer  a  favourable 

44 


opportunity  for  an  attack  on  Fredericksburg.  On 
the  10th,  when  the  cavalry  action  at  Culpepper  had 
revealed  to  him  that  this  operation  had  commenced, 
he  telegraphed  again,  asking  permission  to  attack 
Hill.  But  the  fear  of  a  sudden  raid  on  Washington 
hung  like  a  millstone  round  the  necks  of  Lincoln  and 
his  military  advisers.  They  failed  to  see  the  dangers 
to  which  their  enemy  had  exposed  himself  by  his 
bold  movements.  They  saw  only  the  swelling  flood 
of  invasion  which  was  surging  down  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  Halleck  replied  to  Hooker  with  a  refusal  to 
grant  the  requested  permission.  The  disaster  at 
Chancellorsville  was  still  in  the  minds  of  himself  and 
the  President,  and  there  is  some  excuse  for-  their 
hesitation  to  allow  the  sole  army  on  which  Washington 
depended  for  its  safety  to  become  entangled  again 
in  the  depths  of  the  Wilderness,  while  a  Confederate 
force  of  unknown  strength  was  north  of  the  Potomac. 
All  this  was  divined  by  Lee.  It  was  not  the  first 
time  that  he  had  successfully  played  on  the  fears  of 
the  President  for  the  safety  of  the  national  capital, 
and  it  was  for  this  reason  that  he  had  not  feared  to 
leave  Hill  in  a  position  which  at  first  glance  seemed 
one  of  imminent  peril. 

Hooker,  deprived  of  power  to  take  the  offensive,  had 
no  course  open  but  to  retreat.  On  the  13th  he  broke 
up  his  camp  at  Falmouth  and  put  his  army  in  motion. 
The  left  wing,  composed  of  the  Second,  Fifth  and. 
Twelfth  Corps,  retired  to  Dumfries  on  the  14th,  and 
Fairfax  Court  House  on  the  15th.  The  right  wing, 
comprising  the  First,  Third  and  Eleventh  Corps, 
withdrew  to  Centre ville  on  the  15th,  the  Sixth  Corps 
remaining  at  Manassas.  During  the  retirement,  the 
cavalry  under  Pleasonton,  with  their  head-quarters  at 
Warrenton,  continued  to  watch  the  right  flank  of  the 
army.  Hooker  remained  in  this  position  three  days, 
from  the  15th  to  the  18th.  Jenkins  was  riding  at  will 
through  Pennsylvania,  but  Hooker  dared  not  cross 

45 


the  Potomac  until  he  was  satisfied  that  Lee's  real 
objective  was  not  Washington.1  In  fact,  the  latter, 
having  secured  the  initiative,  was  compelling  his 
opponent  to  conform  to  his  own  movements,  one  of 
the  greatest  advantages  possessed  by  the  offensive. 
As  soon  as  Hill  saw  that  Hooker  had  withdrawn,  he 
broke  up  his  camp,  and  moved  on  the  14th  towards 
Culpepper.  Lee's  object  now  was  to  close  up  his 
attenuated  line,  and  to  throw  his  whole  force  as  quickly 
as  possible  into  Maryland.  So,  while  Hooker  was 
marking  time  at  Centreville,  Longstreet  left  Culpepper 
and  moved  along  the  foot  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  while 
Hill  pressed  on  to  Chester  Gap,  as  fast  as  his  troops 
could  march,  to  join  Ewell  in  the  valley.  Longstreet's 
march  was  covered  by  Stuart,  who  left  Culpepper  on 
the  16th,  with  instructions  to  seize  and  hold  the  gaps 
of  the  Bull  Run  Mountains. 

We  must  turn  for  a  moment  from  the  movements 
of  the  main  armies  to  note  very  briefly  the  subsidiary 
operations  that  were  taking  place  in  front  of  Richmond. 
When  Lee  moved  forward  from  the  Rappahannock 
to  the  Valley,  he  left  Richmond  practically  destitute 
of  troops.  The  defenceless  state  of  the  city  was  well 
known  at  Washington,  and  it  was  considered  a  good 
opportunity  for  employing  the  large  Federal  force  in 
the  Peninsular  in  an  attempt  to  capture  the  Con- 
federate Capital  by  a  coup  de  main.  On  June  13,  at 
the  time  when  Ewell  was  entering  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  General  Getty,  with  a  force  of  7000  men, 
advanced  from  the  White  House,  and,  moving  up  the 
York  River,  planted  himself  across  the  Fredericksburg 
railway  at  Hanover  Junction,  seventeen  miles  north  of 


1  See  Hooker  to  Halleck,  June  19  : — "  Lee's  delay  in  my  front 
has  caused  me  to  doubt  his  intentions  of  throwing  over  any 
considerable  force  on  Maryland  shore.  It  is  the  impression  of 
General  Pleasonton  that  his  infantry  are  still  on  the  opposite 
side  of  Blue  Ridge,  and  that  it  is  his  intention  to  attack  in  this 
direction,"  i.e.  towards  Washington. 

46 


Richmond.  At  the  same  time  General  Keys,  with  5000 
men,  threatened  the  city  from  the  east,  approaching 
as  near  as  Bottom's  Bridge  on  the  Chickahominy,  only 
six  miles  away.  The  excitement  in  the  Confederate 
Capital  was  naturally  very  great.  Lee's  army  was 
far  away,  and  the  enemy  was  almost  at  the  city  gates. 
The  Government,  however,  did  not  give  way  to  panic. 
Not  only  did  President  Davis  forbear  to  recall  Lee 
from  his  projected  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  to  come 
to  the  relief  of  the  Capital,  as  he  might  well  have 
been  justified  in  doing,  but  he  actually  permitted  the 
slender  garrison  to  be  reduced  still  further.1  General 
Lee  had  requested  that  Corse's  brigade  of  Pickett's 
division,  which  he  had  left  behind  at  Richmond,  might 
be  sent  to  join  him  in  Maryland,  and  this  brigade 
left  Hanover  Junction  only  two  days  before  Getty's 
cavalry  raided  that  place,  destroying  the  railway, 
blowing  up  bridges,  and  doing  other  damage  to  public 
property.  All  the  country  between  the  Pamunkey 
and  the  Rappahannock  was  dominated  by  General 
Getty.  He  had  thus  succeeded  in  cutting  Lee's  direct 
line  of  communications  with  Richmond,  and  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Confederate  Capital,  hemmed  in  by  enemies, 
seemed  desperate.  But  at  this  crisis  the  fact  was 
demonstrated  once  more  that  the  best  defence  is 
nearly  always  a  vigorous  offensive.  Lee  was  pro- 
tecting Richmond  far  more  effectually  than  he  would 
have  done,  if  his  army  had  been  behind  the  earthworks 
surrounding  the  city.  The  Confederate  invasion  of 
Pennsylvania  quickly  drove  all  thoughts  of  offensive 
action  out  of  the  minds  of  Lincoln  and  Halleck. 
General  Dix,  in  command  of  the  Union  troops  in  the 
Peninsula,  suddenly  received  orders  to  withdraw  the 
forces  threatening  Richmond,  and  to  send  the  bulk 
of  his  command  to  reinforce  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
This  was  done,  and  the  war-cloud  that    had  hovered 

1  See  Davis  to  Lee,  June  28,  Official  Kecords,  Vol.  27. 
47 


so  threateningly  over  Richmond  passed  away,  leaving 
behind  it  no  trace  save  burning  buildings  and  the 
broken  bridges  on  the  Fredericksburg  railroad  1 

2.  The  Cavalry  Operations.2 

It  is  proposed  to  follow  with  some  care  the  cavalry 
operations  of  the  next  five  days,  from  June  16  to 
the  21st  inclusive,  for  they  afford  a  most  interesting 
example  of  the  way  in  which  the  independent  cavalry 
of  an  army  operates  to  conceal  its  movements.  Stuart 
had  with  him  five  brigades,  those  of  Hampton,  Robert- 
son, Fitzhugh  Lee,  Chambliss,  and  Jones,  about 
10,000  sabres  in  all.  His  instructions  were  to  cover 
the  movements  of  the  Confederate  army  down  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  Pleasonton  had  his  divisions 
concentrated  at  Warrenton  and  Catlett's  Station  on 
the  16th.  His  force  had  been  augmented  to  some 
12,600  sabres  by  the  addition  of  a  fourth  division 
under  Brig.-General  Kilpatrick,  but  half  of  these  had 
not  yet  joined  him,  so  that  on  the  16th  he  could 
hardly  have  had  more  than  10,000  actually  present. 
His  orders  were  to  guard  Hooker's  right  flank,  to  feel 
the  enemy,  and  to  ascertain  as  far  as  possible  his 
numbers  and  dispositions. 

Stuart  left  Culpepper  on  the  16th  and  moved 
north,  halting  that  night  at  Salem  on  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railway.  He  left  Wade  Hampton's  and  Jones' 
brigades  behind  at  Culpepper  to  watch  Warrenton, 
with  orders  to  follow  in  the  rear  of  Hill's  column, 
as  soon  as  the  latter  passed  that  point.  On  the 
17th  he  proceeded  to  occupy  the  gaps  of  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains,  sending  Fitzhugh  Lee's  brigade 
to    Aldie's    Gap    and    Chambliss    to    Thoroughfare 

1  See  correspondence  between  Generals  Halleck  and  Dix  on 
the  conduct  of  this  expedition,  in  Official  Records,  Vol.  27,  No.  1. 

2  See  reports  of  Generals  Stuart  and  Pleasonton  for  the  details 
of  these  operations. 

48 


Gap.  Robertson  was  placed  in  support  of  the  latter 
at  Rectortown,  while  Stuart  himself  took  up  his 
position  at  Middleburg.  The  same  day  Pleasonton 
left  Warrenton  and  moved  north  with  his  whole 
force.  About  noon  his  patrols  came  into  collision  with 
the  Confederate  cavalry  at  Aldie.  Ascertaining  that 
the  enemy  was  holding  the  gap  in  force,  Pleasonton 
determined  to  press  the  attack  at  this  point.  The 
action  continued  with  varying  fortune  till  dusk ; 
finally  Pleasonton  secured  possession  of  the  gap, 
the  Confederate  cavalry  falling  back  on  Middleburg. 
Stuart,  satisfied  that  this  was  the  point  at  which  the 
enemy  was  endeavouring  to  break  through  his  screen, 
effected  a  counter  concentration  of  four  brigades  at 
Middleburg  by  calling  up  Jones'  brigade  from  Cul- 
pepper. Here  on  the  18th  he  was  attacked  by  the 
whole  of  Pleasonton's  force,  reinforced  during  the 
day  by  Kilpatrick's  division,  which  took  part  in  the 
fight.  Stuart  made  no  attempt  to  hold  his  ground, 
for  he  was  heavily  outnumbered,  but  fell  back  slowly, 
contesting  every  inch  of  ground,  and  by  nightfull 
Pleasonton  had  gained  five  miles.  The  19th  passed 
quietly,  but  on  the  20th  and  21st  the  action  was 
renewed,  Stuart  falling  back  through  Upperville  into 
Ashby's  Gap,  where  a  portion  of  Longstreet's  corps 
covered  his  retreat.  Pleasonton  made  no  attempt 
to  press  him  further,  but  fell  back  the  same  day  to 
Middleburg,  and  with  this  the  series  of  cavalry 
engagements  came  to  an  end.1  The  Federal  cavalry 
had  succeeded  in  wresting  from  Stuart  the  whole 
of  Loudon  county  ;  but  they  had  failed  to  penetrate 
his  front,  or  to  gain  any  information  of  Lee's  move- 
ments.    On  the  18th  Hooker  was  still  ignorant  of 

1  The  total  loss  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  from  the  16th  to  the 
21st  was  510  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  Stuart  claims  to 
have  captured  400  prisoners,  mostly  from  Duffle's  division.  The 
total  Union  loss  was  883.  See  reports  of  Stuart  and  Pleasonton 
in  Official  Records. 

d  49 


his  opponent's  designs.  Since  the  15th  he  had  held 
his  army  at  Centreville,  waiting  for  information. 
Ascertaining  on  the  18th  that  Pleasonton  had  seized 
the  gaps  of  the  Bull  Run  mountains,  he  moved 
forward  to  occupy  them.  His  army  was  then 
disposed  along  an  excellent  defensive  line,  covering 
all  the  approaches  to  Washington  from  the  West, 
with  three  corps  in  the  front  line  and  three  in  support. 
In  this  position  he  remained  six  days,  trying  to  gain 
information  of  the  enemy's  intentions,  and  carrying 
on  an  animated  dispute  with  Washington. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more  striking  illus- 
tration of  the  moral  effect  in  war  of  a  bold  strategic 
movement,  skilfully  veiled  by  a  powerful  force  of 
cavalry,  and  of  the  bewilderment  produced  in  the 
mind  of  an  enemy  by  such  a  movement,  than  is 
afforded  by  a  study  of  the  telegrams  that  passed 
between  Hooker  and  Washington  during  these  six 
days.  Neither  Halleck  nor  Hooker  knew  where 
Lee's  army  was,  nor  what  his  intentions  were.  There 
is  an  element  of  humour  in  the  way  in  which  each 
accuses  the  other  of  withholding  information,  the 
truth  being  that  each  was  equally  ignorant.  The 
whole  of  Pennsylvania  was  in  a  tumult,  the  wildest 
reports  coming  from  that  quarter.1  No  one  knew 
Lee's  real  strength,  or  whether  he  meant  to  invade 
Pennsylvania,  or  to  attack  Washington.  And  the 
cause  of  all  this  mystery  and  confusion  was  the 
admirable  way  in  which  Stuart  had  done  his  work, 
in  spite  of  the  persistent  efforts  of  Pleasonton  to 
break  through  the  veil,  and  see  what  was  behind. 
On  the  21st  we  find  Hooker  writing  to  Halleck : — 
"  This  cavalry  force  has  hitherto  prevented  me 
from  obtaining  satisfactory  information  as   to   the 

1  Halleck  to  Hooker,  June  18  : — "  I  can  get  no  information  of 
the  enemy  other  than  that  sent  to  you.  Rumours  from  Pennsyl- 
vania are  too  confused  and  contradicting  to  be  relied  on. 
Officers  and  citizens  are  on  a  big  stampede." 

50 


whereabouts  of  the  enemy.  They  have  masked  all 
their  movements."1  Such  words  from  the  mouth  of 
the  enemy  constitute  the  highest  praise  that  can  be 
given  of  the  manner  in  which  Stuart  had  fulfilled 
his  task. 

3.  Invasion  of  Pennsylvania. 

Ewell's  troops,  which  had  been  resting  at  Williams- 
port  since  their  march  down  the  Valley,  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  that  place  on  the  22nd,  Ewell  himself, 
with  the  divisions  of  Johnson  and  Rodes,  pushed  on 
to  Chambersburg,  which  was  entered  on  the  following 
day,  while  Early's  division,  which  had  been  ordered 
to  march  on  York,  halted  on  the  night  of  the  23rd 
at  Wrainsborough.  Jenkins  had  already  seized 
Carlisle,  and  was  actually  threatening  Harrisburg, 
the  capital  of  Pennsylvania.  On  the  following  day 
the  corps  of  Longstreet  and  Hill  crossed  at  Williams- 
port  and  Shepherdstown  respectively.  The  only 
portion  of  Lee's  army  still  south  of  the  river  on  the 
24th  were  the  cavalry  under  Stuart  at  Snicker's 
Gap,  and  Imboden's  brigade  at  Hancock  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  The  covering  screen  of  cavalry 
which  had  hitherto  served  so  well  to  hide  his  marches 
was  now  absent,  and  it  was  probable  that  in  a  day 
or  two  the  enemy  would  be  in  possession  of  full 
information  as  to  his  numbers  and  dispositions. 
The  strategical  situation  now  underwent  a  change. 
While  Lee  remained  in  the  Valley  his  intentions 
could  only  be  guessed  at,  and  his  opponent  was  in 
consequence  unable  to  move.  When  he  crossed 
into  Maryland  all  doubt  was  removed,  and  Hooker 
was  at  liberty  to  take  such  steps  as  he  considered 
best  to  meet  the  situation  thus  clearly  presented. 
Whereas  previously  Hooker's  movements  depended 
on  Lee's,  now  the  position  was  reversed,  and  Lee's 

1  Official  Records,  Vol.  27. 
51 


subsequent  action  depended  upon  what  Hooker  would 
do.     In  the  meantime  he  pushed  E well's  corps  onward 
into  Pennsylvania  to  threaten  Harrisburg,  and  spread 
as  much  panic  and  alarm  through  the  country-side 
as  possible,  in  the  hopes  that  the  Federal  Government 
would  be  frightened  or  coerced  into  recalling  troops  from 
the  West,  and  so  lightening  the  pressure  on  Vicksburg.1 
General   Early's   division,   marching   on   June   24 
from  Wrainsborough,  reached  Gettysburg  on  the  26th, 
scattering  there  a  small  force  of  the  Pennsylvania 
militia,  and  on  the  28th  entered  York,  which  was 
surrendered  to  Early  without  resistance.     He  imme- 
diately despatched  Gordon's  brigade  to  Wrightsville, 
with  instructions  to  seize  the  great  bridge  over  the 
Susquehanna   at   that   place.     It   was   defended   by 
about  1200  of  the  State  militia,  but  these  stampeded 
at  the  first  shell,  burning  the  bridge  behind  them.2 
This  was  a  great  disappointment  to  Early,  who  had 
intended,  if  he  could  secure  the  bridge,  to  cross  to 
the  left  bank  of  the  Susquehanna  and  attack  Harris- 
burg from  the  rear.3     During  the  two  days  that  he 
occupied  York,  a  very  heavy  contribution,  both  in 
money  and  in  kind,  was  levied  on  the  town,  while 
his   cavalry,   scouring  the   surrounding  country  for 
miles,  brought  in  cattle  and  supplies,  burnt  bridges 
and  stations,  destroyed  Government  property,  and 
created  the  maximum  amount  of  terror  and  conster- 
nation over  the  country-side.     General  Ewell,  with 
the  divisions  of  Johnson  and  Rodes,  reached  Carlisle 
from  Chambersburg  on  June  27,  and  remained  there 
three  days,  making  requisitions  on  the  inhabitants  and 
collecting  supplies.     The  alarm  in  Harrisburg  at  the 
appearance  of  so  great  a  hostile  force  within  twenty 
miles  of  the  city  was  very  great.     A  force  of  about 


1  Lee's  report,  Official  Eecords. 

2  Gordon's  report,  Official  Records. 

3  Early's  report,  Official  Records. 

52 


12,000  militia,  but  no  regular  troops,  had  been  hastily- 
collected  for  the  defence  of  the  State  Capital,  and 
the  command  assigned  to  General  W.  F.  Smith. 
At  Bridgeport,  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Susque- 
hanna, which  is  at  this  point  over  a  mile  wide,  earth- 
works had  been  thrown  up  to  protect  the  bridgeheads 
and  the  approaches  to  the  city  from  the  west.  On 
June  29  Ewell  was  on  the  point  of  advancing  on 
Harrisburg,  when  he  received  an  order  from  General 
Lee  to  march  at  once  to  Gettysburg.  Other  events 
had  been  transpiring  in  Maryland  which  rendered 
an  immediate  concentration  of  the  Confederate  army 
imperative.  On  the  28th  a  scout  had  come  into 
Lee's  hues  at  Chambersburg  with  the  information 
that  the  Union  army  was  at  Frederick.  This  was 
the  first  news  he  had  received  since  the  22nd  of  the 
movements  of  Hooker,1  whom  he  had  hitherto 
believed  to  be  still  on  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac. 
His  own  situation,  as  thus  revealed,  was  somewhat 
critical.  His  army  was  scattered  at  three  points, 
Chambersburg,  Carlisle,  and  York,  while  the  enemy's 
concentrated  force  was  within  a  few  days'  march. 
A  counter  concentration  was  the  first  thing  necessary. 
On  the  same  day  he  sent  dispatches  to  Early  and 
Ewell,  ordering  them  to  march  at  once  on  Gettysburg, 
that  place  being  selected  as  occupying  a  central 
position  with  regard  to  the  different  portions  of  his 
army.2  By  this  narrow  margin  did  Harrisburg 
escape  the  humiliation  of  surrender,  and  the  material 
loss  of  requisitions  and  indemnities,  for  there  is 
little  doubt  that  the  Pennsylvania  militia  could  have 
offered  but  a  feeble  resistance  to  Ewell's  veterans 
had  his  attack  on  the  city  been  seriously  pressed. 

1  Mosby,  in  his  recent  work,  "  Stuart's  Cavalry  in  the  Gettys- 
burg Campaign,"  denies  this,  but  his  arguments  do  not  carry 
conviction.  See  Longstreet  in  "  From  Manassas  to  Appomatox  "  ; 
also  Lee's  report. 

2  Lee's  report. 

53 


4.  Hooker's  Movement  to  Frederick: 
His  Resignation. 

Hooker  had  remained  since  June  18  in  his  position 
between  Leesburg  and  Thoroughfare  Gap,  covering 
the  approaches  to  Washington,  and  waiting  for  the 
enemy  to  disclose  his  next  move.  On  June  24  he 
received  a  message  from  Harper's  Ferry  that  the 
Confederate  army  was  crossing  the  Potomac.  On 
the  25th  a  report  came  in  from  Hagerstown  that 
90,000  men  of  Lee's  army  had  passed  through  the 
town.1  The  estimate  of  numbers  was  exaggerated, 
but  the  substance  of  the  information  was  correct. 
At  last  the  veil  was  lifted !  Pennsylvania,  not  Wash- 
ington, seemed  to  be  the  enemy's  objective.  Hooker's 
subsequent  action  was  prompt.  On  the  same  day 
that  he  received  this  report  the  Union  army  began 
to  cross  the  Potomac  at  Edward's  Ferry.  The 
Twelfth  Corps  marched  towards  Harper's  Ferry, 
the  Second,  Fifth  and  Sixth  were  concentrated  at 
Frederick  City,  while  the  First,  Third  and  Eleventh 
moved  to  occupy  the  gaps  of  South  Mountain. 

Up  to  this  time  Hooker's  movements  had  been 
purely  defensive.  But  at  last,  after  these  weary 
days  of  waiting  and  watching,  he  saw  an  opportunity 
to  strike  a  blow  at  his  too-daring  opponent.  From 
the  moment  that  the  shattered  wrecks  of  Milroy's 
force  had  streamed  across  the  Potomac,  the  garrison 
of  Harper's  Ferry  had  been  hourly  expecting  attack. 
Situated  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  any  army  advancing 
up  the  Cumberland  Valley,  the  position  was  of  such 
obvious  importance  that  it  seemed  inconceivable  that 
Lee  would  dare  to  throw  any  considerable  force  into 
Maryland  until  he  had  first  secured,  or  at  least 
masked,  this  formidable  outpost  of  the  enemy.  If 
further  argument  were  needed,  it  was  afforded  by 
his  action  during  the  previous  Confederate  invasion 

»  Official  Records,  Vol.  27. 
54 


of  Maryland.  Since  June  15,  the  garrison  had 
strained  every  nerve,  by  strengthening  the  existing 
works  and  building  new  ones,  to  place  their  position 
in  a  state  to  meet  successfully  the  long-expected 
assault.1  But  to  the  astonishment  of  the  Federals, 
Lee  ignored  Harper's  Ferry  entirely.  He  did  not 
attack,  he  did  not  even  mask  it.  When  he  crossed 
the  Potomac  on  the  24th,  he  left  not  a  man  behind.2 
This  was  the  opportunity  that  Hooker  determined 
to  seize.  Maryland  Heights,  overlooking  Harper's 
Ferry,  were  held  by  a  mixed  force  of  10,500  men 
under  General  French,  who  had  taken  over  the 
command  of  the  troops  there  on  June  26.3  His 
force  was  made  up  of  the  original  garrison  of  3000 
men,  the  wrecks  of  Milroy's  division,  about  3000 
strong,  and  4500  reinforcements  from  Washington.4 
Hooker  proposed  to  reinforce  French  with  the 
Twelfth  Corps  under  Slocum,  and  send  the  whole 
to  cut  Lee's  lines  of  communication  down  the  Cumber- 
land Valley,  which  lay  unprotected  and  inviting 
attack.  But  as  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  was 
not  under  Hooker's  orders,  he  wrote  to  Halleck  on 
the  26th,  requesting  permission  to  employ  the  force 
in  this  manner.  Halleck  sent  back  a  refusal,  couched 
in  the  following  terms  : — 

"  Maryland  Heights  have  always  been  regarded 
as  an  important  point  to  be  held  by  us,  and  much 
labour  and  expense  incurred  in  fortifying  them.  I 
cannot  approve  their  abandonment  except  in  case 
of  absolute  necessity." 

1  Tyler's  report,  Official  Records. 

2  Exclusive  of  the  cavalry,  and  these  had  orders  to  join  him 
as  early  as  possible.     See  page  59. 

3  General  Kelley  was  transferred  to  West  Virginia,  and  handed 
over  the  command  at  Harper's  Ferry  to  Brig. -Gen.  Tyler  on 
June  15,  who  in  turn  handed  it  over  to  General  French  on 
the  26th. 

4  French's  report. 

55 


To  this  Hooker's  reply  forms  the  best  comment 
possible  : — 

"  I  have  received  your  telegram  in  regard  to 
Harper's  Ferry.  I  find  ten  thousand  men  here  in 
position  to  take  the  field.  Here  they  are  of  no  earthly 
account.  They  cannot  defend  a  ford  of  the  river, 
and  as  far  as  Harper's  Ferry  is  concerned,  there  is 
nothing  in  it.  As  for  the  fortifications,  the  work  of 
the  troops,  they  remain  when  the  troops  are  withdrawn. 
No  enemy  will  ever  take  possession  of  it  for  them. 
All  the  public  property  could  have  been  secured 
to-night,  and  the  troops  moved  to  where  they  could 
have  been  of  some  service.  Now  they  are  but  a  bait 
for  the  rebels,  should  they  return.  I  beg  that  this 
may  be  presented  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  his 
Excellency  the  President." 

Although  marked  by  a  tone  unbecoming  to  a 
subordinate,  this  letter  contains  nothing  but  the  truth, 
a  complete  exposure  of  the  fatuous  policy  pursued 
by  General  Halleck.  The  letter  was  followed  almost 
immediately  by  another,  in  which  Hooker  requested 
permission  to  resign  his  command.  The  friction 
between  Halleck  and  himself  had  become  intolerable.1 
The  disastrous  effect  of  such  antagonism  on  the 
conduct  of  the  campaign  is  too  self-evident  to  need 
any  proof.  Hooker  himself  was  fully  alive  to  the 
fact.     On  the  16th  he  had  written  to  Lincoln  : — 

"  You  have  long  been  aware,  Mr.  President,  that  I 
have  not  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  Major-General 
commanding  the  Army,  and  I  can  assure  you  that 
so  long  as  this  continues,  we  may  look  in  vain  for 
success." 

The  position,  in  fact,  was  impossible.     A  general, 


1  The  despatches  that  passed  between  Halleck  and  Hooker 
form  curious  reading.  The  sneers,  retorts,  and  scarcely  veiled 
insinuations,  with  which  they  are  filled,  are  hardly  credible  until 
they  are  read. 

56 


who  was  hampered  by  his  Government,  disliked  by 
his  officers,  and  distrusted  by  his  men,  could  scarcely 
have  conducted  the  campaign  with  success,  however 
brilliant  may  have  been  his  personal  talents.  His 
resignation  was  accepted,  and  on  the  28th  General 
Hardie  arrived  at  head-quarters,  with  an  order 
appointing  General  Meade,  the  commander  of  the 
Fifth  Corps,  to  be  his  successor.1 

It  may  be  thought  by  the  average  reader  that  to 
change  the  commander  of  a  large  army  in  the  midst 
of  a  complicated  campaign,  at  a  moment  when  affairs 
were  rapidly  approaching  a  climax,  was  an  act  of 
unparalleled  folly  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment. And  so  in  almost  any  other  case  it  would  have 
been.  But,  as  Swinton  has  pointed  out,  a  measure 
which  with  most  armies  would  have  been  the  height 
of  rashness,  was  here  safe  and  easy.  And  it  is  a 
remarkable  fact  that  the  change  of  commanders  did 
not  delay  the  movements  of  the  Army  for  a  single 
day.  A  short  interview  with  Hooker  placed  Meade 
in  full  possession  of  all  the  dispositions  of  the  different 
corps,  and  the  complicated  business  of  transferring 
the  command  was  completed  without  the  slightest 
friction  whatever. 

5.  Character  of  General  Meade  :    His 
Advance  towards  Gettysburg. 

The  new  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
the  sixth  that  that  Army  had  had  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war,2  was  in  many  ways  a  contrast  to  Hooker. 
He  was  a  quiet,  firm,  self-contained  man  of  forty- 
four,  had  served  in  all  the  Virginian  campaigns, 
and  was  known  as  a  capable,  earnest,  and  vigorous 

1  General  Sykes  took  over  the  command  of  his  corps. 

2  The  other  five  were  :  McDowell,  McClellan,  Pope,  Burnside, 
and  Hooker. 

57 


officer.  His  address  to  the  Army,  on  assuming  the 
command,  was  brief  and  manly,  in  marked  contrast 
to  Hooker's  orations.  Throughout  his  tenure  of  the 
supreme  command  he  gave  no  sign  that  he  possessed 
in  the  slightest  degree  the  attributes  of  military 
genius.  His  qualities  were  solid  rather  than  brilliant, 
and  as  such  he  may  be  said  to  have  typified  the 
principal  characteristics  of  the  Army  itself.1 

When  Meade  took  over  the  command,  he  found 
himself  possessed  of  two  advantages  which  were 
denied  to  his  predecessor.  He  was  given  full  control 
of  all  the  forces  in  the  theatre  of  operations,  and  he 
was  kept  constantly  informed  by  his  cavalry  of  the 
enemy's  movements.  Two  courses  lay  open  to  him. 
He  might  adopt  Hooker's  plan  of  acting  against  his 
opponents'  flank  by  throwing  forward  his  army 
through  the  gaps  of  South  Mountain  on  Hagerstown, 
and  thus  severing  Lee's  communications  with  Virginia. 
Or  he  might  advance  north,  keeping  to  the  east  of 
South  Mountain,  and  bring  the  enemy  to  battle  before 
he  should  have  time  to  seize  Harrisburg.  The 
first  plan  was  the  boldest,  and  would  have  the  most 
decisive  results,  for  to  Lee's  army,  fighting  with  its 
back  to  the  north,  defeat  must  mean  annihilation. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  would  expose  all  the  eastern 
portion  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  to  the  enemy's 
attack,  and  would  certainly  be  strenuously  opposed  on 
that  account  by  the  Government.  Meade's  chief 
characteristic  was  caution.  His  single  thought  was  to 
avoid  defeat,  and  he  decided  to  adopt  the  safer  if  less 
promising  plan.2  In  this  he  was  perhaps  right. 
The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  brave  and  resolute  as 
it    always    was,    lacked    some    of    the    elan    which 

1  Meade's  appointment  to  the  command  came  as  a  surprise 
to  the  Army,  which  had  thought  that  it  would  be  given  to 
General  Reynolds,  the  commander  of  the  First  Corps.  See 
Doubleday  in  "  Chancellors ville  and  Gettysburg." 

3  Meade  to  Halleck,  June  28. 

58 


repeated  victories  had  given  its  opponent.  Its 
commander  was  new  and  untried.  As  a  strategist  he 
was  no  match  for  Lee.  It  was  certainly  wiser  to 
run  no  risks  with  the  sole  army  on  which  the  Union 
relied,  at  a  moment  when  such  tremendous  issues 
were  at  stake.  So  the  army  was  set  in  motion  on 
June  28  along  the  roads  leading  northward,  the  points 
marched  on  being  Emmittsburg,  Taneytown,  and 
Westminster.  On  the  same  day  General  French 
received  orders  to  abandon  Harper's  Ferry,  to  fall 
back  with  his  command  to  Frederick,  and  effect  a 
junction  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.1  The  front 
and  flanks  of  the  Army  in  its  northward  march  were 
covered  by  the  cavalry,  Buford's  division  being  on 
the  left  flank,  Kilpatrick  in  front,  and  Gregg  on  the 
right.3 

6.  Operations   of   Confederate   Cavalry  under 
Stuart. 

Since  June  21  Stuart  with  five  brigades  of  cavalry 
had  been  holding  Ashby's  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge.  Lee 
was  naturally  most  anxious  to  regain  touch  with  his 
cavalry  as  early  as  possible,  for  ever  since  crossing  the 
Potomac  he  had  been  without  the  services  of  a  single 
brigade.  On  the  22nd  he  had  sent  instructions  to 
Stuart  to  cross  into  Maryland  not  later  than  the  24th, 
and  immediately  to  push  on  and  feel  the  right  of 
E well's  Corps.  Two  brigades  were  to  be  left  behind 
in  the  valley  to  watch  Hooker  so  long  as  he  remained 
inactive,  but  as  soon  as  he  withdrew  from  their  front 
they  were  to  cross  the  Potomac,  and  close  in  on  the 

1  It  is  curious  to  note  that  Halleck  accepted  without  demur 
the  abandonment  of  Harper's  Ferry,  when  it  was  ordered  by 
Meade,  although  he  had  positively  refused  to  give  Hooker 
permission  to  do  so . 

1  Duffie's  division  had  been  broken  up,  and  distributed  among 
the  other  three. 

59 


rear  of  trie  army.  The  instructions  given  were 
general  in  their  character,  and  allowed  Stuart  con- 
siderable latitude,  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
most  suitable  point  at  which  to  cross  the  Potomac  ; 
but  great  stress  was  laid  on  the  importance  of  getting 
into  touch  with  Ewell  as  quickly  as  possible.1  Stuart 
proposed  to  carry  out  his  orders  by  leaving  the 
brigades  of  Robertson  and  Jones  in  the  valley  to 
watch  Hooker,  and  with  the  remainder  passing  right 
round  the  Federal  camps,  crossing  the  Potomac  at 
Edward's  Ferry,  and  so  rejoining  the  army.  He 
felt  confident  of  his  ability  to  regain  touch  with 
Ewell  by  June  27  at  the  latest,  while  he  considered 
that  such  a  daring  feat  would  not  only  have  a  great 
moral  effect  on  his  own  command,  but  would  confuse 
and  distract  the  Federal  General,  and  cause  the 
utmost  alarm  in  Washington.2 

Stuart  left  Ashby's  Gap  at  midnight  on  the  25th, 
with  Chambliss,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  and  Hampton's 
brigades,  meaning  to  reach  Edward's  Ferry.  But 
unfortunately  for  the  success  of  his  plans  the  same  day 
saw  Hooker  commencing  his  northward  movement, 
and  Stuart  found  every  road  blocked  by  the  Federal 
columns  marching  towards  the  river.  Had  he  been 
discreet  he  would  have  abandoned  his  bold  scheme ;  but 
the  fascination  of  a  raid  entirely  round  the  Federal 
Army,  such  as  he  had  carried  out  successfully  twice 
before,  was  too  strong  for  Stuart,  and  he  clung  to  his 
original  plan.  But  the  Federal  movements  necessitated 
a  much  wider  circuit  than  he  had  intended,  and  it  was 
not  till  the  27th,  two  days  behind  Hooker,  that  he 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  Drainsville  and  hurried  on 
to  Rockville,  where  an  immense  wagon  train  of 
stores  and  supplies  for  the  Union  Army  fell  into  his 
hands.     The  excitement  in  Washington  was  intense. 

1  For  text  of  this  despatch  see  Chapter  VIII. 

2  Stuart's  report. 

60 


Communications  with  the  army  were  broken,  and  the 
wildest  rumours  spread  through  the  city.  But  Stuart 
had  no  time  to  waste  threatening  the  Capital.  The 
Federal  Army,  now  commanded  by  Meade,  was 
marching  steadily  northward,  and  it  was  clear  that 
he  could  not  hope .  to  get  into  touch  with  Ewell's 
Corps,  as  his  orders  directed,  before  the  latter  reached 
York.  So  on  York  he  directed  his  march,  and  riding 
all  night  passed  through  Brooke ville  and  Cookesville, 
crossed  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway  on  the 
29th,  and  reached  Westminster  at  5  p.m.  on  the 
same  day.1 

On  the  28th  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  located 
as  follows  : — 

First  and  Eleventh  Corps  marching  on  Emmittsburg. 

Third  and  Twelfth    ,,  „  „    Taney  town. 

Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Corps  marching  on 

Frizzleburg. 

Buford's  cavalry  division  at  Fairfield. 

Kilpatrick's  ,,      at  Littlestown. 

Gregg's  „      near  Westminster. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Stuart  and  Gregg  were  in  close 
proximity.  Meade  had  kept  his  head  in  the  most 
admirable  manner  when  his  communications  with 
Washington  were  broken  by  Stuart,  but  he  could  not 
altogether  disregard  the  presence  of  the  famous 
Confederate  cavalry  leader  with  6000  sabres  on  his 
flank  and  rear,  and  he  therefore  instructed  Gregg  to 
intercept  Stuart  at  Westminster.2  But  by  the  time 
the  former  had  reached  the  town  Stuart  had  already 
passed  through,  and  was  approaching  Hanover. 
The  place  was  held  by  a  cavalry  brigade  under  General 
Farnsworth.  Stuart  pushed  on  Hampton's  brigade 
to  seize  it,  and  after  some  sharp  fighting  drove  out 
the  defenders,  capturing  a  number  of  prisoners.     Soon 


1  Stuart's  report. 

2  Meade's  report,  Official  Records. 

61 


after  he  was  himself  attacked  by  Kilpatrick,  but 
successfully  maintained  his  position  till  nightfall, 
when  he  evacuated  the  town  and  resumed  his  march 
on  York.  Now  occurred  a  most  unfortunate  piece  of 
bad  luck  for  the  Confederates.  Early  had  received 
Lee's  order  to  countermarch  on  Gettysburg  on  the 
evening  of  the  29th.  He  commenced  his  march  the 
following  morning,  moving  by  the  road  to  Heidlers- 
burg,  while  at  the  same  moment  Stuart  was  approach- 
ing York  by  the  Abbotstown  Road.  The  two  columns 
passed  within  a  few  miles  of  one  another  without 
either  being  aware  of  the  other's  proximity,1  and 
Stuart  arrived  at  York  to  find  that  Early  had  dis- 
appeared. In  spite  of  his  disappointment,  he  lost  no 
time,  but  set  out  immediately  towards  Carlisle,  whither 
he  supposed  Early  had  gone  to  join  Ewell.  He 
reached  that  place  on  July  1 ,  to  find  it  in  the  enemy's 
hands,  but  he  gained  at  last  the  all-important  informa- 
tion that  the  army  was  concentrating  at  Gettysburg. 
Exhausted  as  his  men  were,  their  indefatigable  leader 
immediately  turned  his  horse's  head  in  that  direction 
and  resumed  the  march.  Hundreds  of  men,  worn 
out  with  their  exertions,  slept  in  their  saddles,  but 
the  column  still  pressed  on,  until  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  July  2  Stuart  reported  his  arrival  to  Lee  in  person 
on  the  field  of  battle. 

He  had  covered  200  miles  in  seven  days,  a  very  fine 
performance ;  he  had  thrown  Washington  into  a 
panic  for  two  days,  had  destroyed  large  quantities  of 
stores  intended  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
had  gained  accurate  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  move- 
ments. On  the  other  hand  he  arrived  on  the  battle- 
field with  horses  and  men  exhausted  by  their  exertions, 
and  in  bad  condition  for  further  operations  ;  the 
information  he  had  acquired  came  too  late  to  be  of 
service,  and  the  panic  in  the  capital  was  very  quickly 


1  Stuart's  flankguards  could  not  have  been  vexy  alert. 
62 


allayed.  Finally  and  most  serious  of  all,  for  eight 
days,  that  is  from  the  day  that  he  entered  Maryland, 
General  Lee  had  been  without  the  services  of  a  single 
brigade  of  cavalry.  His  orders  had  not  been  carried 
out.  Robertson  and  Jones  were  still  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  although  the  Union  Army  had  left  their  front 
six  days,  and  Stuart  had  failed  to  carry  out  his  instruc- 
tions to  get  into  touch  with  Ewell.  During  this 
period  Lee  was  groping  in  the  dark,  while  his  opponent 
was  kept  supplied  by  his  cavalry  with  abundant 
information.1  We  shall  see  presently  the  important 
effect  produced  by  these  errors  on  the  subsequent 
course  of  the  campaign. 2 

7.  Militaey  Situation,  Night  of  June  30. 

To  appreciate  the  reasons  for  General  Meade's 
dispositions,  it  should  be  remembered  that  his  primary 
object  was  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  Harrisburg. 
In  this  he  was  immediately  successful,  for  on  June 
30  both  York  and  Carlisle  were  free  from  the  presence 
of  the  invaders.  Further  than  this  Meade  had  no 
definite  plan ;  but  he  had  noted  the  line  of  Pipe 
Creek,  a  tributary  of  the  Monocacy,  as  a  suitable 
position  for  fighting  a  defensive  battle  to  cover 
Washington  and  Baltimore,  and  it  was  with  the  view 
of  bringing  his  Army  on  to  this  alignment  that  he 
now  directed  the  movements  of  the  different  corps.3 

On  the  night  of  June  30  the  Sixth  Corps  on  the 
right  was  at  Manchester,  the  Fifth  at  Union  Mills,  the 


1  Stuart,  however,  succeeded  in  occupying  the  attention  of 
both  Kilpatrick  and  Gregg,  in  futile  attempts  to  catch  him,  at 
a  time  when  their  presence  was  urgently  needed  at  Gettysburg. 
It  was  Buford  who  supplied  Meade  with  information :  the 
others  achieved  nothing.  For  criticism  of  Stuart's  action  see 
Chapter  8. 

2  See  Stuart's  report  for  details  of  these  operations. 

3  Meade  to  Halleck,  July  1. 

63 


Second  at  Uniontown,  the  Twelfth  at  Littlestown, 
and  the  Third  at  Taneytown,  where  Meade  had  fixed 
his  head-quarters.  The  First  and  Eleventh  Corps, 
forming  the  left  wing  of  the  Army,  were  pushed  for- 
ward towards  Gettysburg,  the  First  Corps  under 
Reynolds  halting  for  the  night  at  Marsh  Creek,  four 
miles  short  of  the  town,  while  the  Eleventh  halted 
at  Emmittsburg.  Buford's  cavalry  division  covered 
the  front,  and  was  already  in  possession  of  Gettys- 
burg. Kirkpatrick's  and  Gregg's  divisions  were  on 
the  right  flank  of  the  Army  at  Hanover,  looking  for 
Stuart.  Turning  to  the  Confederate  movements,  Hill 
had  reached  Cashtown  with  two  of  his  divisions,  while 
the  third  under  Anderson  was  still  on  the  west  side 
of  South  Mountain.  The  weather  was  very  bad,  and 
as  it  was  considered  unnecessary  to  hurry,  the  march 
was  conducted  with  a  view  to  the  comfort  of  the 
troops.1  Longstreet  was  at  Fayetteville,  with  Pickett's 
division  at  Chambersburg  guarding  the  trains.  Ewell, 
with  Rodes'  division,  had  halted  for  the  night  at 
Heidlersburg ;  Early,  marching  from  York,  was  also 
near  that  place  ;  while  Johnson's  division,  which  had 
escorted  the  trains  along  the  road  to  Chambersburg, 
was  at  Greenwood.  The  cavalry  were  situated  thus  : 
Stuart  between  York  and  Carlisle,  Jenkins  with 
Ewell,  Imboden  at  McConnelsburg  collecting  supplies, 
Robertson  and  Jones  still  south  of  the  Potomac  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

It  will  be  seen  by  a  glance  at  the  map  that  on  the 
night  of  June  30  the  leading  brigades  of  Hill's  and 
Reynolds'  Corps,  both  marching  on  the  same  point, 
were  within  ten  miles  of  one  another,  and  if  both 
continued  on  the  same  course  a  collision  was  bound 
to  occur.  Yet  neither  Lee  nor  Meade  desired  it.  The 
former,  ignorant  of  his  opponent's  movements,  was 
intent  only  on  a  concentration  of  his  scattered  forces, 

1  See  Lee's  report. 
64 


and  he  had  selected  Gettysburg  merely  as  being  the 
most  convenient  centre.1  The  last  thing  that  he 
desired  was  that  his  point  of  concentration  should 
prove  to  be  situated  under  the  enemy's  very  eyes. 
It  is  one  of  the  commonest  faults  of  strategy,  and  one 
of  the  most  fatal.  Nor  did  Meade  want  to  fight  at 
Gettysburg.  His  intentions,  as  expressed  in  his  des- 
patch to  Halleck,  July  1,  were  to  concentrate  his 
army  on  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek,  covering  his  depots 
at  Westminster,  and  there  await  an  attack.  He  was 
particularly  anxious  to  avoid  having  to  assume  the 
offensive.2  Under  these  circumstances  his  dispositions 
seem  somewhat  obscure.  If  he  meant  to  fight  behind 
Pipe  Creek,  there  seems  no  reason  for  throwing  his 
left  wing  forward  to  Gettysburg.  It  will  be  noted 
that  on  the  night  of  June  30  the  Confederate  Army 
had  the  advantage  of  being  much  more  concentrated 
than  its  opponent,  whose  right  and  left  wings  were 
more  than  30  miles  apart.  The  danger  to  which  the 
Union  left  wing  was  exposed,  if  it  advanced  to 
Gettysburg,  is  obvious.  It  was  extremely  likely  to 
encounter  the  enemy  in  superior  numbers  in  an  iso- 
lated position,  and  to  be  crushed  before  the  remainder 
of  the  Army  could  come  up  to  its  assistance.  The 
movement  in  fact  was  strategically  unsound,  and  it 
was  destined  to  lead  to  a  terrible  disaster  to  the 
Union  arms.3 


1  See  Lee's  report. 

2  Meade  to  Halleck,  June  30. 

3  It  is  possible  that  the  impetuosity  of  General  Reynolds, 
who  was  in  command  of  the  left  wing,  was  the  cause  of  this 
false  move.  Reynolds  was  a  Pennsylvanian.  As  such  he  was 
eager  to  prevent  the  further  invasion  of  his  native  State,  and 
his  ardour  may  well  have  overcome  his  prudence.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  definitely  stated  in  Meade's  report  that  he 
himself  ordered  the  forward  movement  to  Gettysburg. 


65 


CHAPTER  IV. 

BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG. 

1.  Description  of  the  Field. 

An  observer,  standing  on  Cemetery  Hill,  immediately 
south  of  Gettysburg,  can  obtain  an  excellent  view  of 
the  whole  of  the  ground  to  the  north  and  west  of  the 
town,  which  was  to  form  the  scene  of  the  battle  of 
July  1.  The  turnpike  roads  to  Chambersburg  and 
Hagerstown  leave  the  town  on  the  west,  and  separating 
at  an  angle  of  some  forty  degrees  pursue  a  switch- 
back course  over  a  succession  of  low  undulations 
which  run  north  and  south.  Seminary  Ridge,  which 
is  the  first  one  encountered,  offers  a  pronounced  slope 
on  its  eastern  side  at  this  point,  and  is  dotted  with 
copses  and  small  clumps  of  trees.  On  its  western 
side  the  gradient  here  is  very  slight,  and  merges 
gradually  into  a  second  undulation  overlooking  the 
bed  of  Willoughby  Run,  a  small  stream,  often  dry 
at  this  part  of  its  course.  Beyond  the  Run  the  Cham- 
bersburg road  ascends  a  long  gradual  slope  and  dis- 
appears over  a  distant  crest,  the  hills  of  South  Moun- 
tain closing  in  the  horizon.  Standing  on  Seminary 
Ridge,  between  the  two  pikes,  and  half  hidden  by 
trees,  is  the  Lutheran  Seminary,  from  the  cupola 
of  which  a  wide  view  can  be  obtained.  Some  2000 
yards  to  the  north  rises  Oak  Hill,  a  prominent  emin- 
ence, which  commands  all  the  ground  south  of  it  as 
far  as  the  Chambersburg  pike.  A  railroad  track 
runs  parallel  to  this  road,  passing  through  a  series 

66 


GETTYSBURG.    POSITIONS      JULY       I 


of  shallow  cuttings,  and  after  skirting  the  town  sweeps 
to  the  north  and  runs  towards  Hanover.  From  the 
north  end  of  Gettysburg  there  run  two  main  roads 
to  Mummasburg  and  Carlisle  respectively.  The  ground 
here  is  flat  and  open,  consisting  largely  of  cornfields, 
through  which  flows  Rock  Creek,  a  small  stream 
easily  fordable.  The  greater  part  of  the  ground 
described  above  is  very  suitable  for  the  movements 
of  troops,  while  the  successive  ridges  offer  admirable 
positions  for  artillery. 

2.  Collision  at  Gettysburg.    Repulse  of 
Confederate  Attack. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  on  the  night  of  June  30 
Heth's  Confederate  division  was  near  Cashtown, 
bivouacking  by  the  road  side,  and  the  First  Union 
Corps  under  General  Doubleday1  at  Marsh  Creek, 
both  within  a  few  miles  of  Gettysburg.  On  the 
evening  of  the  same  day  Buford's  cavalry  division, 
covering  Doubleday 's  advance,  reached  the  town. 
Buford  established  his  piquet  line  along  Willoughby 
Run  and  round  to  the  north  as  far  east  as  Rock  Creek, 
the  main  body  taking  up  a  position  on  the  crest 
overlooking  the  Run,  on  either  side  of  the  Chambers- 
burg  pike.2  At  daylight  on  July  1  the  Confederate 
troops  were  under  arms  and  marching  towards 
Gettysburg.  Buford  was  aware  of  their  approach, 
but  instead  of  falling  back  upon  the  First  Corps,  he 
determined  to  hold  the  town  with  his  cavalry,  until 
the  Federal  infantry  could  come  up  to  his  support. 
At  about  5.30  a.m.  the  first  shot  of  the  battle  was 
fired    by    Heth's  advance  guard,  which  came  into 


1  General  Reynolds  was  in  command  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
army,  comprising  the  First,  Third  and  Eleventh  Corps,  the 
command  of  the  First  Corps  devolving  upon  Doubleday. 

2  Buford's  report. 

67 


collision  with  the  Federal  piquets.  These  were  quickly 
driven  in,  and  the  Confederate  skirmishers,  swarming 
down  to  the  bed  of  the  Run,  opened  fire  on  Gamble's 
brigade.  Firing  continued  in  a  desultory  manner  for 
some  hours  until  about  10  a.m.,  when  the  van  of  the 
First  Corps,  consisting  of  Wadsworth's  division,  led 
by  General  Reynolds  in  person,  arrived  on  the 
field.  Under  Reynolds'  personal  direction  Cutler's 
brigade  was  deployed  across  the  turnpike,  over- 
looking the  Run,  while  Meredith's  brigade,  coming 
up  a  little  later,  took  up  position  in  McPherson's 
Wood  on  the  left.  The  cavalry,  which  had  been 
hard  pressed  and  had  suffered  severely,  was  then 
withdrawn,  Gamble's  brigade  being  formed  up  behind 
the  Seminary,  while  Devin  was  detached  to  watch 
the  right  flank.1 

At  this  moment  Heth  launched  his  attack.  He  had 
deployed  his  division  with  the  brigades  of  Davis  and 
Archer  in  the  front  line,  Pettigrew  and  Brocken- 
borough  in  support,  while  his  artillery,  consisting  of 
four  batteries,  came  into  action  at  a  range  of  some 
1300  yards  on  the  ridge  west  of  the  Run.  Davis' 
brigade  crossed  the  dry  bed  of  the  Run,  pressed 
rapidly  up  the  slope  beyond,  and  striking  Cutler's 
right  flank  drove  back  his  brigade  in  great  disorder 
towards  Seminary  Ridge.  The  Confederates,  how- 
ever, pursued  too  far.  In  their  rapid  advance  they 
lost  all  order,  the  supporting  brigade  was  not  up,  and 
Doubleday,  seeing  the  disaster  that  had  befallen  his 
right,  threw  his  reserve  on  Davis'  right  flank,  crumpled 
it  up,  and  forced  the  whole  to  retreat  with  great  loss 
across  the  Run.2  This  success  re-established  the 
Union  right.  On  their  left  Archer  had  crossed  the 
Run  and  pushed  into  McPherson's  Wood,  but  so 
vigorously  was  he  met  by  Meredith  that  after  a 
determined  encounter  the  Confederates  were  driven 

1  Doubleday's  report.  2  Ibid. 

68 


out  of  the  wood  and  back  across  the  Eun,  Archer 
himself  and  many  of  his  men  being  taken  prisoners. 
But  the  Federals  had  not  gained  this  success  without 
paying  a  heavy  price  for  it.  General  Reynolds  was 
dead,  shot  through  the  head  while  personally  directing 
the  movements  of  Meredith's  brigade.1  So  fell 
General  Meade's  right-hand  man,  the  most  brilliant 
officer  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  a  victim  to  his 
own  impetuous  rashness.  The  Confederate  assaults 
on  both  wings  had  been  repulsed,  and  Doubleday, 
who  was  now,  by  the  death  of  Reynolds,  the  senior 
officer  on  the  field,  re-formed  his  line  in  its  old  position. 
A  lull  ensued  in  the  action,  but  as  both  sides  were 
rapidly  receiving  reinforcements,  it  was  obvious  that 
the  struggle  would  soon  be  renewed.' 

About  noon  Pender's  Confederate  division  of  Hill's 
Corps  reached  the  field  from  Cashtown,  and  was 
deployed  to  the  right  of  the  Chambersburg  pike  in 
rear  of  Heth.  Ewell's  Corps  was  also  close  at  hand. 
Rodes'  division,  marching  in  the  morning  from 
Heidlersburg,  reached  the  neighbourhood  of  Oak 
Hill  about  1  p.m.,  Devin's  piquets  reporting  its 
appearance  to  Doubleday.  Early's  division,  coming 
from  York,  was  approaching  from  the  north-east,  a 
direction  which  would  bring  him  upon  the  right 
flank  and  rear  of  the  Federals.  On  the  Union  side 
the  remainder  of  the  First  Corps,  comprising  the 
divisions  of  Rowley  (late  Doubleday 's)  and  Robinson, 
reached  the  Seminary  about  11  a.m.,  closely  followed  by 
the  leading  brigade  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  which  had 
marched  from  Emmittsburg  that  morning.  General 
Howard,  in  command  of  the  latter,  rode  on  ahead 
of  his  troops  to  Cemetery  Hill,  where  he  received  the 
sad  news  of  Reynolds'  death.  This  left  him  the 
senior  officer  on  the  spot.  A  glance  over  the  field 
revealed  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  he  at  once 

1  Meredith's  report,  Official  Records. 
69 


sent  back  a  message  to  his  own  corps  to  hasten 
forward,  and  another  to  General  Sickles  at  Taneytown, 
urging  him  to  march  at  once  with  the  Third  Corps 
on  Gettysburg.1  His  hasty  glance  over  the  ground 
led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  Cemetery  Ridge 
formed  the  only  suitable  position  for  his  small  com- 
mand, but  owing  to  the  necessity  of  extracting  the 
First  Corps  from  its  exposed  situation  it  was  impossible 
to  adopt  this  plan.2  By  1  p.m.  the  divisions  of 
Barlow  and  Shurz  appeared  on  the  field,  and  were 
ordered  by  Howard  to  form  in  line  on  Seminary 
Ridge,  north  of  the  Chambersburg  pike,  thus  pro- 
longing Doubleday's  line  en  echelon  to  the  north. 
But  this  order  was  never  executed.  Devin's  reports 
indicated  that  the  enemy  was  approaching  in  great 
strength  from  the  north.  The  Eleventh  Corps  was 
therefore  ordered  to  form  front  in  that  direction,  the 
line  being  formed  in  the  level  fields  north  of  the  town, 
Barlow's  right  resting  on  a  knoll  above  Rock  Creek 
and  Shurz's  left  on  the  Mummasburg  pike.  The 
two  divisions  numbered  about  6000  men  in  all. 
Steinwehr's  division,  which  came  up  last,  together 
with  two  batteries,  was  retained  by  Howard  as  a 
reserve  on  Cemetery  Hill,  where  he  took  up  his  own 
position.  Rowley's  division  of  the  First  Corps  had 
been  pushed  forward  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  Doubleday's 
very  weak  line,  Stone's  brigade  on  the  right,  resting 
on  the  turnpike,  Biddle's  on  the  left  of  Meredith. 
Robinson  was  held  in  reserve  at  the  Seminary,  which 
his  troops  put  into  a  rough  state  of  defence.  It  will 
be  seen  that  the  Federal  position  now  formed  a  kind 
of  obtuse  angle  ;  the  line,  however,  was  not  complete, 
a  gap  of  over  700  yards  intervening  between  the  left 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps  and  the  right  of  the  First. 
The  artillery  was  thus  distributed  : — 

3  batteries  on  Seminary  Ridge  and  2  batteries  on 

1  Howard's  report.  2  Ibid. 

70 


the  turnpike,  in  rear  of  the  firing  line  ;  the  whole  in 
action  against  the  Confederate  batteries  behind 
Willoughby  Run. 

3  batteries  in  rear  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  in  action 
against  Oak  Hill. 

2  batteries  in  reserve  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

1  battery  with  Gamble's  cavalry  brigade. 

3.  Renewal    of    the  Attack  :     Defeat   of   the 
Federals. 

The  battle,  which  since  11  a.m.  had  been  hanging 
fire,  was  now  bursting  out  again  with  renewed 
intensity  on  all  sides.  General  Ewell  reached  Oak 
Hill  in  person  about  1  p.m.,  and  his  keen  military  eye 
at  once  perceived  the  importance  of  this  position, 
which  would  enable  him  to  bring  an  enfilading  fire 
upon  the  First  Corps.1  Four  batteries  were  rapidly 
brought  into  action  on  the  hill,  and  their  fire  produced 
a  most  telling  effect,  the  two  Federal  batteries  on 
the  turnpike  being  withdrawn  in  a  shattered  condi- 
tion, while  Cutler's  brigade  was  so  cut  up  that  it  was 
withdrawn  to  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  Seminary 
Ridge.2  This  movement  exposed  Stone's  flank, 
compelling  him  to  refuse  his  right,  so  that  his  line 
became  a  right  angle,  resting  on  the  turnpike.  Rodes 
had  deployed  his  division  for  attack  with  the  brigades 
of  Daniel,  Iverson,  O'Neal,  and  Dole  in  line,  and 
Ramseur  in  support,  the  centre  of  his  line  being 
intersected  by  Seminary  Ridge.  The  gap  in  the 
enemy's  front  had  not  escaped  his  notice,  and  now  at 
2.30  p.m.  he  pushed  forward  O'Neal  and  Iverson  to 
seize  the  interval.3  At  the  same  moment  Doubleday 
had  ordered  up  Robinson's  division  from  the  Seminary 
to  close  the  gap.   Baxter's  brigade,  advancing  to  do  so, 

1  EwelFs  report,  Official  Records. 

2  Doubleday's  report,  ibid. 

3  Ewell's  report,  Official  Records. 

71 


came  violently  into  collision  with  Iverson  and  O'Neal, 
but  he  managed  to  hold  his  own,  punishing  severely 
his  assailants,  until  Paul's  brigade  came  up  to  his 
support,  when  a  vigorous  counter-attack  hurled  Iver- 
son back  with  great  slaughter  and  the  loss  of  300 
prisoners.1  This  success  was  highly  inspiriting  to 
the  Federals  at  the  moment,  but  it  ultimately  proved 
most  disastrous.  For  Baxter,  in  the  excitement  of  his 
countercharge,  had  advanced  over  500  yards  beyond 
the  position  assigned  to  him  on  the  left  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  so  that  his  right  flank,  which  should  have 
been  covered  by  Von  Amberg,  was  now  entirely 
exposed.  As  Iverson  fell  back,  Daniel's  Confederate 
brigade  advanced  and  attacked  Stone's  right  wing, 
while  Davis'  brigade  assaulted  his  left.  The  fighting 
here  was  very  desperate,  Colonel  Stone  and  his 
second-in-command,  Colonel  Wister,  both  being  shot 
down,  while  Daniel's  loss  was  equally  severe,  for  he 
was  exposed  to  an  enfilade  fire  from  Cutler's  brigade. 
On  the  Confederate  right  Heth's  division  renewed  the 
attack  on  McPherson's  Wood,  where  Meredith  and 
Biddle  still  stubbornly  held  their  own. 

It  was  now  nearly  4  p.m.  On  the  extreme  left  of 
the  Confederate  line  Early  was  at  last  in  position  to 
attack.  He  formed  the  brigades  of  Hoke,  Hays,  and 
Gordon  in  line  across  the  Heidlersburg  road,  on  both 
sides  of  Rock  Creek,  with  Smith's  brigade  in  support. 
Four  batteries  came  into  action  in  the  fields  east  of 
the  road,  completely  enfilading  the  Eleventh  Corps.2 
On  the  Union  side  all  was  foreboding  and  despair. 
Doubleday  and  Shurz  sent  to  Howard,  asking  urgently 
for  reinforcements.  Howard  replied  that  he  had  none 
to  spare,  for  he  considered  it  essential  to  hold  on  to 
Cemetery  Hill  as  an  ultimate  rallying  point.3     To 


1  Iverson's  report,  Official  Records. 

2  Early's  report,  ibid. 

3  Howard's  report,  ibid. 

72 


all  appeals  for  orders  he  replied,  "  Hold  on  a  while 
longer,  for  I  am  expecting  Slocum  at  any  moment. " 
The  crisis  had  now  arrived.  A  little  after  4  p.m. 
all  the  Confederate  forces  on  the  field  under  Hill, 
Rodes,  and  Early  advanced  simultaneously  to  the 
attack.  On  the  Union  right  the  issue  was  quickly 
decided.  Gordon's  brigade  rushed  forward  with  a 
yell  against  Barlow's  division,  Barlow  himself  was 
shot  down,  and  his  troops  gave  way  and  broke  to 
the  rear.  This  exposed  Shurz's  right  flank.  Dole, 
advancing  impetuously,  drove  him  back,  and  the  whole 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps  retreated  in  the  wildest 
disorder  towards  the  town.  Steinwehr,  on  Cemetery 
Hill,  threw  in  Coster's  brigade  to  check  the  rout,  but 
the  reinforcement  came  too  late.  Coster  became 
involved  in  the  rush  of  fugitives  to  the  rear,  and  was 
rolled  back  with  the  rest.1  Meanwhile  an  appalling 
struggle  was  raging  round  the  First  Corps.  The  rout 
of  Shurz's  division  exposed  Doubleday's  right  flank. 
Robinson's  division,  attacked  in  front  by  Ramseur,  in 
flank  by  O'Neal,  and  in  rear  by  Dole,  was  surrounded 
and  cut  to  pieces  after  a  desperate  resistance.  Out 
of  2500  men  who  went  into  action,  1690  were  killed 
or  wounded.2  Stone's  brigade,  attacked  by  Daniel, 
Davis,  and  Scales,  suffered  an  even  more  terrible  loss, 
only  400  men  out  of  1300  fighting  their  way  back  to 
Seminary  Ridge.2  Cutler  was  able  to  effect  his  retreat 
comparatively  unmolested,  but  the  loss  in  this 
brigade  had  already  amounted  to  nearly  1000  casual- 
ties.2 On  the  left  Biddle  and  Meredith  still  managed 
to  retain  their  ground  against  Heth  and  Pender,  but 
to  hold  on  any  longer  was  manifestly  hopeless.  Double- 
day,  seeing  that  the  day  was  lost,  sent  one  of  his  staff 
to  ask  Howard  for  orders.  This  officer  found  the 
General   at   the   Cemetery,    looking   the   picture   of 

1  Howard's  Report,  Official  Report. 

2  For  details  of  casualties  see  "  Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III. 

73 


despair,  for  he  had  just  witnessed  the  rout  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps.1  Howard  could  do  nothing  but 
order  Doubleday  to  fall  back  fighting  in  as  good 
order  as  possible.  This  was  done,  although  with 
great  difficulty,  the  Union  line  being  rallied  on  Sem- 
inary Ridge.  Here  these  brave  troops,  unshaken  by 
the  fearful  ordeal  that  they  had  passed  through, 
prepared  to  hold  the  position  long  enough  to  enable 
the  Union  batteries  to  be  withdrawn.  The  Con- 
federates, flushed  with  triumph,  advanced  with  yells 
that  rang  over  the  whole  field.  Their  assault  was 
stubbornly  met,  Heth  being  slightly  wounded  and 
Scales'  brigade  much  shaken.  This  gallant  defence 
served  its  purpose.  The  Union  batteries  were  got 
off  in  safety,  and  then,  abandoning  the  ridge,  the 
shattered  remnants  of  the  once  splendid  First  Corps 
retreated  to  the  town.2  Here  a  terrible  scene  ensued. 
The  Eleventh  Corps,  pouring  in  total  rout  through  the 
streets,  came  into  violent  collision  with  Doubleday 's 
gallant  regiments,  which  still  retained  some  semb- 
lance of  their  organisation.  The  townspeople,  hurry- 
ing to  their  doors,  saw  with  sorrow  and  dismay 
the  disaster  that  had  overwhelmed  their  defenders. 
The  Confederates  came  fiercely  on  behind.  Hays 
and  Hoke  crossed  Rock  Creek  near  the  railway  bridge 
and  rushed  into  the  town,  capturing  thousands  of 
prisoners.3  The  survivors  streamed  up  the  slopes 
of  Cemetery  Hill,  where  Steinwehr's  division  formed 
the  only  nucleus,  and  one  of  doubtful  solidity,  on 
which  to  rally.  The  situation  was  black  indeed.  The 
First  Corps  was  reduced  to  a  mere  remnant  barely 
2500  strong.  The  morale  of  the  Eleventh  Corps 
was  destroyed,  and  the  men,  in  spite  of  the  efforts 
of    their    officers,    were    only   rallied   with    extreme 

1  Doubleday  :  "  Chancellors ville  and  Gettysburg." 

2  Doubleday's  report. 

3  Hoke's  report,  Official  Records. 

74 


difficulty.1  Fortunately  there  had  arrived  on  Ceme- 
tery Hill  an  able  and  energetic  commander  in  the 
person  of  General  Hancock,  who  had  been  sent  forward 
by  General  Meade,  on  receipt  of  the  news  of 
Reynolds'  death,  to  take  command  of  all  the  troops 
at  Gettysburg.  Under  his  supervision  some  sort  of  a 
line  was  finally  formed,  and  the  batteries  placed  so  as 
to  command  the  approaches  from  the  town. 

Luckily  for  the  Federals,  their  opponents  were  too 
much  disorganised  by  their  rapid  advance  to  follow 
up  the  victory  promptly.  General  Lee  had  arrived 
in  person  on  the  field  at  the  moment  when  the 
Confederates  were  making  their  combined  attack  at 
the  close  of  the  day.  It  was  a  triumphal  moment  for 
him.  Everywhere  the  enemy  was  giving  way,  and 
from  the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge  he  saw  his  dis- 
organised masses  pour  through  the  town  and  up  the 
hill  beyond.  The  show  of  resistance  made  by  Han- 
cock did  not  deceive  him,  and  appreciating  the 
importance  of  carrying  this  position,  he  despatched 
one  of  his  staff  to  Ewell  with  instructions  "  to  press 
those  people,  and  secure  the  hill  if  possible."2  But 
the  latter  had  not  got  his  troops  in  hand  for  a  fresh 
attack.  Early  had  formed  Hays  and  Hoke  in  position 
to  advance,  but  his  other  brigades  were  away  on  the 
left  flank,3  and  Rodes'  division  was  in  some  disorder 
and  not  yet  up.  Heth  and  Pender  had  halted  on 
Seminary  Ridge.  It  was  possible  that  the  Federals 
had  received  large  reinforcements,  they  showed  a 
bold  front,  and  under  the  circumstances  Ewell  decided 
to  use  his  discretion  and  await  the  arrival  of  John- 
son's division  before  renewing  the  attack.4  Johnson 
reached  the  field  shortly  before  sunset,  and  was  7  at 


1  Hancock's  report,  Official  Records. 

2  Taylor. 

3  Early's  report,  ibid. 

4  Ewell's  report,  ibid. 

75 


once  moved  forward.  But  the  situation  had  now 
materially  altered.  Slocum's  Corps,  marching  from 
Taneytown,  reached  Cemetery  Hill  about  7  p.m.,1 
and  part  of  the  Third  Corps  came  up  a  little  later. 
These  fresh  troops  made  the  position  practically  safe 
against  a  coup  de  main,  and  Lee,  having  ascer- 
tained that  the  enemy  had  been  reinforced,  decided 
to  make  no  further  advance  that  night. 

It  had  indeed  been  a  day  of  disaster  to  the  Union. 
Over  6000  Federals  had  been  killed  or  wounded, 
and  between  3000  and  4000  captured,  an  aggregate 
of  nearly  10,000  casualties,  together  with  three  guns 
lost.  The  First  Corps  had  gone  into  action  about 
8200  strong,  and  the  Eleventh  Corps  about  9000. 
To  this  must  be  added  Buford's  two  brigades,  num- 
bering some  2800  sabres,  making  the  total  Federal 
force  on  the  field  roughly  20,000.  The  Confederates 
brought  into  action  upwards  of  27,000  men  from 
first  to  last.  Hill  lost  2400,  Ewell  about  3000, 
making  the  total  Confederates  loss  5400,  about  20 
per  cent,  of  the  numbers  engaged.2 

4.  Night  of  July  1. 

About  10  p.m.,  at  his  head-quarters  in  Taney  town, 
General  Meade  received  a  despatch  from  Hancock 
reporting  the  disaster  at  Gettysburg.  Rumours  of 
misfortune  had  been  coming  from  the  front  all  day, 
and  he  had  already  notified  his  corps  commanders 
to  hold  their  troops  in  readiness  to  march  on  Gettys- 
burg. On  the  receipt  of  Hancock's  report  all  uncer- 
tainty was  at  an  end.  The  enemy  was  evidently 
concentrating  his  entire  strength  at  Gettysburg. 
Slocum  and  Sickles,  acting  without  orders,  had 
already  reached  the  field,  and  Meade  had  now  no 

1  Slocum's  report,  Official  Records. 

2  Doubleday,   "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg." 

76 


other  course  open  to  him  but  to  push  forward  the  rest 
of  his  army  to  effect  a  counter-concentration.  So 
the  line  of  Pipe  Creek  was  definitely  abandoned,  and 
the  Second,  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  ordered  forward 
to  Gettysburg,  Meade  himself  starting  for  the  same 
place  at  11  p.m.1  At  7  a.m.  on  the  morning  of  July  2 
the  Second  Corps  reached  the  battlefield,  followed 
at  8  a.m.  by  the  remainder  of  the  Third  and  part  of 
the  Fifth.  The  rest  of  the  Fifth  arrived  about  noon, 
and  Newton's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  about  2  p.m. 
The  rear  of  that  corps,  brought  up  by  Howe's  division, 
which  had  to  march  over  30  miles  from  Manchester, 
did  not  reach  the  field  till  as  late  as  5  p.m.2 

The  positions  of  the  Confederate  forces  at  midnight 
on  July  1  were  as  follows :  Hill's  Corps  bivouacked 
on  Seminary  Ridge,3  Rodes'  division  and  part  of 
Early's  in  the  town,  Johnson's  division  in  the  fields 
east  of  Rock  Creek.  Longstreet's  Corps  was  strung 
out  along  the  road  between  Chambersburg  and  Gettys- 
burg, McLaws'  division  2  miles  from  the  latter  place, 
Hood  at  Greenwood,  Law's  brigade  at  New  Guild- 
ford, and  Pickett's  division  at  Chambersburg.  Stuart, 
with  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Hampton, 
Chambliss,  and  Jenkins,  was  hurrying  south  from 
Carlisle,  Robertson  with  his  own  and  Jones'  brigade 
moving  north  from  Williamsport.  Imboden  was  at 
McConnelsburg  in  the  Cumberland  Valley,  collecting 
supplies. 

5.  Description  of  the  Field. 

Cemetery  Hill  is  an  oval-topped  eminence,  with 
gently  sloping  sides,  rising  immediately  south  of  the 
town.     A  thousand  yards  to  the  south-east  rises  the 

1  Meade's  report. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Anderson's  division  reached  the  field  about  4  p.m.,  but  took 
no  part  in  the  action. 

77 


wooded  crest  of  Gulp's  Hill,  connected  to  the  Ceme- 
tery Hill  by  a  saddle  or  neck  of  ground.  Round  its 
eastern  base  winds  Rock  Creek,  a  small  stream,  some 
30  feet  wide  and  6  inches  deep,  with  wooded  banks. 
East  of  Culp's  Hill  the  ground  is  wooded  and  hilly. 
To  the  south  it  changes  to  flat,  open  fields,  inter- 
sected by  small  watercourses,  which  drain  into  Rock 
Creek.  Cemetery  Hill  is  prolonged  to  the  south  by 
what  is  known  as  Cemetery  Ridge,  a  slight  undula- 
tion of  the  ground,  almost  entirely  bare  of  trees, 
which  extends  some  2500  yards  as  far  as  Wiekert's 
House.  A  mile  away  to  the  west,  across  a  flat  plain 
destitute  of  cover,  runs  the  corresponding  crest  of 
Seminary  Ridge,  showing  up  from  the  Cemetery 
against  the  sky  line  as  a  broken  line  of  dark  woods.1 
At  Wiekert's  House  the  open  ground  that  marks 
Cemetery  Ridge  disappears,  and  is  succeeded  by  a 
medley  of  woods,  bogs,  and  thick  undergrowth, 
out  of  which  rises  the  steep,  rocky  eminence  of  Little 
Round  Top.  This  forms  a  spur  of  the  still  loftier 
Round  Top,  or  Sugar  Loaf  Mountain.  Both  these 
hills  are  covered  with  woods  from  base  to  brow,  their 
sides  are  very  steep,  and  their  surfaces  extremely 
rugged  and  broken.  Their  summits  command  mag- 
nificent views  over  the  surrounding  country.  As 
regards  the  roads,  the  following  should  be  noted : 
First,  the  Taney  town  pike,  running  due  south  in 
rear  of  Cemetery  Ridge  and  Round  Top.  Secondly, 
the  Baltimore  pike,  ascending  the  northern  face  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  then  turning  eastwards  and  crossing 
Rock  Creek,  leaving  Culp's  Hill  on  the  left  hand. 
Thirdly,  the  Emmittsburg  pike,  which  branches  off 

1  It  should  be  remembered  that  neither  Cemetery  Hill  nor  the 
ridge  of  the  same  name  form  at  all  conspicuous  natural  features. 
Viewed  from  the  Lutheran  Seminary,  they  are  hardly  noticeable  ; 
the  objects  that  actually  strike  the  eye  are  Culp's  Hill  and  Bound 
Top.  The  same  is  true  of  Seminary  Ridge.  From  the  Union 
position  it  does  not  look  like  a  ridge  at  all. 

78 


from  that  to  Baltimore  at  the  foot  of  Cemetery  Hill 
and  then  runs  south-west  diagonally  across  the  fields 
between  the  two  ridges. 

6.  Dispositions  of  the  Union  Army,  Morning 
of  July  2. 

General  Meade  arrived  in  person  on  the  field  about 
1  a.m.,  looking  tired  and  anxious.1  As  soon  as  it 
was  sufficiently  light,  he  went  forward  to  examine 
the  position.  The  line  to  be  held  was  about  7500 
yards  long,  from  Round  Top  on  the  left  to  Culp's 
Hill  on  the  right,  and  was  in  shape  somewhat  like 
the  letter  J,  the  vertex  of  the  curve  being  formed  by 
Cemetery  Hill.  The  high  hills  on  the  flanks  and  the 
open  ridge  in  the  centre,  with  its  excellent  field  of  fire, 
afforded  admirable  positions  for  defence.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  ground  did  not  lend  itself  well  to 
counter  attack,  and  the  Seminary  Ridge,  about  a  mile 
away,  would  afford  an  enemy  good  positions  for  his 
artillery.  However,  the  first  drawback  did  not  worry 
General  Meade,  whose  plans  were  based  almost 
entirely  on  a  passive  defence. 

Having  inspected  the  position,  Meade  proceeded  to 
make  his  dispositions  to  hold  it.  By  11  a.m.  his  line 
was  completely  formed.  On  the  right  was  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  under  Slocum,  his  right  flank  resting 
on  a  small  stream  that  flows  into  Rock  Creek  near 
McAllister's  Mill,  and  his  left  on  Culp's  Hill.  The 
troops  had  spent  the  early  hours  of  the  morning 
in  strengthening  their  lines  with  log  breastworks 
and  abattis  of  felled  trees.2  On  Slocum's  left  was 
the  Eleventh  Corps  holding  Cemetery  Hill,  its  right 
connecting  with  Wadsworth's  division  across  the 
head  of  the  valley  that  runs  up  between  the  two  hills. 

1  Doubleday  :   "  Chancellors ville  and  Gettysburg." 

2  Greene :  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

79 


The  remainder  of  the  First  Corps  formed  a  local 
reserve  in  rear  of  the  Cemetery.1  On  Howard's  left  was 
the  Second  Corps,  under  Hancock,  holding  Cemetery 
Ridge.  Sickles'  Third  Corps  was  ordered  to  prolong 
the  line  as  far  as  Round  Top,  while  the  Fifth  Corps, 
under  Sykes,  formed  a  general  reserve  at  Power's 
Hill.  The  Sixth  Corps  had  not  yet  reached  the  field. 
Meade's  head-quarters  were  established  in  a  small 
cottage  on  the  Taneytown  pike,  and  his  ammunition 
trains  and  reserve  artillery  were  parked  by  the  cross- 
roads near  Wiekert's  House.  Buford's  cavalry  division 
watched  the  left  flank,  but  was  withdrawn  about 
1  p.m.  and  sent  to  Westminster,  with  orders  to  guard 
the  supply  trains  which  had  been  assembled  at  this 
point.2 

General  Sickles  was  very  much  dissatisfied  with 
the  position  allotted  to  him  to  defend.  Owing  to  its 
close  and  intricate  character,  it  afforded  no  field  of 
fire  to  the  front,  no  well-marked  line  on  which  to 
deploy  his  command,  and  no  position  for  his  artillery. 
In  addition  to  all  this,  the  Emmittsburg  road,  running 
parallel  to  his  front  at  a  distance  of  some  1500  yards, 
offered  an  excellent  site  for  the  enemy's  batteries, 
whence  he  could  bombard  the  line  upon  which  Sickles 
was  required  to  form  his  corps.  The  Emmittsburg 
road  seemed  to  offer  a  far  more  advantageous  position. 
It  would  give  him  a  good  field  of  fire  to  the  front  and 
flanks,  excellent  sites  for  his  artillery,  and  its  posses- 
sion would  be  denied  to  the  enemy.  It  had,  however, 
some  grave  disadvantages.  His  left  flank  would  be 
en  Vair,  and  the  only  remedy  would  be  to  refuse  his 


1  The  First  Corps  received  a  strong  reinforcement  in  the  shape 
of  Stannard's  brigade,  which  came  up  on  the  night  of  the  1st, 
but  took  no  part  in  the  battle  that  day.  General  Newton  took 
over  the  command  of  the  First  Corps  on  the  2nd,  Doubleday 
resuming  the  command  of  his  division. 

2  Buford's  division  was  in  urgent  need  of  rest  and  recupera- 
tion. 

80 


left  by  swinging  it  back  towards  the  Round  Tops, 
thus  making  the  line  a  salient.  Furthermore,  the 
position  was  too  long  for  the  numbers  at  his  disposal, 
and  his  right  flank  would  lose  its  connection  with  the 
left  of  the  Second  Corps.  Sickles  rode  over  to  head- 
quarters and  explained  the  situation  to  General 
Meade,  who  sent  his  Chief  of  Artillery  (Brig. -General 
Hunt)  to  report  on  the  suitability  of  the  alternative 
position.  What  happened  subsequently  is  rather 
obscure,  but  Sickles  seems  to  have  considered  that 
Hunt  had  authority  to  authorise  the  proceeding,  and 
about  2  p.m.  he  commenced  to  move  his  troops 
forward  to  the  new  line.1  Birney's  division,  on  the 
left,  was  disposed  as  follows.  Graham's  brigade  was 
posted  at  the  angle,  in  an  enclosure  called  the  Peach 
Orchard,  surrounded  by  low  rubble  walls.  On  his 
left  was  De  Trobriand,  facing  south-west  on  sloping 
ground  leading  down  to  a  little  boggy  stream  which 
crossed  his  front.  Next  to  him  was  Ward's  brigade 
prolonging  the  line  as  far  as  Devil's  Den,  a  low  oval- 
shaped  hill,  covered  with  trees  and  large  boulders. 
Devil's  Den  is  separated  from  the  Round  Tops  by  a 
swampy  hollow,  full  of  dense  undergrowth,  through 
which  meanders  a  water-course  called  Plum  Run. 
Humphreys'  division  was  formed  along  the  Emmitts- 
burg  road,  Carr's  brigade  in  the  front  line,  Brewster 
and  Burling  in  support.  It  will  be  noted  that  the 
Round  Tops,  which  formed  the  key  to  the  whole 
Federal  position,  remained  unheld.  The  responsi- 
bility for  this  remarkable  piece  of  negligence  rested 
on  General  Sickles,  whose  conduct  will  be  referred 
to  later.  The  Federal  artillery  was  disposed  as 
follows  : — 

17   batteries   (81    guns)    on   Cemetery   Hill,   com- 
manding the  approaches  from  north,  east,  and  west. 

1  See  General  Hunt's  account  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders."     See 
also  the  reports  of  Meade  and  Sickles,  Official  Records. 

F  81 


7  batteries  (40  guns)  along  the  crest  of  Cemetery- 
Ridge,  in  rear  of  the  Second  Corps. 

10  batteries  (56  guns)  by  the  Peach  Orchard,  of 
which  5  were  placed  along  the  Emmittsburg  road, 
facing  north-west,  and  5  perpendicular  to  the  road, 
facing  south-west. 

One  6-gun  battery  on  Devil's  Den,  and  a  second  in 
rear  of  De  Trobriand's  brigade. 

The  reserve  artillery  (121  guns)  was  parked  by  the 
cross-roads  near  Wiekert's  House. 

The  strength  of  the  Union  army  on  the  morning 
of  July  2,  including  only  men  actually  present  for 
duty  with  the  colours,  was  : 


No.  of 

Corps. 

Infantry.  Artillery.  Total. 

guns. 

First     Corps  (Newton)     .  . 

3700 

500 

4200 

27 1 

Second       „     (Hancock)  .  . 

.       12400 

600 

13000 

24 

Third         ,,     (Sickles)       .  . 

.      11200 

700 

11900 

30 

Fifth         „     (Sykes) 

.      12000 

550 

12550 

26 

Sixth         ,,     (Sedgwick)  .  . 

.      14500 

1050 

15550 

48 

Eleventh  .,     (Howard)     . . 

5400 

600 

6000 

25  2 

Twelfth      „     (Slocum)      .  . 

8200 

400 

8600 

20 

Artillery  Keserve  (Hunt) 

2200 

2200 

110 

Details 

1900 

Total 

.     67400 

6600 

75900 

310 

The  returns  for  June  30 3  show  a  total  of  100,800, 
exclusive  of  the  cavalry  corps,  borne  on  the  muster 
rolls  of  the  army.  Deducting  10,000  casualties  on 
July  1,  we  are  left  with  a  balance  of  nearly  14,000 
men  absent  from  the  ranks  either  by  desertion, 
straggling,  or  other  causes.  The  rapid  march  to  the 
battlefield  probably  accounted  for  a  large  number  of 
the  stragglers. 


1  1  gun  was  lost  on  July  1. 

2  2  guns  lost  on  July  1. 

3  See  "  Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III. 

82 


7.  Confederate  Dispositions  for  the  Attack. 

With  the  earliest  streaks  of  light  General  Lee  was 
in  the  saddle,  examining  the  enemy's  position.1 
In  accordance  with  his  habit  on  important  occasions, 
he  held  an  informal  council-of-war,  at  which  his 
corps  commanders  were  invited  to  give  their  views 
on  the  situation.  General  Longstreet,  impressed  by 
the  strength  of  the  enemy's  flanks,  and  by  the  deadly 
field  of  fire  afforded  to  his  centre  by  the  wide  stretch 
of  open  fields  between  the  two  ridges,  was  strongly 
against  an  attack  ;  and  urged  the  alternative  scheme 
of  endeavouring  to  manoeuvre  the  enemy  out  of  the 
strong  position  he  had  taken  up  by  operating  against 
his  left  flank,  and  so  threatening  his  lines  of  com- 
munication with  Washington.2  The  merits  of  this 
scheme  will  be  discussed  later.  It  is  sufficient  here 
to  say  that  in  the  absence  of  his  cavalry,  General 
Lee  considered  such  manoeuvres  impracticable,  and 
preferred  the  alternative  plan  of  following  up  his 
unexpected  victory  of  the  previous  day  by  pressing 
the  attack  forthwith,  in  the  hope  of  catching  his 
opponent  unready,  with  part  of  his  army  still  in  the 
rear.3  But  on  which  flank  should  his  attack  be  made  ? 
A  careful  examination  of  the  ground  by  Gulp's  Hill 
soon  convinced  him  that  a  general  assault  on  this 
side  was  impracticable,  owing  to  the  broken  nature 
of  the  ground.  Moreover,  the  movements  of  troops 
towards  this  flank  would  be  visible  to  the  enemy  on 
Cemetery  Hill.  About  8  a.m.  Lee  returned  to  the 
Seminary.  Colonel  Long,  of  his  staff,  and  his  Chief  of 
Artillery,  General  Pendleton,  had  in  the  meantime 
examined  carefully  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  brought 
back  a  favourable  report.4     The   Confederate  com- 


1  White :   "  R.  E.  Lee." 

2  Longstreet :   "  From  Manassas  to  Appomatox." 

3  Lee's  report. 

4  See  Pendleton's  report. 

83 


mander  then  decided  on  his  plan  of  battle,  which  was 
as  follows  : — 

"  It  was  determined  to  make  the  principal  attack 
upon  the  enemy's  left,  and  endeavour  to  gain  a  position 
from  which  it  was  thought  that  our  artillery  could 
be  brought  to  bear  with  effect.  Longstreet  was 
directed  to  place  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood 
on  the  right  of  Hill,  partially  enveloping  the  enemy's 
left,  which  he  was  to  drive  in. 

"  General  Hill  was  ordered  to  threaten  the  enemy's 
centre,  to  prevent  reinforcements  being  drawn  to 
either  wing,  and  to  co-operate  with  his  right  division 
(Anderson's)   in  Longstreet's  attack. 

"  General  Ewell  was  instructed  to  make  a  simul- 
taneous demonstration  upon  the  enemy's  right,  to  be 
converted  into  a  real  attack  should  opportunity 
offer."1 

In  considering  this  plan,  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  at  this  time  (between  8  and  9  a.m.)  the 
Federal  left  wing  followed  the  crest  of  Cemetery 
Ridge  as  far  as  the  neighbourhood  of  Wiekert's  House 
and  there  ended,  Birney's  division  being  on  the  flank. 
The  Third  Corps  had  not  yet  taken  up  its  ultimate 
position  on  the  Emmittsburg  road ;  it  had,  in  fact, 
only  just  reached  the  field,  while  the  Fifth  Corps 
was  not  yet  quite  up,  and  the  Sixth  many  miles  away. 
Lee's  plan  of  attack  is  simple  and  clear.  He  pro- 
posed to  make  a  feint  on  the  enemy's  right  flank, 
a  holding  attack  on  his  centre,  and  a  decisive  attack, 
of  an  enveloping  nature,  with  16,000  men,  on  his  left, 
with  the  object  of  crumpling  up  that  flank  and 
rolling  it  in  on  the  centre. 

It  was  most  important  that  the  attack  should  be 
opened  as  soon  as  possible,  before  the  enemy  should 
have  time  further  to  strengthen  his  line,  or  to  receive 
additional   reinforcements.     The   orders   given   were 

1  Lee's  report. 
84 


verbal  only,  and  their  exact  wording  has  since  been 
the  subject  of  bitter  controversy,  but  there  is  no 
doubt  that  Longstreet  was  ordered  to  move  as  soon 
as  possible  with  the  troops  he  had  with  him.1  This, 
however,  he  did  not  do.  Shortly  after  sunrise  the 
divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  reached  Seminary 
Ridge,  but  Law's  brigade  of  Hood's  division,  which 
had  started  at  3  a.m.  from  New  Guildford,  24  miles 
away,  did  not  reach  the  field  till  nearly  noon.2  Not 
until  then  did  Longstreet  set  his  corps  in  motion 
towards  Round  Top,  and  the  march  thus  tardily 
commenced  was  still  further  delayed  by  bad  staff 
arrangements.  Moreover,  it  soon  became  evident 
that  General  Lee's  orders  had  been  framed  under  a 
misapprehension  of  the  enemy's  dispositions,  for  the 
position  that  Longstreet  was  to  have  taken  up  was 
found  to  be  already  occupied  by  Sickles.3  This 
necessitated  a  change  in  Longstreet's  intended  move- 
ment. It  was  not  till  nearly  4  p.m.  that  McLaws' 
division  reached  its  allotted  position,  wheeled  to  the 
left,  and  deployed  in  the  woods  by  Warfield's  House, 
while  Hood,  marching  past  his  rear,  formed  into  line 
on  his  right  across  the  Emmittsburg  road.  The  line 
of  woods,  which  border  Seminary  Ridge,  concealed  his 
division  from  the  view  of  the  Federal  troops  at  the 
Peach  Orchard,  and  from  the  signallers  on  Little 
Round  Top.  On  the  left  of  McLaws  was  formed 
Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  Corps,  in  line  along 
Seminary  Ridge.  Pender's  division  was  formed  in 
two  lines  on  the  left  of  Anderson,  his  left  resting  on 
the  Hagerstown  pike  near  the  Lutheran  Seminary. 
Heth's  division,  which  had  been  much  shaken  by  the 
action  on  July  1 ,  was  massed  in  reserve  behind  Pender 
and  took  no  part  in  the  fighting  this  day.     Rodes' 

1  See  Appendix  C. 

2  Law  :  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

3  Longstreet :    "  From  Manassas  to  Appomatox." 

85 


division  of  Ewell's  Corps  was  drawn  up  facing  Ceme- 
tery Hill,  his  line  passing  through  the  centre  of  the 
town  and  connecting  on  the  right  with  Pender,  on 
the  left  with  Early.  Half  of  the  latter 's  division  was 
formed  in  the  fields  east  of  Cemetery  Hill,  the  brigades 
of  Smith  and  Gordon  being  detached  to  the  north- 
east to  watch  the  left  rear  of  the  army.  On  Early's 
left  was  Johnson's  division  on  the  left  bank  of  Rock 
Creek,  facing  Culp's  Hill.  The  artillery  was  posted 
as  follows  : — 

Longstreet's  Corps. 

10  batteries  (37  guns),  under  Colonels  Alexander 
and  Cabell,  along  the  edge  of  the  woods  by  Warfleld's 
House.  Objective,  the  Peach  Orchard.  Range  about 
600  yards. 

2  batteries  (8  guns),  under  Colonel  Henry,  on  the 
right  of  Hood's  division  facing  Round  Top. 

Hill's  Corps. 

12  batteries  (44  guns),  under  Colonels  Mcintosh, 
Garnett,  and  Pegram,  along  the  line  held  by  Hill's 
Corps.  Objective,  Cemetery  Ridge.  Range  about 
2000  yards. 

Ewell's  Corps. 

5  batteries  (20  guns),  under  Colonel  Brown,  near 
the  Seminary. 

4  batteries  (16  guns),  under  Colonel  Carter,  in 
the  fields  north  of  the  town.  Objective,  Cemetery 
Hill.     Range  2000  yards. 

4  batteries  (16  guns),  under  Major  Latimer  (Andrew's 
battalion),  behind  Rock  Creek.  Objective,  Culp's 
Hill.     Range  about  1200  yards. 

The  effective  strength  of  the  army  of  Northern 
Virginia  on  the  morning  of  July  2  *  was  as  follows  : — 


1  See  "  Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III. 
86 


Strength  of 

all  Arms. 

Guns 

Longstreet's  Corps 

25,650 

83 

E  well's 

21,150 

81 

Hill's 

18,300 

77 

Total      ..  65,100  241 


8.  Attack  on  the  Union  Left  and  Centre. 

The  morning  passed  quietly  in  both  the  Union  and 
Confederate  lines,  with  the  exception  of  a  persistent 
but  desultory  firing  kept  up  between  the  hostile 
patrols  and  skirmishers.  General  Meade  had  at 
one  time  considered  the  feasibility  of  attacking  John- 
son's division  in  its  isolated  position  facing  Culp's 
Hill,  but  an  unfavourable  report,  made  by  Slocum, 
caused  him  to  abandon  the  idea.  General  Lee 
had  taken  up  his  position  on  Seminary  Ridge  near 
Hill's  head-quarters,  and  here  he  remained  all  day, 
seated  on  the  stump  of  a  tree,  sometimes  chatting 
with  his  staff,  at  other  times  studying  carefully  the 
enemy's  position  through  his  field-glasses.  His  man- 
ner was  cheerful  and  confident,  but  as  the  day  wore 
on,  and  still  there  came  no  sign  or  sound  of  Long- 
street,  his  impatience  became  intense.  Again  and 
again  his  staff  heard  him  exclaim,  "  What  can  be 
keeping  Longstreet !  What  can  be  keeping  him  !  "* 
It  was  past  4  p.m.  before  the  crash  of  artillery  from 
the  woods  to  the  south  announced  that  the  attack 
had  commenced  at  last.  The  ten  Confederate  batter- 
ies, posted  along  the  edge  of  the  woods  by  Warfield's 
House,  opened  fire  simultaneously  upon  the  Peach 
Orchard.  The  Federal  artillery  instantly  replied. 
At  such  close  range  the  fire  could  not  fail  to  be  very 

1  Long :    "  Memoirs  of  General  Lee." 
87 


deadly,  and  on  both  sides  the  loss  in  men  and  horses 
was  very  great.1  General  Sickles,  realising  from 
the  intensity  of  the  fire  that  the  main  attack 
was  about  to  be  directed  against  his  front,  sent 
back  hurriedly  to  Sykes  requesting  reinforcements. 
The  Fifth  Corps,  wearied  with  its  long  march  of 
eighteen  miles,  was  resting  near  Power's  Hill,  and 
Sykes,  thinking  that  there  was  no  special  need  for 
haste,  waited  till  his  men  had  drunk  their  coffee 
before  setting  them  in  motion  towards  the  Peach 
Orchard.2  General  Meade  had  also  hurried  to  the 
point  of  danger.  He  was  much  dissatisfied  with  the 
line  which  Sickles  had  thought  fit  to  occupy,  but 
seeing  that  the  enemy  was  on  the  point  of  attacking 
decided  that  it  was  now  too  late  to  attempt  to  correct 
it.  He  therefore  contented  himself  with  sending  his 
Chief  Engineer,  Brig.-General  Warren,  to  report 
on  the  safety  of  Sickles'  left  flank,  and  ordering 
Caldwell's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  to  reinforce 
his  right.3  Warren  reached  the  summit  of  Little 
Round  Top  about  ten  minutes  before  Longstreet 
launched  his  attack,  and  was  startled  to  find  it  unoccu- 
pied save  by  some  signallers.  But  he  experienced  a 
still  greater  shock  when  he  discovered  that  the  Con- 
federate infantry  were  already  deployed  in  the  woods 
in  front  of  him,  and  were  actually  on  the  point  of 
advancing.  Hurrying  down  the  hill  to  report  this 
critical  state  of  affairs,  he  came  upon  Barnes'  division 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  going  out  on  the  Peach  Orchard 
road  to  reinforce  Sickles.  In  view  of  the  urgency  of 
the  situation,  Warren  took  the  responsibility  of 
detaching   Vincent's    brigade,    without   referring   to 

1  Alexander :    "  Battles  and  Leaders."     Also  Hunt,  ibid. 

2  Doubleday :  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  167. 
General  Sykes'  own  report  is  extremely  difficult  to  follow.  It 
does  not  afford  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  his  delay  in  marching 
to  the  assistance  of  the  Third  Corps. 

3  Meade's  report,  Official  Records. 

88 


Barnes,  and,  with  a  hurried  explanation  of  the  cir- 
cumstances, sent  him  to  the  hill  top.1 

The  Confederate  attack  was  made  in  echelon  of 
divisions  from  the  right.  About  4.30  p.m.  Hood's 
division  advanced,  the  slanting  sunlight  shining  on 
their  long  lines  of  bayonets  as  they  swept  forward  in 
magnificent  order  across  the  valley.  A  few  minutes 
later  Hood  fell,  severely  wounded,  but  this  misfortune 
failed  to  check  the  steady  advance  of  his  command. 
On  the  right  Law's  Alabama  brigade  pressed  forward 
through  field  and  wood  until  it  reached  the  foot  of 
Round  Top.  Here  the  brigade  inclined  to  the  left 
towards  the  spur  formed  by  Little  Round  Top,  the 
regiment  on  the  right  passing  over  the  summit  of  the 
main  mountain  and  descending  on  the  further  side. 
Thus  this  important  position,  which  commanded 
the  entire  left  wing  of  the  enemy,  was  actually  in 
Confederate  hands ;  but  by  some  extraordinary  negli- 
gence no  garrison  was  left  on  its  summit,  and  Law's 
brigade  began  to  climb  the  south  face  of  Little  Round 
Top.2  As  chance  would  have  it,  Vincent's  Union 
brigade  was  scaling  the  north  side  at  the  same  moment. 
The  Federals  reached  the  top  first  by  a  bare  margin, 
and  received  their  opponents  with  a  volley  at  point- 
blank  range.  Then  among  the  tumbled  boulders  and 
dense  thickets  there  began  a  confused  and  bloody 
struggle  for  the  possession  of  the  hill.  Vincent  was 
quickly  reinforced  by  Weed's  brigade  and  by  Haz- 
lett's  battery,  which  was  dragged  up  by  incredible 
exertions  to  the  crest.  In  the  meantime  Robertson's 
Texan  brigade  advanced  to  attack  Devil's  Den.  He 
was  met  by  a  deadly  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery, 
and  the  brigade  wavered,  but  Benning,  coming  up 
in  support,  carried  the  whole  forward,  and  the 
Confederates,    sweeping    irresistibly    over    the     hill, 

1  Warren  :   "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

2  Law,  ibid. 

89 


captured  three  guns  of  Smith's  battery  and  drove 
Ward's  brigade  in  great  disorder  across  the  wheat- 
field.1  Halting  only  to  re-form  his  ranks,  Robertson 
led  his  brigade  across  Plum  Run  against  the  western 
side  of  Little  Round  Top,  while  Law  attacked  from 
the  south.  Again  and  again  the  Confederates  renewed 
their  charges,  but  their  opponents  fought  with  des- 
perate determination  to  cling  to  their  position.  The 
loss  on  both  sides  was  most  severe.  Weed,  Vincent, 
and  Hazlett,  were  all  struck  down,  with  550  of  the 
rank  and  file,  while  on  the  Confederate  side  the  loss 
in  the  two  brigades  amounted  to  over  1000  men.2 

At  the  same  time  that  Robertson  and  Benning 
attacked  Ward,  Anderson  advanced  against  De  Tro- 
briand.  Such  difficulty  did  the  latter  have  in  holding 
his  ground,  that  Burling's  brigade  was  thrown  in  to 
support  him.  The  whole  of  Hood's  division  being 
now  engaged,  McLaws  advanced  to  storm  the  Peach 
Orchard.  Here  was  the  real  focus  of  the  struggle. 
The  position  was  protected  by  stone  walls,  and  had 
in  front  a  bare  sloping  glacis,  over  which  the  assaulting 
lines  had  to  advance.  Longstreet  in  person,  hat  in 
hand,  led  his  troops  forward  under  a  storm  of  bullets 
until  the  head  of  Kershaw's  brigade  charged  across 
the  Emmittsburg  road.  Here  it  wheeled  to  the  left, 
and  attacked  the  batteries  in  rear  of  the  Peach 
Orchard.  This  movement  exposed  Kershaw's  right 
to  an  enfilade  fire  from  part  of  De  Trobriand's  line, 
but  Semmes,  coming  up  at  the  critical  moment,  rein- 
forced Kershaw  and  repulsed  the  counter-attack, 
falling  himself  mortally  wounded  at  the  same  moment.3 
Colonel  Alexander  pushed  forward  one  of  his  batteries 
as  far  as  the  turnpike,  where  it  came  into  action 

1  Smith's  report,  Official  Kecords. 

2  Law  :  "  Battles  and  Leaders."     Also  Doubleday  :  "  Chancel- 
lors ville  and  Gettysburg." 

3  Kershaw :   "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

90 


against  the  Peach  Orchard,  taking  the  troops  holding 
the  angle  in  enfilade.1  Simultaneously,  Barksdale, 
who  had  been  impatiently  awaiting  the  order  to 
advance,  led  his  Mississippi  brigade  at  the  front, 
swept  over  the  wall,  and  drove  back  Graham  in  the 
utmost  disorder.  Now  was  shown  the  fatal  weakness 
of  the  salient  angle,  for  when  the  Peach  Orchard 
was  captured,  both  Humphreys'  and  Birney's  lines 
were  taken  in  flank.  Humphreys,  with  commendable 
promptitude,  swung  back  part  of  his  line  at  an 
angle  to  the  road,  and  for  a  time  managed  to  hold  his 
own,2  but  Birney's  position  was  untenable,  for  not 
only  did  Barksdale  threaten  his  right  flank,  but 
Robertson,  by  the  capture  of  Devil's  Den,  had  already 
turned  his  left.  The  whole  line  gave  way,  and 
retreated  in  much  disorder  through  the  wheatfield 
in  rear  of  the  position.  Then  Alexander,  limbering 
up  his  batteries,  took  them  at  a  hand  gallop  across 
the  fields,  and  came  into  action  again  on  the  Emmitts- 
burg  road  against  the  retreating  enemy.3  The  six 
Federal  batteries  behind  the  Peach  Orchard  were  in 
great  danger.  Kershaw  was  pressing  forward  against 
them  in  front,  while  Barksdale  was  threatening  their 
flank  and  rear.  Retreat  was  inevitable,  but  owing 
to  the  great  number  of  casualties  among  the  horses, 
this  was  an  operation  of  extreme  difficulty.  Never- 
theless it  was  in  great  measure  successfully  performed. 
Many  of  the  guns  were  run  back  by  hand,  others 
had  to  be  left  on  the  field,  and  fell  for  a  time  into  the 
enemy's  hands.  All  that  were  brought  off,  mingled 
together,  their  organization  completely  lost,  were 
massed  by  General  Hunt  in  rear  of  Plum  Run  along 
the  edge  of  a  wood,  and  did  much  by  their  fire  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  Federal  infantry.4 

1  Alexander,  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

2  Humphreys'    report,    Official   Kecords. 

3  Alexander,  ibid. 

4  Hunt  :    "  Battles    and    Leaders." 

91 


At  the  moment  that  Birney's  line  gave  way  and 
retreated  across  the  wheatfield,  the  leading  brigades 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  on  the  point  of  arriving  to 
their  support.  Had  they  reached  the  field  twenty 
minutes  earlier,  their  arrival  might  have  turned  the 
scales,  but  now  it  was  too  late.  Sweitzer's  and  Til- 
ton's  brigades  of  Barnes'  division  advanced  in  line 
in  rear  of  Birney  to  cover  his  retreat.  The  rush 
of  fugitives  through  their  ranks  threw  them  into 
disorder,  and  before  this  could  be  rectified  Anderson 
and  Wofford  charged  them  in  front  and  flank, 
crumpled  them  up,  and  flung  them  back.  Sykes 
sent  forward  Ayres'  division  as  a  last  hope,  and 
Caldwell's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  was  thrown 
in  as  well  to  stem  the  advance  of  the  exultant  Con- 
federates. For  a  moment  they  succeeded.  Brooke's 
brigade  forced  back  Semmes'  almost  as  far  as  the 
Emmittsburg  road,  but  Barksdale  and  Wofford 
struck  in  upon  his  right  flank,  and  Caldwell,  finding 
his  division  unsupported  and  almost  surrounded, 
had  no  choice  but  to  struggle  back  as  best  he  could 
to  Cemetery  Kidge.  This  isolated  Ayres,  who  was 
fiercely  attacked  on  his  right  flank,  and  only  succeeded 
in  extricating  himself  with  the  loss  of  1000  officers 
and  men.  At  this  moment  General  Sickles,  trying  to 
rally  the  beaten  troops,  was  himself  struck  by  a 
fragment  of  shell,  which  tore  off  his  right  leg.  He 
had  to  be  carried  from  the  field,  the  command  of  his 
corps  devolving  upon  General  Birney.1 

Every  one  of  the  reinforcements  sent  in  to  save  the 
Third  Corps  had  been  checked,  outflanked,  and 
thrown  back  in  a  shattered  condition,  and  the  Con- 
federate advance  was  still  unchecked.  Fortunately 
for  the  Union  army,  Crawford's  division  of  the  Fifth 
Corps  had  not  yet  been  engaged,  and  Wright's  division 
of  the  Sixth  had  been  brought  up  by  Meade,  when  he 

1  See  reports  of  Birney,  Longstreet,  Caldwell,  and  McLaws. 

92 


perceived  the  disaster  that  was  overtaking  Sykes.1 
Posted  on  the  steep  ridge  that  rises  behind  Plum 
Run,  north  of  Little  Round  Top,  these  two  divisions 
formed  a  solid  nucleus  of  fresh  troops,  on  which  the 
shattered  fragments  of  the  Third  and  Fifth  Corps 
could  rally.  The  Confederates,  too,  were  in  much 
disorder  by  their  rapid  advance,  and  the  line  of  massed 
batteries  behind  Plum  Run  swept  with  their  fire 
the  ground  over  which  they  must  press  their  attack 
further.  Barksdale,  impatient  of  delay  while  aught 
remained  to  be  accomplished,  led  his  brigade  against 
the  guns  and  actually  captured  Watson's  battery  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet.  But  the  success  was  only 
momentary.  Willard's  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps, 
detached  from  Hancock  to  strengthen  the  threatened 
left  rank,  was  thrown  in  to  retake  the  battery.  Barks- 
dale  was  shot  down  while  imploring  his  men  to  stand 
firm,  and  died  within  the  Federal  lines.  His  brigade, 
exhausted  by  their  previous  efforts,  could  not  hold 
their  ground,  and  were  hurled  back  almost  as  far  as 
the  Peach  Orchard.  But  Willard's  success  was  as 
brief  as  that  of  Barksdale.  His  impetuous  counter- 
attack uncovered  his  flanks.  He  fell  dead  on  the 
field,  and  his  brigade,  surrounded  and  routed,  was 
flung  back  to  its  original  position  with  a  loss  of  700 
officers  and  men.2 

It  will  be  remembered  that  when  Barksdale  broke 
through  Sickles'  line  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  Hum- 
phreys swung  back  his  left  to  meet  an  attack  on  that 
flank,  and  retained  his  right  on  the  Emmittsburg 
road.  His  position,  however,  was  necessarily  very 
insecure,  and  it  only  needed  a  vigorous  effort  to  over- 
throw him.  Hill's  orders  were  to  co-operate  in 
Longstreet's  attack  with  his  right  division,  and  with 
the  remainder  to  threaten  Cemetery  Ridge,  and  so 

1  Meade's  report,  Official  Records. 

2  McLaws'  report,  ibid. 

93 


prevent  the  enemy  from  sending  reinforcements  to 
either  of  his  flanks.  Anderson's  division  was  ordered 
to  attack  in  echelon  of  brigades  from  the  right,  as 
soon  as  McLaws  should  be  fairly  engaged  with  the 
enemy.  Wilcox's  and  Perry's  brigades  were  facing 
Humphreys,  Wright  and  Posey  opposite  Gibbon's 
division  of  the  Second  Corps  on  Cemetery  Ridge. 
The  attack  was  pushed  gallantly  home  by  Wilcox, 
Perry,  and  Wright,  but  owing  to  a  misunderstood 
order  Posey  did  not  stir.1  Humphreys'  line  gave 
way  almost  instantly,  falling  back  through  a  tangle 
of  woods  and  enclosures  towards  Cemetery  Ridge, 
followed  closely  by  the  Confederates,  yelling  with 
exultation.  Hancock  threw  in  two  regiments  to  sup- 
port Humphreys'  right,2  but  these  were  immediately 
routed  by  Wright  and  driven  back  with  the  rest. 
Humphreys  fell  back  slowly,  struggling  to  retain 
his  ground,  but  Anderson's  attack  was  irresistible, 
and  he  was  forced  back  to  Cemetery  Ridge,  losing 
over  2000  officers  and  men  out  of  the  5000  which 
he  had  originally  taken  into  action.3  Doubleday's 
division  was  brought  rapidly  up  from  Cemetery 
Hill  to  cover  his  retreat,  and  this  succour  was  sorely 
needed,  for  the  Confederates,  flushed  with  victory, 
were  pressing  on  to  storm  the  ridge.  Wilcox  and 
Wright  actually  reached  the  crest,  but  Perry  was 
beaten  back  by  the  concentrated  fire  of  several  batter- 
ies. Now  was  the  time  when  a  strong  reserve  should 
have  been  at  hand  to  follow  up  and  secure  the  success 
which  Wilcox  and  Wright  had  so  gallantly  won. 
The  situation  was  intensely  critical.  The  Federals 
were  straining  every  nerve  to  hold  Longstreet  back, 
their  centre  had  been  broken  through,  a  little  more 
and  the  battle  would  be  won.     But  the  nearest  troops 


1  This  is  evident  from  Posey's  report. 

2  Hancock's  report. 

3  "  Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III. 

94 


that  were  in  a  position  to  support  Anderson  were 
those  of  Pender's  division,  nearly  a  mile  away  across 
the  valley,  and  Pender  had  not  moved.1  Wilcox 
maintained  his  position  on  the  crest  for  a  short  time, 
but  he  was  soon  menaced  by  greatly  superior  numbers, 
for  Williams'  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  was 
hurriedly  brought  up  by  General  Meade  in  person  to 
retake  the  lost  position.2  Wright,  whose  left  was 
exposed  by  Perry's  failure  to  advance,  was  obliged 
to  retreat,  and  then  Wilcox,  seeing  the  hopelessness 
of  further  effort,  extricated  himself  as  well  as  possible 
from  his  perilous  position  and  withdrew  across 
the  Emmittsburg  road.3  The  loss  in  Anderson's 
division  in  this  splendidly  executed  attack  was 
extremely  severe.  Wilcox  lost  fifty  per  cent,  of  his 
strength,  Wright  forty- two  per  cent.,  the  total  loss 
in  the  three  brigades  amounting  to  over  1900  men. 

By  this  time  it  was  8  p.m.  and  almost  dark.  On 
Longstreet's  front  the  Confederates  were  surging 
against  the  ridge  behind  Plum  Run,  the  red  flashes 
from  their  rifles  stabbing  the  darkness  among  the 
tangled  woods.  It  would  be  difficult  to  describe  the 
state  of  confusion  into  which  Longstreet's  Corps  was 
thrown  by  these  four  hours  of  desperate  and  successful 
fighting.  Regiments  and  brigades  were  all  mingled 
together  in  a  confused  mass,  while  the  gathering 
darkness  and  the  broken  ground  added  to  the  disorder. 
The  loss  of  life  had  been  frightful.  Hood's  division 
had  lost  2200  men,  McLaws  2100,  about  25  per  cent, 
of  their  fighting  strength.  On  the  Federal  side  it 
was  still  greater.  The  Third  Corps  had  suffered  over 
4000  casualties,  the  Fifth  1900,  the  reinforcements 
from  the  Second  Corps  2000.  But  the  bare  figures 
give  no  idea  of  the  frightful  ferocity  of  the  fighting, 

1  General  Pender  had  been  wounded.     See  page  101. 

2  Doubleday  :   "  Chancellorsville  and   Gettysburg." 

3  Wilcox's   report. 

95 


nor  of  the  shocking  appearance  of  the  ground  over 
which  Longstreet's  Corps  had  charged.  The  wheat- 
field  and  the  hollow  behind  it,  which  had  formed 
the  chief  centre  of  this  dreadful  struggle,  were  in 
truth  a  very  "  Valley  of  Death."  Yet  Longstreet, 
who,  once  the  action  had  commenced,  showed  an 
energy  and  resolution  beyond  praise,  proposed  a 
further  attack,  and  went  forward  to  Plum  Run  to 
examine  the  enemy's  line.1  But  the  position  was 
too  formidable.  The  divisions  of  Crawford,  Wright, 
and  Howe,  12,000  fresh  troops,  none  of  whom  had  as 
yet  fired  a  shot,  were  massing  on  the  ridge  before  him, 
while  the  shattered  and  disorganised  divisions  of 
Barnes,  Birney,  and  Caldwell  were  being  rallied  and 
re-formed.  His  own  troops  were  exhausted  by  their 
previous  efforts,  while  the  darkness  and  the  general 
disorder  all  urged  against  a  renewal  of  the  attack. 
On  the  right  the  prolonged  struggle  for  Little  Round 
Top  still  swayed  to  and  fro.  About  7  p.m.  Fisher's 
brigade  of  Crawford's  division  was  sent  to  reinforce 
the  Union  troops.  Pushing  forward  round  the  south 
side  of  the  hill  he  struck  Law's  right  flank,  rolled  it 
up,  and  forced  him  to  fall  back  towards  Plum  Run, 
while  the  Federals,  following  up  this  success,  seized 
and  held  the  summit  of  Round  Top.2  Desultory 
firing  continued  in  this  part  of  the  field  till  past  9  p.m., 
when  it  finally  ceased.  Reluctantly  abandoning  the 
idea  of  a  further  attack,  Longstreet  decided  to  with- 
draw his  troops  to  the  position  previously  occupied 
by  Sickles.  Barksdale's  brigade  held  the  Peach 
Orchard,  Semmes  and  Benning  Devil's  Den  ;  Wofford, 
Anderson,  and  Kershaw  were  withdrawn  across  the 
wheatfield,  while  Law  and  Robertson  maintained 
and  entrenched  their  positions  on  the  slopes  of  the 
Round  Tops.     No  counter-attack  on  a  general  scale 

1  Longstreet's  report,  Official  Records. 

2  Fisher's  report,  ibid. 

96 


was  attempted  by  the  Federals,  but  McCandless' 
brigade  was  pushed  forward  towards  the  wheatfield, 
and  harassed  Anderson  somewhat  in  his  withdrawal.1 
So  ended  the  long  and  bloodily  contested  struggle 
in  this  portion  of  the  field. 

9.  Attack  on  the  Union  Right. 

General  Lee's  plan  of  battle  directed  that,  as  soon 
as  Longstreet  commenced  the  principal  assault  on 
the  enemy's  left,  Ewell  was  to  make  a  holding  attack 
on  his  right,  to  be  converted  into  a  real  one  if  oppor- 
tunity offered.  It  was  of  course  essential  to  the 
success  of  the  scheme  that  Longstreet  and  Ewell 
should  both  attack  simultaneously.  Otherwise  it 
was  possible  that  one  might  be  crushed  by  a  concen- 
tration against  him,  before  the  other  could  come  into 
action.  Ewell's  instructions,  transmitted  to  his 
division  commanders,  were  that  Johnson  should 
attack  Culp's  Hill,  and  the  other  divisions  the  Ceme- 
tery, Early  from  the  east  and  Rodes  from  the  west, 
the  sound  of  Longstreet's  guns  at  the  Peach  Orchard 
being  the  signal  for  the  attack  to  commence.2  Pender 
on  Rodes'  right,  had  been  instructed  by  General  Hill 
to  hold  his  division  in  readiness  to  threaten  Cemetery 
Ridge,  and  to  co-operate  with  Anderson  or  Rodes, 
as  opportunity  might  offer.3 

By  4  o'clock  Johnson  had  his  four  brigades  in 
position,  facing  Culp's  Hill  on  the  left  bank  of  Rock 
Creek,  and  Early  on  his  right  held  Hays  and  Hoke 
ready  to  attack  the  Cemetery,  but  his  other  two  bri- 
gades were  still  in  the  rear,  two  miles  away,  and  Rodes 
had  not  yet  commenced  to  disengage  his  troops  from 
the  streets  of  the  town  and  deploy  for  the  attack.  Soon 
after  4  p.m.  the  roar  of  Alexander's  batteries  far 
away  by  Round  Top  broke  the  silence,  and  announced 

1  Crawford's  report.         2  Ewell's  report.         3  Hill's  report. 
g  97 


the  commencement  of  Longstreet's  attack.  Now 
was  the  time  for  E well's  Corps  to  advance.  But 
Gordon's  brigade,  which  had  been  ordered  in  to 
support  Early,  had  not  yet  come  up,  and  Johnson  was 
feeling  his  way  cautiously  forward  through  the  dense 
woods  below  Gulp's  Hill.  The  assault  was  accordingly 
delayed,  but  a  heavy  fire  was  opened  on  Cemetery 
Hill  by  the  Confederate  batteries  east  of  Rock 
Creek,  under  Major  Latimer,  and  by  those  north  of 
the  town,  under  Colonel  Carter.  The  enemy's  artil- 
lery, established  in  and  about  the  Cemetery,  replied 
promptly,  and  for  an  hour  the  artillery  duel  was 
hotly  maintained.  The  Confederate  batteries  were 
outnumbered  by  their  opponents,  besides  having 
none  of  the  advantages  of  position,  and  suffered 
considerable  loss  without  being  able  in  any  way  to  keep 
down  the  hostile  fire.1  All  along  the  fine,  from  the 
Cemetery  to  McAllister's  Mill,  the  Union  troops 
stood  to  arms,  expecting  an  assault,  but  two  hours 
passed,  and  the  Confederates  gave  no  sign.2  General 
Meade  was  in  a  state  of  terrible  anxiety.  He  had 
seen  the  Third  Corps  cut  to  pieces,  the  Fifth  had  been 
thrown  in,  and  all  that  could  be  spared  from  the 
Second,  and  still  Longstreet's  advance  was  unchecked. 
Believing  that  it  was  too  late  now  to  expect  an  attack 
on  his  right,  he  ordered  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  vacate 
their  trenches,  march  at  once  to  Round  Top,  and 
report  to  General  Sedgwick.3  This  was  done,  the 
divisions  of  Williams  and  Geary  quitting  their  lines 
about  7  p.m.,  upon  which  General  Meade  in  person 
took  charge  of  the  column,  and  led  it  to  its  destina- 
tion.4   But  General  Slocum,   who  was  aware   that 

1  EwelPs  report. 

2  Greene  :    "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

3  Meade's  report. 

4  Williams'  division,  commanded  by  Ruger,  was  brought  up 
to  reinforce  Humphreys  (see  page  95).  Geary  lost  his  way,  and 
did  not  come  up  in  time. 

98 


the  enemy  was  massing  opposite  Culp's  Hill,  was 
uneasy  as  to  the  safety  of  the  Union  right,  and  he 
obtained  permission  to  retain  Greene's  brigade  on 
Culp's  Hill,  to  hold  the  vacated  trenches. 

It  was  fortunate  indeed  that  he  did  so.  Hardly 
had  Kuger  and  Geary  commenced  their  march,  when 
Johnson  delivered  his  long-delayed  assault.  The 
brigades  of  Nicholls,  Jones,  and  Steuart  were  formed 
in  line,  Walker's  brigade  being  detached  to  watch  the 
left  flank,  owing  to  a  report  that  the  enemy  was 
advancing  from  that  quarter.1  Through  the  deep 
shadow  of  the  woods  the  Confederate  infantry 
advanced  towards  the  hill  top,  when  a  deadly  volley 
from  the  enemy's  breastworks  met  them  at  close 
quarters.  Nicholls'  and  Jones'  brigades  rushed  for- 
ward with  a  cheer,  but  failed  to  carry  the  formidable 
works  before  them.  Again  and  again  their  officers, 
displaying  the  most  superb  courage,  led  them  against 
the  position,  only  to  be  beaten  back  each  time  with 
terrible  loss.  As  soon  as  he  saw  Johnson  thus  fairly 
engaged,  Early  had  ordered  Hays  and  Hoke  to 
advance  on  Cemetery  Hill,  without  waiting  for 
Gordon.2  The  attack  was  pushed  home  in  the 
most  gallant  manner.  Four  of  Latimer's  batteries 
shelled  the  position  for  a  few  minutes,  and  then  the 
infantry  crossed  the  fields  and  began  to  climb  the 
hill.  As  they  advanced  they  were  met  by  a  furious 
fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  from  front  and  flank, 
but,  without  halting,  Hays'  Louisianians  charged  Von 
Gilsa's  brigade,  drove  them  back,  captured  Wied- 
richt's  battery,  and  reached  Bicketts'  on  the  crest 
of  the  hill.  A  murderous  hand  to  hand  struggle 
ensued  for  the  possession  of  the  guns.  Had  Gordon 
been  up   to  reinforce   Hays,   he   might  have  made 

1  The  enemy  proved  to  be  Gregg's  cavalry  division,  which 
reached  the  field  from  Hanover  about  (i  p.m. 

2  Early's  report. 

99 


good  his  footing ;  but  just  as  the  success  gained  by 
Wilcox  and  Wright  had  been  rendered  abortive  by 
the  failure  to  give  them  support,  so  now  the  fruits  of 
Hays'  splendid  charge  were  thrown  away  in  an  equally 
disheartening  manner.  For  a  moment  there  was 
dismay  in  the  Union  ranks.  Doubleday's  division, 
forming  the  local  reserve,  had  been  hurried  away  to 
meet  Wright's  assault.  Shurz's  division  could  not 
be  relied  upon.  At  this  crisis  Hancock  sent  Carroll's 
brigade  to  the  help  of  the  Eleventh  Corps.1  Had 
Rodes  attacked  as  was  intended,  he  would  not 
have  dared  so  to  weaken  his  own  lines  ;  but  Rodes' 
division  was  still  filing  out  of  the  streets  of  the  town, 
and  he  took  no  part  in  the  fight  whatever.  Carroll's 
arrival  turned  the  scales.  Instead  of  friends  Hays 
found  only  enemies.  Hoke's  brigades  had  been  beaten 
back  by  the  terrible  artillery  fire,  thus  exposing  Hays' 
left.  Finding  themselves  unsupported  and  their 
flank  threatened  by  Carroll,  the  Confederates  fell 
back  slowly  and  in  good  order,  taking  with  them  75 
prisoners  and  some  captured  colours.  Considering  the 
hazardous  character  of  the  attack,  their  loss  was  not 
excessive,  amounting  to  about  200  in  each  brigade  ;2 
this  was  mainly  due  to  the  waning  light,  which  inter- 
fered with  the  aim  of  the  Federal  gunners.3 

On  the  extreme  left  the  Confederates  had  been  more 
successful.  Steuart's  brigade,  pushing  up  the  slopes 
of  Culp's  Hill,  found  the  breastworks  at  this  point 
held  by  nothing  more  than  a  few  sentries.  They  were 
quickly  scattered  and  the  works  captured.  Steuart 
was  now  in  a  position  to  enfilade  the  right  of  the 
Federal  line,  which  he  was  rolling  up,  capturing  a 

1  Hancock's  report. 

2  In  popular  accounts  of  the  battle,  Hays'  brigade  (the  Louisiana 
"  Tigers  ")  is  described  as  having  been  almost  annihilated.  The 
absurdity  of  this  is  shown  by  Hays'  official  report,  in  which  his 
loss  on  this  occasion  is  given  as  23  officers  and  158  men,  total  181. 

3  Doubleday. 

100 


number  of  prisoners  and  a  stand  of  colours.  Greene 
quickly  called  up  his  small  reserve  to  check  him, 
but  the  Federal  position  was  intensely  critical,  and  it 
needed  little  more  to  render  the  whole  line  untenable.1 
Fortunately  for  Greene  it  was  now  quite  dark,  and 
the  flashes  of  the  rifles  were  all  that  there  was  to 
indicate  the  positions  of  the  hostile  lines.  Both  sides 
were  in  much  disorder,  and  Steuart,  who  had  almost 
won  the  key  of  the  position,  decided  not  to  hazard 
the  success  already  gained  by  a  further  advance  in  the 
dark,  but  to  remain  where  he  was  in  the  captured 
works  and  wait  for  daylight.2  Nicholls  and  Jones, 
the  latter  wounded,  had  suspended  the  attempt  to 
storm  the  rest  of  the  line,  and  about  10  p.m.  the  firing 
gradually  ceased.  Including  Early's  division,  the 
Confederate  loss  was  about  1000  officers  and  men ; 
that  of  the  Federals  not  more  than  600. 

A  word  of  explanation  is  required  here  to  account 
for  the  failure  of  Rodes'  and  Pender's  divisions  to 
take  any  part  in  the  assault  on  Cemetery  Hill,  a 
failure  which  threw  away  every  chance  of  success. 
Shortly  before  Johnson  launched  his  attack,  General 
Pender,  riding  along  his  line,  was  struck  by  a  frag- 
ment of  shell  and  severely  wounded,  an  injury  which 
the  subsequent  hardships  of  the  retreat  rendered  a 
mortal  one.3  An  unaccountable  delay  occurred  before 
General  Lane,  the  senior  brigadier  in  the  division, 
was  notified  that  the  command  had  devolved  upon 
him.  He  was  ignorant  of  the  orders  that  Pender  had 
received,  and  while  he  was  sending  to  Hill  for  instruc- 
tions the  time  for  action  had  come  and  gone.4  The 
failure  of  Rodes  to  co-operate  in  the  attack  is  less 
easy  to  explain.     He  did  not  commence  his  move- 


1  Greene :  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

2  Steuart's  report,  Official  Records. 

3  Hill's  report,  ibid. 

4  Lane's  report,  Official  Records. 

101 


ment  early  enough.  He  had  to  move  his  troops  out 
of  the  streets  by  a  flank,  change  direction  to  the  left, 
and  then  advance  twice  as  far  as  Early  ;  by  the  time 
he  was  ready  to  do  this,  it  was  too  late.1  The  result 
of  this  general  muddle  was  that,  instead  of  a  general 
attack  of  12,000  men  upon  Cemetery  Hill,  Early's 
two  brigades,  little  more  than  3000  strong,  advanced 
alone  and  unsupported  to  attack  three  times  their 
number,  strongly  posted  behind  entrenchments,  and 
backed  by  a  powerful  line  of  batteries. 

About  9  p.m.  the  divisions  of  Ruger  and  Geary, 
returning  to  their  lines  by  Culp's  Hill,  stumbled  into 
the  Confederate  sentries  holding  their  own  breast- 
works. For  the  first  time  the  Federals  realised  the 
imminent  danger  that  threatened  their  right  flank. 
Johnson  had  seized  a  position  within  four  hundred 
yards  of  the  Baltimore  turnpike,  and  could  he  make 
good  this  footing  he  would  render  indefensible 
the  whole  of  the  Federal  right  wing.  Ruger  hesi- 
tated to  incur  the  risks  of  an  attack  in  the  dark,  and 
the  random  shots  of  the  Confederate  sentries  were 
the  last  fired  that  night.  The  weary  troops  slept 
on  their  arms  in  the  positions  they  occupied  at 
nightfall,  aware  that  the  struggle,  so  bloody  and 
terrible,  was  still  undecided,  and  would  be  renewed  on 
the  morrow. 

1  Rodes'  report,  Official  Reports. 


102 


CHAPTER  V. 

GETTYSBURG,  THE  BATTLE  OF  JULY  3. 

1.  Preparations  to  Renew  the  Battle. 

The  night  of  July  2  passed  quietly,  unbroken  by 
any  collision  between  the  hostile  piquet  lines.  Short- 
ly after  the  firing  had  ceased  the  corps  commanders 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  received  orders  to  attend 
a  council-of-war  at  General  Meade's  head-quarters. 
The  question  they  were  asked  to  decide  was  :  Should 
the  army  remain  and  give  battle  again,  or  should  it 
retreat  ?  The  day  had  been  one  of  sad  disaster  to  the 
army  of  the  Potomac.  The  aggregate  loss  from  the, 
two  days'  fighting  amounted  to  the  appalling  total  of 
19,000  men,  the  whole  army  was  in  a  state  of  the 
greatest  disorder,  and  only  the  Sixth  and  Twelfth 
Corps,  which  had  been  barely  engaged,  were  in  re- 
liable condition  for  battle.  The  responsibility  that 
rested  on  General  Meade  was  heavy  indeed.  His 
army  was  all  that  stood  between  the  invaders  and  the 
rich,  unprotected  States  of  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey, 
and  New  York,  and  its  defeat  might  well  prove  a 
death-blow  to  the  Union.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  the  arduous  exertions  of  the  week,  the  terrible 
responsibility  of  his  position,  added  to  anxiety,  want 
of  sleep,  and  physical  exhaustion,  proved  a  strain 
almost  more  than  General  Meade  could  bear.  In  this 
crisis  his  officers  afforded  him  the  moral  support  of 
which  he  was  so  much  in  need.  It  is  a  common 
saying  that  a  council-of-war  never  fights,  but  in  this 

103 


instance  at  least  it  is  untrue.  All  were  impressed 
by  the  severity  of  the  punishment  which  the  army 
had  received,  nevertheless  all  were  of  the  opinion  that 
the  battle  ought  to  be  fought  out  to  the  bitter  end. 
Nowhere  else  in  Pennsylvania  would  they  find  another 
position  so  strong  for  defence  as  the  one  that  they 
were  now  holding,  and  a  retreat  after  the  events  of  the 
day  would  be  a  clear  acknowledgment  of  defeat, 
most  disastrous  to  the  morale  of  the  army.  After 
some  discussion  General  Butterfield,  Meade's  Chief 
of  Staff,  put  to  each  officer  in  turn  three  questions : 
Should  the  army  remain  on  Cemetery  Ridge,  should 
it  take  the  offensive,  and  if  it  was  decided  to  remain, 
how  long  ?  All,  without  an  exception,  voted  to 
remain.  It  was  also  decided  unanimously  to  await 
an  attack,  and  not  to  take  the  offensive.  On 
the  third  question  there  was  considerable  difference 
of  opinion.  General  Meade,  who  had  listened  at- 
tentively to  the  views  of  his  officers,  though  taking 
little  part  in  the  discussion  himself,  remarked  briefly, 
"  Such,  then,  is  the  decision,"  and  so  the  council 
broke  up.1 

At  daylight  on  July  3  General  Lee,  quitting  his 
head-quarters  on  the  Chambersburg  pike,  rode  over  to 
the    Peach    Orchard    to    consult    with    Longstreet.2 

1  See  Gibbon's  account  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders."  General 
Meade  was  afterwards  accused  of  having  made  up  bis  mind  to 
retreat,  and  it  is  said  that  be  bad  definitely  instructed  bis  Cbief 
Staff  Officer,  General  Butterfield,  to  draw  up  tbe  necessary  orders. 
The  statement  was  denied  by  General  Meade  ;  in  any  case,  the 
action  affords  no  proof  of  any  such  fixed  intention  on  his  part, 
being  merely  a  precaution  such  as  a  prudent  general  would  always 
take  in  view  of  possible  emergencies. 

2  At  this  council-of-war  there  were  present,  besides  General 
Lee,  the  following  officers :  Generals  Longstreet,  McLaws, 
and  Anderson,  Brig.-General  Wilcox,  and  Colonels  Taylor,  Long, 
and  Venable,  of  Lee's  staff.  No  written  record  of  the  pro- 
ceedings was  made,  and  the  orders  that  were  subsequently 
given   were   verbal   only.      Their   exact   wording   has   been   in 

104 


On  the  whole  the  results  of  the  previous  day's  fight- 
ing had  been  in  favour  of  the  Confederates.  They  had 
driven  in  the  enemy's  left  wing  a  distance  of  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile,  had  completely  routed  two  of  his 
corps,  and  had  secured  a  lodgment  on  the  right  of  his 
line  at  Culp's  Hill.  A  prompt  renewal  of  the  attack 
appeared  to  offer  every  prospect  of  success.  Lee's 
report  runs  as  follows  : — 

"  The  result  of  this  day's  operations  induced  the 
belief  that,  with  proper  concert  of  action,  and  with  the 
increased  support  that  the  positions  gained  on  the 
right  would  enable  the  artillery  to  render  to  the 
assaulting  columns,  we  should  ultimately  succeed, 
and  it  was  accordingly  detemined  to  continue  the 
attack.  The  general  plan  was  unchanged.  Long- 
street,  reinforced  by  Pickett's  three  brigades,  which 
arrived  near  the  battlefield  during  the  afternoon  of 
the  2nd,  was  ordered  to  attack  the  next  morning, 
and  General  Ewell  was  directed  to  assail  the  enemy's 
right  at  the  same  time.  General  Longstreet  was 
delayed  by  a  force  occupying  the  high  rocky  hills 
on  the  enemy's  extreme  left  (Round  Top),  from 
which  his  troops  could  be  attacked  in  reverse  as 
they  advanced.  His  operations  had  been  embar- 
rassed the  day  previous  by  the  same  cause,  and  he 
now  deemed  it  necessary  to  defend  his  flank  and  rear 
with  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws.  He  was 
therefore  reinforced  by  Heth's  division  and  two 
brigades  of  Pender's,  to  the  command  of  which  Major- 
General   Trimble   was   assigned.     General   Hill   was 

dispute  ever  since.  Nor  do  the  official  reports  of  the  chief  actors 
do  much  to  solve  the  mystery,  for  they  disagree  on  certain 
essential  points.  General  Lee's  own  report  is  vague  and  some- 
what contradictory.  It  has  almost  the  air  of  being  so  written 
as  to  palliate  the  errors  that  were  made  in  the  execution  of  his 
orders ;  this  makes  it  very  difficult  to  understand  what  his 
original  intentions  really  were.  Probably  the  mystery  will  never 
be  thoroughly  cleared  up.  For  a  criticism  of  Longstreet's  action 
see  Appendix  C. 

105 


directed  to  hold  his  line  with  the  rest  of  his  command, 
afford  General  Longstreet  further  assistance  if  re- 
quired, and  avail  himself  of  any  success  that  might  be 
gained. 

"  A  careful  examination  was  made  of  the  ground 
secured  by  Longstreet  and  his  batteries  placed  in 
positions,  which  it  was  believed  would  enable  them  to 
silence  those  of  the  enemy.  Hill's  artillery  and  part 
of  Ewell's  was  ordered  to  open  simultaneously,  and 
the  assaulting  column  to  advance  under  cover  of  the 
combined  fire  of  the  three.  The  batteries  were 
directed  to  be  pushed  forward  as  the  infantry  pro- 
gressed, protect  their  flanks,  and  support  their  attacks 
closely."  1 

It  will  be  noted  that  Lee  states  that  "  the  general 
plan  was  unchanged."  This  would  imply  that  he 
originally  meant  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  enemy's 
left  flank ;  but,  owing  to  the  representations  made 
by  Longstreet  of  the  great  strength  of  the  enemy's 
position  at  Round  Top,  he  having  stripped  his  centre 
to  reinforce  his  wings,  Lee  decided  to  alter  his  plan, 
and  to  make  his  attack  instead  against  the  enemy's 
centre  on  Cemetery  Ridge.  If  the  centre  could  be 
broken  in,  the  whole  line  would  be  disrupted,  and  the 
Federal  right  wing,  pinned  between  the  assaulting 
column  and  Ewell's  troops  at  Culp's  Hill,  would 
probably  be  destroyed.  It  was  true  that  the  centre 
was  the  strongest  part  of  the  whole  line,  and  could  not 
be  carried  save  by  a  heavy  sacrifice  of  life,  but  Lee 
could  boast  that  he  commanded  troops,  who  had  never 
yet  failed  to  respond  to  any  call  that  he  had  made 
upon  them.  Pickett's  division,  on  whom  the  bulk 
of  the  work  was  to  fall,  was  composed  entirely  of 
Virginian  regiments,  the  very  flower  of  the  Confeder- 
ate infantry,  and  these  had  not  yet  fired  a  shot  in  the 
battle. 

1  Lee's  report. 
106 


It  should  be  carefully  noted  that  by  the  terms  of 
Lee's  report,  McLaws  and  Hood  were  not  to  participate 
in  the  attack.  This  was  to  be  carried  out  by  Pickett, 
Heth,  and  part  of  Pender's  division,  the  remainder  of 
Hill's  Corps  to  be  held  in  readiness  to  take  advantage 
of  any  success  that  might  be  gained.  We  shall  see 
how  lamentably  Hill  failed  to  carry  through  his  share 
of  the  concerted  plan,  and  what  disastrous  conse- 
quences resulted  therefrom.  The  orders  having  been 
issued,  the  meeting  broke  up,  and  Lee,  after  riding 
along  the  front  of  his  line  as  far  as  the  outskirts  of 
Gettysburg,  took  up  a  position  with  his  staff  near 
Hill's  head-quarters  on  Seminary  Ridge. 

2.  The  Fighting  on  the  Union  Right. 

It  was  not  till  2  a.m.  on  the  3rd  that  Meade  had 
been  informed  of  the  danger  that  threatened  his  right 
wing  from  Johnson's  partially  successful  attack  the 
night  before.1  It  was  imperative  to  dislodge  him  as 
soon  as  possible,  or  the  safety  of  the  whole  Union  army 
would  be  imperilled.  Meade  therefore  directed  the 
Twelfth  Corps  to  attack  at  daylight,  and  drive  the 
enemy  out  of  the  captured  breastworks.  During  the 
small  hours  of  the  morning  five  batteries  were  got  into 
position  to  bear  upon  Steuart's  lines  and  assist  in  the 
attack,  while  Ruger's  brigade,  temporarily  com- 
manded by  Colgrove,  reoccupied  the  works  on  the 
extreme  right  of  the  line,  which  were  separated  from 
those  in  Steuart's  possession  by  a  shallow,  swampy 
ravine.  The  positions  taken  up  by  Ruger's  and 
Geary's  divisions  formed  a  re-entrant  angle,  the  ver- 
tex being  towards  the  Baltimore  pike  and  the  two 
flanks  resting  on  the  breastworks  held  respectively 
by  Greene  and  Colgrove.2  The  Confederates  were 
also  fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  maintaining  the 

1  Meade's  report,  Official  Records.     2  Williams'  report,  ibid. 

107 


valuable  foothold  they  had  secured  in  the  enemy's 
lines.  During  the  night  Smith's  brigade  had  been 
brought  up  to  reinforce  Johnson,  and  also  O'Neal 
and  Daniel  from  Rodes'  division,  but  owing  to  the 
steepness  of  the  slopes  it  was  found  impossible  to  get 
up  any  artillery.1  The  strength  of  the  force  under 
General  Williams'  command  was  about  9000  men, 
opposed  to  some  10,000  under  General  Johnson. 

It  was  just  growing  light  at  4.30  a.m.,  when  the 
Federal  batteries,  posted  along  the  Baltimore  pike, 
opened  a  furious  fire,  at  a  range  of  600  to  800  yards,  on 
the  entrenchments  held  by  Steuart.  Twenty  minutes 
later  Williams  ordered  the  infantry  to  advance.  The 
attack  came  as  a  surprise  to  Johnson,  who  had  not 
expected  the  enemy  to  take  the  offensive.2  Never- 
theless he  was  not  taken  off  his  guard,  and  his  troops, 
standing  to  arms  in  the  grey  light  of  dawn,  success- 
fully repulsed  the  attempt  to  retake  the  lost  en- 
trenchments. For  three  hours  they  were  subjected 
to  a  sustained  and  continuous  shell-fire,  to  which 
they  were  unable  to  reply.  Johnson  had  been 
directed  to  make  his  attack  in  concert  with  Long- 
street,  and  to  wait  for  the  sound  of  the  latter's  guns, 
but  seeing  how  his  men  were  suffering  under  the 
artillery  bombardment,  he  considered  it  inadvisable 
to  wait  any  longer.3  At  8  a.m.  the  assault  was  re- 
newed all  along  the  line.  O'Neal  reinforced  Jones 
and  Nicholls'  brigades  in  a  renewed  effort  to  storm 
the  breastworks  on  Culp's  Hill.  Steuart  and  Daniel 
advanced  across  the  marshy  brook  in  their  front 
against  Ruger,  while  Walker,  commanding  the  cele- 
brated Stonewall  brigade,  assaulted  the  works  held 
by  Colgrove.  In  spite  of  the  most  sustained  and 
heroic  efforts  on  the  part  of  all  concerned,  no  lodg- 
ment was  effected  anywhere  in  the  Union  lines. 
About  10.30  a.m.  the  Stonewall  brigade  moved  to  the 

1  EwelPs  report.        2  Johnson's  report.        3  Ibid. 
108 


right  opposite  Greene's  breastworks,  and  the  assault 
was  renewed  against  both  Ruger  and  Geary,  but 
without  avail.  The  Federal  position  was  too  strong, 
and  the  numbers  engaged  too  nearly  equal  to  afford  the 
Confederates  a  fair  chance  of  success.  They  had 
hitherto  resisted  all  efforts  to  drive  them  from  their 
own  lines,  but  shortly  after  9  a.m.  Niell's  brigade  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  crossed  Rock  Creek,  and  began  to  menace 
Johnson's  left  flank.  He  detached  Smith's  brigade 
and  part  of  Walker's  to  meet  the  threatened  attack, 
but  in  view  of  the  isolated  situation  of  his  division 
and  the  danger  to  which  it  would  be  exposed  by  a 
counter-attack  in  force,  this  movement  against  his 
flank  made  his  position  manifestly  intenable.  Re- 
luctantly he  decided  that  no  other  course  was  open  to 
him  but  to  withdraw.1  About  11  a.m.  Steuart  and 
Daniel  abandoned  the  entrenchments,  which  had  cost 
so  much  blood  to  hold,  and  fell  back  with  the  rest 
of  the  command  to  the  right  bank  of  Rock  Creek, 
in  which  position  they  remained  till  midnight.  No 
further  fighting  took  place,  except  between  the  piquet 
lines,  which  maintained  a  brisk  fire  all  day.  The  losses 
of  the  Confederates  in  the  struggle  for  Culp's  Hill  had 
been  very  severe.  Including  the  brigades  of  Daniel, 
O'Neal,  and  Smith,  their  casualties  in  the  two  days' 
fighting  amounted  to  some  2400  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing.  The  Federals,  fighting  largely  behind 
breastworks,  suffered  much  less,  their  casualties 
being  under  1200,2  some  of  which  were  caused  by 
the  fire  of  their  own  batteries.  This  unexpected 
result  of  the  fighting  had  a  most  prejudicial  effect  on 
General  Lee's  plans.  He  relied  largely  for  success  on 
proper  concerted  action  between  Longstreet  and 
Johnson,  and  now  before  Longstreet  was  even  ready 
to  commence  the  attack,  Johnson  had  been  forced  to 
relinquish  the  footing  he  had  secured  in  the  enemy's 

1  Johnson's  report.     2  "  Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III. 
109 


lines,    and    the    pre-arranged    co-operation    between 
the  two  wings  was  upset  at  the  outset. 

3.  Situation  in  the  Centre. 

While  the  duel  for  Culp's  Hill  was  being  fought 
out  on  the  Union  right,  Longstreet  was  making  his 
arrangements  for  the  assault  on  the  enemy's  centre, 
although  he  was  very  doubtful  of  its  chances  of  success. 
Pickett's  division  was  drawn  up  behind  a  belt  of 
woods  in  a  small  hollow  opposite  some  buildings, 
called  Codori's,  on  the  Emmittsburg  road.  On  his 
left  was  formed  Heth's  division,  now  commanded  by 
Pettigrew,  his  four  brigades  being  placed  in  line, 
and  the  brigades  of  Scales  and  Lane,  commanded  by 
Trimble,  in  support  in  rear  of  the  right  of  Pettigrew's 
division.  There  was  no  support  in  rear  of  the  left. 
On  the  right  of  Pickett,  about  two  hundred  yards 
in  rear  of  the  Emmittsburg  road,  were  drawn  up  the 
brigades  of  Wilcox  and  Perry,  which  were  also 
intended  to  take  part  in  the  assault.  On  Pettigrew's 
left  the  line  was  prolonged  by  the  two  remaining 
brigades  of  Pender's  division,  Thomas  and  Perrin, 
and  then  by  Ramseur,  Dole,  and  Iverson,  of  Rodes' 
division,  as  far  as  the  outskirts  of  Gettysburg.  Wright, 
Posey,  and  Mahone  formed  a  local  reserve  in  rear  of 
Pettigrew.  As  regards  McLaws  and  Hood,  Long- 
street  had  ridden  over  to  Round  Top  about  9  a.m. 
and  instructed  Law,  in  command  of  Hood's  division, 
to  be  prepared  to  renew  the  attack  on  his  front  as 
soon  as  Pickett  was  launched  to  the  assault.  Law 
replied  that  to  do  so  was  madness.1  The  Federals 
had  spent  the  night  strengthening  their  lines,  and 
their  front  now  bristled  with  stone  parapets  and 
breastworks.  However  the  threatening  attitude  kept 
up  by  Law  had  the  effect  of  holding  the  enemy  to  his 

1  Law  :   "  Battles  and  Leaders." 
110 


works  all  day,  and  prevented  him  from  sending  any 
considerable  reinforcements  to  other  parts  of  the 
line.1  McLaws'  division  remained  in  the  positions 
it  had  occupied  at  the  close  of  the  previous  day,  and 
did  nothing.  The  Confederate  artillery  was  posted 
as  follows  :  The  artillery  battalions  of  Alexander  and 
Cabell  were  brought  forward  from  Seminary  Ridge 
and  placed  by  the  Peach  Orchard.  The  Washington 
artillery,  under  Major  Eshleman,  hitherto  in  reserve, 
was  posted  along  the  Emmittsburg  road,  and  on  its 
left  Pickett's  divisional  artillery,  under  Colonel 
Dearing.  The  whole  of  the  artillery  of  Longstreet's 
Corps,  a  total  of  75  guns  actually  in  action,  was 
placed  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Alexander.2 
Along  the  slopes  of  Seminary  Ridge,  from  Pickett's 
position  to  the  Hagerstown  pike,  were  70  guns,  com- 
posed of  the  artillery  battalions  of  Garnett,  Lane, 
Poague,  Pegram,  and  Mcintosh,  all  of  Hill's  Corps. 
Still  further  north  were  Carter's  batteries  of  Ewell's 
Corps,  numbering  16  guns.  The  ranges  of  all  these 
batteries  to  the  nearest  points  of  the  Federal  line  varied 
from  1000  to  2000  yards. 

Turning  to  the  Federal  dispositions,  it  should  be 
noted  that  the  organisation  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac had  been  greatly  dislocated  by  the  indiscriminate 
reinforcing  of  one  part  of  the  line  from  another,  which 
had  taken  place  on  the  evening  of  July  2.  The 
different  corps  were  reduced  to  a  confused  medley  of 
units,  incapable  of  taking  the  offensive  or  indeed  of 
performing  any  manoeuvre  whatever.  Thus*on  the 
left  the  line  was  composed  of  the  Third,  Fifth,  Sixth, 
and  part  of  the  Second  Corps,  all  mingled  together, 
while  the  right  of  Culp's  Hill  was  held  by  a  medley 
of   troops   from   the   First,   Eleventh,   and   Twelfth 

1  Humphreys'  division  was  the  only  unit  that  was  withdrawn 
from  the  Union  left  to  reinforce  the  centre. 

2  Alexander  :    "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

Ill 


Corps.  No  attempt  was  made  by  General  Meade, 
either  during  the  night  or  the  following  morning,  to 
remedy  this  state  of  affairs,  a  necessary  preliminary 
to  any  idea  of  taking  the  offensive.  His  preparations 
were  confined  solely  to  the  artillery.  General  Hunt 
was  very  active  in  placing  batteries  on  the  crest  wher- 
ever there  was  room  for  them,  but  the  Federal  position 
being  a  convex  one,  there  was  not  so  much  space  for 
the  deployment  of  artillery  as  there  was  along  the 
Confederate  front,  and  a  large  proportion  of  the 
batteries  was  left  in  reserve.  About  80  guns  were 
posted  finally,  six  batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill,  five 
along  Hancock's  front,  ten  under  Colonel  McGilvery 
extended  along  the  ridge  to  the  south,  and  one 
battery  on  Little  Bound  Top.  All  of  these  guns, 
with  the  exception  of  some  on  Cemetery  Hill,  were 
placed  in  the  open,  unprotected  by  any  form  of  cover, 
a  neglect  which  was  to  cost  them  dearlv.1 

One  must  now  describe  in  some  detail  the  nature  of 
Hancock's  position,  for  this  part  of  the  Federal  line 
was  about  to  become  the  scene  of  the  most  desperate 
fighting  of  the  battle.  Hancock's  line  was  held  by 
the  divisions  of  Gibbon  and  Hays,  Caldwell  having 
been  called  away  to  reinforce  the  Fifth  Corps.  The 
brigades  of  Willard,2  Smyth,  Webb,  and  Hall  held  the 
front  line,  with  Harrow's  brigade  in  support  in  rear 
of  the  left.  Willard's  right  connected  with  Stein- 
wehr's  division  on  Cemetery  Hill.  Along  the  front 
of  the  Second  Corps  ran  a  low  stone  wall,  which  had 
been  (ftitrenched  and  placed  in  a  state  of  defence. 
Webb  formed  his  brigade  with  two  regiments  holding 

1  Hunt :    "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

2  Willard's  brigade  was  ordered  to  return  to  its  original  posi- 
tion on  Cemetery  Ridge  after  its  repulse  by  McLaws  on  the 
Federal  left  on  the  evening  of  the  previous  day.  Carroll's  brigade 
of  Hay's  division  retained  the  position  on  the  east  flank 
of  Cemetery  Hill  which  it  had  taken  up  at  9  p.m.  on  July  2, 
when  repulsing  Early's  attack. 

112 


the  wall  and  the  remainder  in  support  on  the  reverse 
slope  of  the  crest,  his  left  resting  on  a  clump  of  trees, 
which  stands  on  a  small  knoll  near  the  centre  of  Han- 
cock's position.  Between  the  two  lines  were  the 
batteries  on  the  brow  of  the  slope.  Hall's  right  flank 
rested  similarly  on  the  clump  of  trees,  and  his  left 
on  Stannard's  brigade  of  the  First  Corps.  The 
ground  in  front  forms  a  gently  sloping  glacis,  abso- 
lutely bare  of  any  form  of  cover,  and  intersected  by 
post  and  rail  fences.  A  conspicuous  object  in  the 
foreground  is  the  Emmittsburg  road,  which  runs 
diagonally  across  the  front  of  the  Federal  position, 
while  three-quarters  of  a  mile  away  across  the  fields 
stretches  the  belt  of  woods,  which  marked  the  Con- 
federate line.1 

4.  Longstreet's  Attack  :    The  Artillery  Duel. 

Shortly  after  1  p.m.  Pickett  reported  to  Longstreet 
that  his  division  was  ready.  It  had  been  arranged 
that  the  signal  for  the  Confederate  batteries  to  open 
was  to  be  two  guns  fired  by  the  Washington  Artillery. 
About  1.15  p.m.  Major  Eshleman,  in  command, 
received  the  order  from  Longstreet  to  commence 
firing.  The  reports  of  the  two  signal  guns  rang  out 
immediately  on  the  still  air.  There  was  a  slight 
pause,  and  then  a  hundred  and  forty  guns  came  simul- 
taneously into  action.2  The  Federal  batteries  opened 
at  once  in  reply.  General  Hunt,  who  watched  the 
battle  from  Cemetery  Eidge,  says :  "  The  scene  was 
indescribably  grand.  All  their  batteries  were  soon 
covered  with  smoke,  through  which  the  flashes  were 
incessant,  while  the  air  seemed  filled  with  shells, 
whose  sharp  explosions,  with  the  hurtling  of  their 
fragments,  formed  a  running  accompaniment  to  the 
deep  roar  of  the  guns."3     The  first  effects  of  this 

1  See  reports  of  Hancock,  Gibbon,  and  Hall,  Official  Records. 

2  Alexander :    "  Battles  and  Leaders."  3  Hunt,   ibid. 

H  113 


terrible  bombardment  fell  on  Meade's  reserve  ammu- 
nition column,  which  had  been  parked  on  the  reverse 
slope  of  the  ridge,  and  received  all  the  shells  which 
just  grazed  the  crest.  No  less  than  six  ammunition 
caissons  blew  up  in  succession,  and  as  the  smoke  of 
the  explosions  rose  in  the  air,  the  Confederate  yells 
of  triumph  could  be  heard  for  a  mile  along  the 
line.1  A  salvo  of  shells  fell  into  General  Meade's 
head-quarters  on  the  Taneytown  road,  killing  many 
horses  of  the  staff,  and  compelling  the  removal  of 
head-quarters  to  Power's  Hill,  where  Meade  remained 
till  the  cannonade  ceased.2  The  chief  fury  of  the 
bombardment  fell  on  Webb's  portion  of  the  line,  the 
clump  of  trees  on  his  left  forming  a  convenient  ranging 
point  for  the  Confederate  gunners.  The  Union  artil- 
lery, exposed  to  full  view  on  the  crest,  suffered  severe- 
ly, Cushing's,  Brown's,  and  Arnold's  batteries  being 
put  out  of  action  and  Woodruff's  terribly  damaged. 
Five  officers  were  killed,  nine  wounded,  while  the  loss 
among  the  rank  and  file  and  the  destruction  of 
horses  and  material  was  very  great. 3  It  would  have 
been  greater  still  had  the  Confederate  fire  been  concen- 
trated on  different  points  of  the  enemy's  line  in 
succession,  but  the  fire  was  too  dispersed  to  secure  the 
full  effect  possible  from  so  many  batteries  in  action 
against  a  common  objective. 

The  artillery  duel  was  maintained  without  a  break 
for  nearly  two  hours,  and  the  expenditure  of  ammuni- 
tion was  in  consequence  enormous.  General  Hunt, 
going  along  the  Federal  line,  was  alarmed  to  find  that 
the  contents  of  the  limber  boxes  were  running  short. 
There  was  an  ample  supply  in  the  ammunition  park, 
but  time  would  be  required  to  get  this  up  and  dis- 
tribute it,  and  the  enemy's  infantry  might  advance  at 
any  moment.     Meade  was  not  to  be  found,  so  Hunt, 

1  Doubleday  :    "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg." 

2  Hunt :    "  Battles  and  Leaders."  3  Ibid. 

114 


acting  on  his  own  responsibility,  directed  each  battery 
that  he  passed  to  cease  firing  and  husband  its  ammu- 
nition. The  order  was  obeyed  by  all  except  those 
along  the  front  of  the  Second  Corps,  which  received 
express  orders  from  Hancock  to  continue  the  fire.1 
Shortly  before  this  Colonel  Alexander,  who  was  in 
command  of  all  the  Confederate  batteries  on  the  Em- 
mittsburg  road,  received  a  message  from  Longstreet, 
which  ran  as  follows  : — 

"  Colonel — If  the  artillery  fire  does  not  have  the 
effect  to  drive  off  the  enemy  or  greatly  demoralise 
him,  so  as  to  make  our  efforts  pretty  certain,  I  prefer 
that  you  should  not  advise  General  Pickett  to  make 
the  charge.  I  shall  rely  a  great  deal  on  your  good 
judgment  to  determine  the  matter,  and  shall  expect 
you  to  let  General  Pickett  know  when  the  moment 
offers."2 

Such  a  communication  was  equivalent  to  handing 
over  to  Alexander  the  command  of  the  assaulting 
column,  a  sufficiently  extraordinary  proceeding  on 
the  part  of  a  general  officer  of  Longstreet 's  rank 
and  reputation.  Alexander  replied  that  he  could 
only  judge  of  the  effect  by  the  return  fire,  and  that 
his  ammunition  would  soon  run  low.  Longstreet's 
answer,  a  condensed  repetition  of  his  previous  note, 
left  Alexander  in  a  painful  state  of  uncertainty  as  to 
the  wishes  of  his  commanding  officer.  He  decided 
to  ascertain  Pickett 's  opinion  of  the  situation,  and 
on  consulting  that  officer  found  him  perfectly  confident 
of  success,  though  fully  aware  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
task  before  him.  Then,  Alexander  says,  he  felt  that 
he  could  not  let  the  attack  suffer  by  any  indecision 
on  his  part.  He  returned  to  his  guns,  and  wrote  to 
Longstreet,  "  General — When  our  fire  is  at  its  best, 
I  shall  order  Pickett  to  charge."2 


1  Hunt's  report.      2  Alexander:    "Battles  and  Leaders." 
3  Ibid. 

115 


For  half  an  hour  longer  the  cannonade  continued ; 
the  enemy's  fire  coming  back  as  persistently  as  ever. 
Then  suddenly  the  batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill  ceased 
firing,  limbered  up,  and  disappeared. 

Now,  if  ever,  was  the  time.  Alexander's  note  to 
Pickett  ran,  "  For  God's  sake  come  quick.  The  18 
guns  are  gone  ;  come  quick,  or  my  ammunition  will 
not  support  you  properly."  Pickett  rode  over  to 
Longstreet,  and  asked  if  the  time  had  come.  Long- 
street,  convinced  in  his  own  mind  that  Pickett  was 
marching  to  annihilation,  could  not  bring  himself  to 
speak  the  fateful  words,  and  merely  bowed  his  head. 
Raising  his  sword  to  the  salute  Pickett  replied  firmly, 
"  I  shall  lead  my  division  forward,  sir,"  and  immedi- 
ately turned  away  and  went  to  his  command.1 

5.  Assault  on  Cemetery  Ridge  :    Repulse 
of  Pickett  and  Pettigreav. 

Longstreet  rode  forward  to  a  point  where  he  could 
watch  the  troops  march  past.     Alexander  says  : — 

"  Longstreet,  leaving  his  staff,  came  up  alone  to 
where  I  was.  It  was  then  about  2.40  p.m.  I  ex- 
plained the  situation,  feeling  then  more  hopeful,  but 
afraid  that  our  artillery  ammunition  might  not  hold 
out  for  all  we  would  want.  Longstreet  said,  '  Stop 
Pickett  immediately,  and  replenish  your  ammuni- 
tion/ I  explained  that  it  would  take  too  long,  and 
the  enemy  would  recover  from  the  effect  our  fire  was 
having,  and  we  had,  moreover,  very  little  to  replenish 
with.  Longstreet  said,  '  I  don't  want  to  make  this 
attack.  I  would  stop  it  now,  but  that  General  Lee 
ordered  it,  and  expects  it  to  go  on.  I  don't  see  how 
it  can  succeed.' 

"  I  listened  but  dared  not  offer  a  word.  The  battle 
was  lost  if  we  stopped.     Ammunition  was  far  too  low 

1  Longstreet :   "  From  Manassas  to  Appomatox.  " 
116 


GETTYSBURG,     POSITIONS      JULY      2 


fcniours  «t  12  feet 


to  try  anything  else,  for  we  had  been  fighting  three 
days.  There  was  a  chance,  and  it  was  not  my  part 
to  interfere.  While  Longstreet  was  still  speaking, 
Pickett's  division  swept  out  of  the  wood  and  showed 
the  full  length  of  its  grey  ranks  and  shining  bayonets, 
as  grand  a  sight  as  ever  a  man  looked  on.  Joining  it 
on  the  left,  Pettigrew  stretched  farther  than  I  could 
see.  General  Dick  Garnett,  just  out  of  the  sick  am- 
bulance and  buttoned  up  in  an  old  blue  overcoat, 
riding  at  the  head  of  his  brigade,  passed  us  and  saluted 
Longstreet.  We  had  served  on  the  plains  together 
before  the  war.  I  rode  with  him  a  short  distance, 
and  then  we  wished  each  other  good  luck  and  a  good- 
bye, which  was  our  last."1 

We  can  imagine  the  feelings  with  which  Longstreet 
must  have  watched  those  troops  march  past  him  in  all 
the  pride  of  war  to  what  he  felt  convinced  was  useless 
slaughter.  As  the  brigades  passed  him,  sitting  erect 
in  his  saddle  and  returning  the  salutes  of  the  officers, 
the  faces  of  the  men  were  lit  with  confidence  and  hope. 
Even  their  opponents  could  not  resist  exclamations 
of  admiration  at  the  long  lines  that  swept  across  the 
fields  against  them  in  such  perfect  order.  Then  all 
along  the  crest  the  Federal  batteries  opened  once 
more.  Every  gun  was  engaged,  except  the  batteries 
on  Hancock's  front,  which  had  exhausted  their 
long-range  shell,  and  were  reserving  their  case-shot 
for  close  quarters.  On  the  other  hand,  at  this  the 
crisis  of  the  battle,  when  their  fire  should  have  been  at 
its  hottest,  the  Confederate  batteries  stood  silent, 
almost  every  round  in  their  ammunition  chests 
having  been  expended.  Unmolested  by  the  enemy's 
artillery,  the  Union  gunners  were  therefore  able  to 
pour  their  whole  fire  upon  the  advancing  infantry. 
In  spite  of  the  hail  of  shell  the  Confederate  divisions 
moved  on  unbroken,  and  passed  across  the  Emmitts- 

1  Alexander  :    "  Battles  and  Leaders." 
117 


burg  road  in  the  same  regular  order  in  which  they  had 
commenced  the  attack.  Here  occurred  a  momentary 
pause  to  close  the  ranks,  somewhat  disordered  by 
climbing  the  fences  which  border  the  road.  The  left 
of  Pickett's  line  crossed  the  road  by  Codori's  house, 
so  that  his  line  of  advance,  if  continued,  would  have 
thrown  him  on  Stannard's  brigade,  but  at  this  point 
the  column  swerved  to  the  left,  and  led  towards  the 
clump  of  trees  that  formed  the  centre  of  Gibbon's  line. 
Then  the  whole  fury  of  the  storm  burst  upon  the 
assaulting  columns.  From  the  batteries  in  their 
front,  from  Cemetery  Hill  and  from  Little  Round 
Top,  shell  and  case-shot  tore  through  their  crowded 
masses,  while  the  Federal  infantry,  posted  behind 
stone  walls  and  breastworks,  poured  in  incessant 
volleys  at  close  range.  Pettigrew's  line  was  visibly 
shaken  by  this  awful  fire,  but  animated  by  the  example 
of  their  officers  the  troops  still  pressed  blindly  on. 
Davis'  brigade  actually  reached  Hay's  line,  and  left 
their  colours  on  the  stone  wall,  but  this  was  the 
utmost  they  could  do.  The  brigade  of  Marshall  (late 
Pettigrew),  composed  of  newly-joined  conscripts,  be- 
wildered by  the  uproar  and  disheartened  by  the  fall 
of  nearly  all  their  officers,  hesitated  and  broke  up. 
Then  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy's  infantry  delivered 
a  counter-attack  on  the  left  flank  of  the  line.  This 
decided  the  issue.  Pettigrew  and  Trimble's  com- 
mand gave  way  and  retreated  in  great  disorder  and 
confusion  to  their  original  position.1 

Pettigrew  and  Trimble  had  been  flung  back,  but 
Pickett's  division  had  still  to  be  reckoned  with. 
As  the  Virginians  pressed  on,  they  passed  diagonally 
across  the  front  of  Stannard's  brigade,  and  he,  seeing 
the  opportunity,  swung  his  line  round  to  the  right, 
and   poured  a   deadly  fire   into   their  flank.2    This 

1  Swinton  :  "  Campaign  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac."  Gib- 
bon's   report.     Heth's    report. 

2  Doubleday  :    "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg." 

118 


caused  Kemper's  brigade  to  crowd  in  on  the  centre, 
and  Armistead's  men  closing  on  the  leading  brigade 
at  the  same  time,  the  whole  rapidly  merged  into  a 
solid  yelling  mass,  which  charged  straight  on  Gibbon's 
position.  Garnett  and  Kemper,  gallantly  leading 
their  men,  were  both  shot  down  within  a  few  yards 
of  the  stone  wall,  and  the  loss  in  the  ranks  was  fearful. 
But  nothing  could  check  that  iron  infantry.  Webb's 
front  line  broke  to  the  rear,  the  Virginians  poured 
over  their  entrenchments,  and  their  colours  were 
planted  triumphantly  on  the  stone  wall. 

By  the  little  group  of  staff  officers  and  orderlies 
who  surrounded  Longstreet,  the  course  of  Pickett's 
assault  was  watched  with  astonishment  and  delight. 
To  them  it  seemed  that  the  victory  was  already  won, 
and  Colonel  Freemantle,  of  the  British  Army,  turning 
to  Longstreet,  exclaimed,  "  General,  I  would  not  have 
missed  this  for  anything  in  the  world  !  "x  But  the 
veteran  soldier  was  not  deceived  by  the  appearance 
of  success,  and  his  keen  glance  already  foresaw  the 
ultimate  catastrophe.  Pickett  had  indeed  broken 
the  first  line,  but  behind  it  was  a  second,  strongly 
held,  and  backed  by  artillery.  General  Armistead, 
at  the  head  of  a  handful  of  men,  all  that  he  could 
collect,  charged  Cushing's  battery,  and  fell  dead  within 
the  enemy's  lines,  with  his  hand  resting  on  one  of  the 
guns.2  The  spot  where  he  fell  has  been  fitly  called 
the  High  Water  Mark  of  the  Kebellion,  for  never 
before  or  after  did  the  Confederacy  stand  so  near, 
as  at  that  moment,  to  the  realisation  of  all  its  hopes. 
But  now  for  the  third  time  in  this  disjointed  battle 
a  fatal  blunder  threw  away  all  the  fruits  of  the  success 
that  Pickett's  charge  had  won.     His  division  was  left 


1  Freemantle :  "  Three  Months  hi  the  Field  with  the  Con- 
federate Armies." 

2  General  Armistead's  memorial,  on  the  spot  where  he  fell  in 
so  heroic  a  manner,  is  the  sole  Confederate  monument  on  the 
battlefield. 

119 


entirely  without  support.  On  his  left  Pettigrew  and 
Trimble  had  been  beaten  back.  On  his  right,  Wilcox 
and  Perry,  having  no  orders,  had  not  advanced.  In 
this  tremendous  crisis  General  Anderson  failed  most 
lamentably  to  carry  out  the  important  part  that  had 
been  assigned  to  him  in  General  Lee's  plan  of  attack. 
His  orders  were  to  hold  his  division  in  readiness  to 
move  up  in  support  if  it  should  become  necessary.1 
Not  until  Pickett  and  Gibbon  had  actually  crossed 
bayonets  over  the  stone  wall  did  he  consider  it  time 
to  send  orders  to  Wilcox  to  advance,  and  by  the  time 
his  staff  officers  had  found  the  latter  and  delivered  the 
message,  the  crucial  moment  had  come  and  gone.2 
To  Posey,  Wright,  and  Mahone  Anderson  gave  no 
orders  at  all,  although  two  of  these  brigades  had  not 
fired  a  shot  in  the  battle,  and  had  they  advanced 
when  Pettigrew 's  troops  were  seen  to  hesitate,  they 
might  have  rallied  the  wavering  line  and  carried  it 
with  them  to  victory.  But  it  was  not  to  be.  Not  a 
man  moved  to  go  to  the  help  of  Pickett's  gallant 
division,  which  was  left  to  fight  the  battle  out  as  best 
it  might.  The  clump  of  trees  in  the  centre  of  Gibbon's 
line  was  the  centre  of  a  dreadful  melee,  in  which  the 
opposing  ranks  were  packed  into  a  dense  mass  four 
deep,  firing  into  one  another  at  a  few  yards  distance. 
Armistead's  brigade  had  driven  a  wedge  into  Gibbon's 
line,  and  were  enfilading  Hall's  brigade  on  Webb's 
left.  Hall  threw  in  his  supports  at  right  angles  to  his 
front  fine  to  meet  this  attack,  and  Harrow's  brigade, 
hitherto  in  reserve,  was  thrust  in  wherever  there 
was  room.3  The  Confederate  battle  flags  flew  in  a 
long  line  on  the  stone  wall,  and  each  became  the  special 
mark  of  Union  bullets.  The  batteries,  which  Colonel 
Alexander  had  sent  forward  to  follow  up  the  storming 
column,  did  good  service  at  this  point,  their  shot  cut- 
ting  lanes   through   the   crowded   masses   of   Hall's 

1  Anderson's  report.       2  Wilcox's  report.       3  Hall's  report. 

120 


brigade.1  Webb,  Hancock,  and  Gibbon  were  all 
wounded,  nearly  every  field  officer  in  Pickett's  divi- 
sion had  fallen,  and  still  neither  side  would  give  way. 
So  dreadful  a  struggle  could  not  last  long.  Hum- 
phreys' division,  hurriedly  sent  for  from  the  left 
flank,  was  brought  up  to  reinforce  Hall.  Stannard 
was  pressing  heavily  on  Pickett's  unprotected  right 
flank,  and  a  strong  line  of  infantry,  hastily  collected 
from  different  regiments,  threatened  his  left.  Human 
valour  could  do  no  more.  The  order  to  retreat  was 
reluctantly  given,  and  the  remnants  of  Pickett's 
command,  abandoning  the  stone  wall,  fell  back  across 
the  fields.  But  many  of  the  best  and  bravest  of 
his  troops,  those  that  had  forced  their  way  furthest 
into  the  enemy's  lines,  were  inevitably  left  behind, 
and  having  done  all  that  brave  men  could  do,  were 
compelled  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

At  the  moment  that  Pickett  fell  back,  Wilcox  and 
Perry  advanced  to  his  support.  There  was  nothing 
left  for  them  to  support,  but  in  obedience  to  their 
orders  they  pressed  on  across  the  Emmitsburg  road  to 
within  five  hundred  yards  of  the  position  on  the  ridge, 
which  Birney's  division  was  holding.  Here  the 
terrible  artillery  fire  compelled  them  to  halt.  It  was 
so  obvious  that  nothing  could  be  gained  by  the 
isolated  attack  of  2000  men  on  a  whole  army  that 
Wilcox,  after  vainly  trying  to  get  instructions,  ordered 
his  command  to  retreat;  this  was  done  in  good 
order,  the  Federals  making  no  attempt  to  follow.2 
Perry,  who  had  been  directed  to  conform  to  the 
movements  of  Wilcox,  withdrew  also,  but  in  the 
great  uproar  the  order  to  retreat  was  not  heard 
by  the  left  of  his  line,  and  Stannard 's  Union  brigade, 
making  a  sudden  counter-attack,  captured  a  number 
of  prisoners.3  Wilcox  and  Perry  between  them  lost 
360  men  in  this  singularly  ill-timed  movement. 

1  Gibbon's  report.  2  Wilcox's  report. 

3  Doubleday  :   "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg." 

121 


In  this  attack  Pickett's  division  lost  two  brigadiers 
killed  and  one  mortally  wounded,  nine  field  officers 
killed  and  eight  wounded,  and  2843  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing  of  the  rank  and  file  out  of  5000  who  took 
part  in  the  assault.  Pettigrew  and  Trimble  had 
between  them  upwards  of  3000  casualties,  and  the 
total  Confederate  loss  in  the  attack  cannot  have  been 
much  short  of  6000  men.  The  Federals  had  not 
won  this  great  success  without  paying  a  heavy 
price  for  it.  Stannard's  brigade  had  350  casualties, 
Hay's  division  500,  and  Gibbon's,  which  had  borne 
the  brunt  of  the  attack,  1600,  nearly  50  per  cent,  of 
its  strength.  Including  the  casualties  among  the 
batteries  and  in  other  units  from  the  bombardment, 
the  total  Union  loss  may  be  placed  at  about  3,000 
officers  and  men.1 

The  disorder  and  alarm  in  the  Confederate  lines 
when  Pickett's  and  Pettigrew's  shattered  and  dis- 
organised divisions  retreated  to  Seminary  Ridge  was 
very  great.  A  general  counter-attack  all  along  the 
enemy's  line  was  expected  to  be  launched  immediate- 
ly, and  at  the  time  neither  Hill  nor  Longstreet  was 
in  a  condition  to  meet  it.  At  this  critical  moment 
General  Lee  left  his  staff  and  rode  up  all  alone  to  the 
point  where  Alexander  stood.2  Never  did  those 
noble  qualities,  by  which  he  won  all  men's  hearts, 
shine  more  brightly  than  at  this  disastrous  moment. 
His  very  presence  acted  like  magic  on  the  disheartened 
troops.  His  unruffled  bearing  and  kindly  words  did 
wonders  to  allay  the  tendency  to  panic.3  The 
stragglers,  as  they  came  in,  were  rallied,  and  lay  down 
quietly  in  the  positions  assigned  to  them,  fresh  am- 
munition was  got  up  for  the  batteries,  and  the  re- 
serves were  so  posted  as  to  present  a  bold  front  to  the 

1  For  details  of  casualties  see  "  Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III. 

2  Alexander  :  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

3  Freemantie  :  "  Three  Months  in  the  Field  with  the  Confederate 
Armies." 

122 


enemy.  The  Confederates  need  have  had  no  fear. 
General  Meade  was  not  a  commander  who  took  any 
risks.  He  was  too  thankful  to  have  repulsed  the 
determined  assault,  that  had  so  nearly  disrupted  his 
centre,  to  have  any  thought  of  taking  the  offensive. 
Moreover,  a  general  counter-attack  of  this  nature 
must  be  carefully  prepared  beforehand.  It  cannot 
be  improvised  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  and 
we  have  already  noted  how  Meade  had  taken  no 
steps  to  disentangle  his  army  from  the  confusion  into 
which  it  had  been  thrown  by  the  general  mixing  up  of 
units  on  the  previous  day.  A  short  time  after  Pickett's 
repulse  a  great  burst  of  cheering  that  went  rolling 
down  the  Union  lines  did  indeed  seem  to  portend 
an  advance  of  some  sort,  but  nothing  happened. 
It  was  caused  by  the  arrival  on  Cemetery  Ridge  of 
General  Meade,  who  rode  down  the  line  receiving 
the  cheers  of  his  men,  and  it  was  now  evident 
that  the  Federals  had  no  intention  of  following  up 
their  success. 

6.  Cavalry  Actions  :    Confederate  Withdrawal 
to  Seminary  Ridge. 

During  the  morning,  Brig. -General  Kilpatrick,  with 
the  cavalry  brigades  of  Merritt  (Buford's  division) 
and  Farnsworth,  had  moved  over  from  the  Union  right 
flank  to  the  left,  with  orders  from  General  Meade 
to  attack  the  exposed  flank  of  Law's  division  (late 
Hood)  and  crumple  it  up.1  Law  had  been  informed 
by  his  scouts  of  Kilpatrick's  approach,  and  took  steps 
to  protect  his  flank  and  rear  by  posting  part  of 
Anderson's  and  Robertson's  brigades  between  the 
Emmittsburg  road  and  Plum  Run.2  About  5  p.m., 
some  time  after  all  firing  in  the  centre  had  ceased, 
Kilpatrick   moved   forward.     Merritt's   brigade   and 

1  Kilpatrick's  report.  2  Law :    "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

123 


part  of  Farnsworth's  were  dismounted,  and  advanced 
against  Anderson's  Georgia  regiments,  and  Kilpatrick, 
seeing  as  he  thought  a  favourable  opportunity 
to  attack  the  rear  of  Law's  division,  ordered  Farns- 
worth,  with  two  regiments,  the  1st  West  Virginia  and 
the  1st  Vermont,  to  charge.  The  former  were 
repulsed  by  a  steady  and  well  aimed  rifle  fire  from 
the  1st  Texas,  but  the  latter,  led  by  Farnsworth  in 
person,  rode  down  a  thin  line  of  skirmishers  and 
swept  across  the  valley  towards  Devil's  Den.  Their 
career,  however,  was  short.  At  Snyder's  House,  the 
4th  Alabama  was  hurriedly  drawn  up  to  meet  them, 
and  a  well-directed  volley  from  this  regiment  com- 
pelled them  to  sheer  off.  Repulsed  in  an  attempt 
on  Henry's  batteries  near  the  turnpike,  and  exposed 
to  a  galling  fire  from  two  sides,  the  mass  of  horseman 
disintegrated  into  scattered  parties,  which  broke 
their  way  more  or  less  successfully  back  to  the  main 
body.  But  Farnsworth,  as  though  disdaining  to 
return  from  defeat,  rode  towards  Round  Top,  fol- 
lowed by  less  than  a  score  of  troopers,  charged  the 
15th  Alabama,  who  faced  about  to  meet  him,  and  was 
shot  down  within  a  few  yards  of  their  bayonets. 
In  this  brief  action  Farnsworth's  brigade  had  about  a 
hundred  casualties,  of  which  sixty-five  were  in  the 
1st  Vermont.  The  charge,  although  gallantly  de- 
livered, was  made  in  insufficient  strength,  and  proved 
a  complete  failure.  Had  General  Meade  massed  the 
bulk  of  his  cavalry  on  his  left  flank,  instead  of  on  his 
right,  and  had  the  Federal  infantry  holding  the  Round 
Tops  co-operated  with  Kilpatrick  by  attacking  Law 
and  Robertson  in  front  at  the  same  moment  that  the 
cavalry  were  launched  against  their  flank  and  rear, 
it  is  possible  that  the  whole  of  Longstreet's  right  wing 
might  have  been  cut  to  pieces.2 

1  Kilpatrick  claims  in  his  report  that  this  charge  of  Farns- 
worth's prevented  Law's  division  from  taking  part  in  Longstreet's 

124 


General  Lee's  plan  of  battle  assigned  an  important 
part  to  his  cavalry.  As  soon  as  the  main  attack  was 
developed,  Stuart  was  directed  to  move  with  the  whole 
of  his  command  round  the  Federal  right  wing,  and 
place  himself  across  the  Baltimore  pike.1  If,  as 
Lee  confidently  expected,  the  enemy  was  driven  from 
his  positions  on  the  hills,  then  the  attack  of  Stuart's 
troopers  on  their  flank  and  rear  could  not  fail  to  have 
great  results.  Soon  after  10  o'clock  he  moved  forward 
with  the  brigades  of  Jenkins,  Hampton,  Fitzhugh  Lee, 
and  Chambliss,  and  halted  with  his  command  on  some 
rising  ground  known  as  Cress  Ridge,  whence  flows  a 
small  stream  called  Cress  Run.  Here  he  discovered 
that  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was 
in  his  front.  This  was  Gregg's  division,  which  had 
been  posted  in  the  morning  at  the  bridge  over  White 
Run,  but  had  moved  forward  simultaneously  with 
Stuart,  whose  movements  were  watched  and  reported 
to  him  from  Cemetery  Hill.2  The  opposing  sides 
were  very  fairly  matched.  Stuart's  four  brigades 
numbered  about  5000  men,  and  he  had  with  him  three 
horse-artillery  batteries.  Gregg  had  the  brigades  of 
Custer  (Kilpatrick's  division),  Mcintosh,  and  Irvin 
Gregg,  some  4000  sabres,  with  six  batteries  of  artillery. 

While  the  great  artillery  duel  that  preceded  Long- 
street's  attack  was  at  its  height,  Stuart  brought  his 
batteries  into  action  on  the  brow  of  Cress  Ridge.  The 
Union  artillery,  posted  near  the  Hanover  road,  replied 
promptly,  and  under  cover  of  this  fire  Mcintosh's 
brigade  was  thrown  forward  as  a  line  of  dismounted 
skirmishers  towards  the  wooded  crest  occupied  by 
the  Confederates.  A  brisk  action  was  maintained 
for  some  time  with  varying  fortune  until  Hampton's 


assault.  This  is  absurd.  Law  had  already  reported  to  Long- 
street  that  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  Round  Tops  was  impossible 
(see  p.  110). 

1  Lee's  report.  2  Gregg's  report. 

125 


brigade,  supported  by  a  part  of  Fitzhugh  Lee's, 
suddenly  appeared  out  of  the  woods  and  charged 
forward  across  the  fields.  So  unexpected  was  the 
attack  that  the  Federals  had  no  massed  body  of 
cavalry  ready  to  meet  it,  but  Custer  and  Gregg, 
acting  with  the  greatest  vigour,  sent  forward 
against  Hampton  every  regiment  that  could  be 
thrown  in,  Gregg  leading  the  counter-charge  in 
person.  A  confused  melee  ensued,  in  which  both 
sides  suffered  severely,  and  General  Wade  Hampton 
was  borne  to  the  rear  badly  wounded  about  the  head 
with  sabre  cuts.  It  was  a  moment  when  victory 
would  have  fallen  to  that  side  which  could  have 
sent  forward  a  fresh  body  of  cavalry,  however  small, 
to  strike  the  other  in  flank.  But  on  neither  side 
was  such  a  force  at  hand,  and  after  a  fierce  struggle 
the  combatants  separated,  exhausted  by  their  efforts, 
and  fell  back  to  their  original  positions.  The  action 
was  in  every  respect  a  drawn  one.  The  Federals 
lost  300  men,  the  Confederates  240,  the  loss  of  Wade 
Hampton,  a  tried  and  able  officer,  being  a  severe  blow 
to  them.  Desultory  firing  was  kept  up  till  dark, 
when  Stuart,  in  obedience  to  orders  received  from 
Lee,  withdrew  to  Seminary  Ridge.1 

With  the  failure  of  Longstreet's  assault,  Lee's 
last  bolt  was  shot.  He  had  no  more  troops  left  with 
which  to  renew  the  attack,  his  ammunition  was 
almost  exhausted,  and  his  army,  of  which  almost  every 
unit  had  been  severely  engaged,  had  suffered  a  loss 
of  nearly  30  per  cent,  of  its  original  strength.  To 
disengage  his  wings  from  the  awkward  positions  they 
occupied,  and  make  timely  preparations  for  the 
inevitable  retreat,  were  the  problems  that  now 
absorbed  his  attention.  As  the  afternoon  wore  on, 
a  movement  of  withdrawal  commenced  along  the 
Confederate  front.     The  batteries  on  the  Emmitts- 

1  See  reports  of  Stuart  and  Gregg. 
126 


burg  pike  were  withdrawn  gun  by  gun,  first  to  Semin- 
ary Ridge  and  thence  to  Willoughby  Run.1  Long- 
street's  divisions  then  evacuated  the  positions  they 
held,  close  up  to  the  Union  lines,  and  fell  back  on 
Seminary  Ridge.  The  movement,  a  difficult  and 
dangerous  one,  especially  so  for  Law's  division,  was 
successfully  executed  with  hardly  any  molestation 
from  the  enemy.  The  latter  made  no  movement, 
except  to  push  forward  the  brigades  of  Nevin  and 
McCandless  to  harass  McLaws  in  his  retreat.  A 
regiment  of  Benning's  brigade,  mistaking  its  orders, 
advanced  instead  of  retiring,  and  being  attacked 
by  Nevin  and  McCandless,  was  badly  cut  up  before 
it  could  extricate  itself.2  With  this  exception  the 
withdrawal  was  effected  without  the  loss  of  a  man. 
This  inactivity  of  the  Federals  was  due  to  the  orders 
of  General  Meade,  who  instructed  Sykes  to  feel  the 
enemy,  but  on  no  account  to  bring  on  a  general  engage- 
ment. Johnson's  force  was  withdrawn  from  Culp's 
Hill  at  midnight,  and  marching  round  behind  Gettys- 
burg took  up  a  position  on  Seminary  Ridge  on  the 
left  of  Lee's  line.3  During  the  evening  and  through- 
out the  night  pick  and  spade  were  busy  in  the  Con- 
federate bivouacks,  and  at  daylight  on  July  4  a 
long  line  of  entrenchments  crowned  Seminary  Ridge, 
behind  which  Lee's  troops,  unshaken  by  the  terrible 
ordeal  that  they  had  been  through,  were  confident 
in  their  ability  to  inflict  a  bloody  repulse  on  any 
attempt  of  the  enemy  to  attack  them  in  their  own 
lines. 

The  losses  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  in  this 
desperately  contested  battle  were  23,045  killed, 
wounded  and  missing  of  all  ranks,  and  those  of  the 
army  of  Northern  Virginia  20,451. 4    The  Federals 

1  Alexander:  "Battles  and  Leaders."        2  McLaws'  report. 

3  Johnson's  report. 

4  See  detailed  statement  of  losses  at  end  of  volume  ;   these  are 

127 


also  lost  seven  pieces  of  artillery  and  captured  none. 
It  will  be  noted  that  the  Federals,  although  fighting 
throughout  on  the  defensive  and  often  behind  breast- 
works, had  more  casualties  than  their  opponents. 
This  unusual  result  was  due  to  the  terrible  losses 
suffered  by  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  in  their  disas- 
trous retreat  from  the  battlefield  of  July  1,  and 
to  the  almost  equally  severe  punishment  inflicted 
on  the  Third  Corps  when  it  was  driven  from  the 
Peach  Orchard.  Whenever  the  Union  troops  were 
successful  in  holding  their  lines  and  repulsed  the 
attack,  they  inflicted  a  far  greater  loss  than  they 
received.  A  remarkable  feature  of  the  battle  was  the 
great  number  of  officers  of  high  rank  who  fell  on  both 
sides.     Their  names  were  : — 

Killed  or  mortally  wounded. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia  :  Maj. -General  Pender, 
Brig.-Generals  Armistead.  Garnett,  Kemper,  Semmes 
and  Barksdale. 

Army  of  the  Potomac  :  Maj. -General  Reynolds, 
Brig.-Generals  Weed,  Farnsworth  and  Zook,  Acting 
Brig.-Generals  Vincent,  Cross  and  Willard. 

Wounded. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia  :  Maj. -Generals  Hood 
and  Heth,  Brig.-Generals  Scales,  Anderson,  Robert- 
son, Jones,  Hampton  and  Jenkins. 

Army  of  the  Potomac  :  Maj. -Generals  Hancock 
and  Sickles,  Brig.-Generals  Warren,  Gibbon,  Webb, 
Graham,  Paul,  Barlow,  Barnes,  and  Stannard. 

The  number  of  officers  of  all  ranks,  killed,  wounded 
or  missing  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  1574,  an 

based  on  the  details  given  in  Vol.  III.,  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 
Other  accounts  place  the  Confederate  loss  as  high  as  30,000.  But 
this  may  perhaps  be  due  to  an  error  in  counting  the  wounded 
Confederate  prisoners  ttvice  over,  that  is,  both  in  the  list  of  wounded 
and  also  in  the  list  of  prisoners. 

128 


eloquent  testimony  to  their  courage  and  self-sacrificing 
devotion.  The  percentage  of  loss  to  numbers  engaged 
was  in  many  of  the  units  extraordinarily  high.  The 
First  Corps  was  almost  annihilated.  It  lost  67  per  cent, 
of  its  strength,  the  Second  Corps  36  per  cent.,  the  Third 
Corps  35  per  cent.  On  the  other  hand,  Slocum's 
Corps  suffered  comparatively  little,  and  Sedgwick's 
was  barely  engaged.  Turning  to  the  Confederate 
casualties,  the  losses  in  the  divisions  of  McLaws, 
Hood,  Rodes,  and  Johnson  varied  from  25  to  30 
per  cent.,  while  in  Pickett's  and  Heth's  it  was  over 
60  per  cent.  The  brigades  of  Posey  and  Mahone,  of 
Anderson's  division,  were  the  only  units  in  the  whole 
army  not  actively  engaged  on  one  or  more  of  the 
three  days.  Lee  had  fought  his  army  almost  to  the 
last  man  in  his  determination  to  secure  victory.  But 
no  man  can  command  success,  and  if  the  task  that  he 
demanded  of  his  troops  was  too  much  even  for  them, 
yet  the  slaughter  that  they  inflicted  on  the  enemy  was 
so  great  that  the  battle  only  ended  finally  with  the 
mutual  exhaustion  of  both  combatants. 


129 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE  CONFEDERATE  RETREAT. 

1.  Military  Situation  Night  of  July  3. 

On  the  night  of  July  3,  the  Federal  forces  in  the 
strategic  area  were  situated  as  follows  : — 

At  Gettysburg : — The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  reduced 
to  about  60,000  effectives. 

The  cavalry  divisions  of  Gregg  and  Kilpatrick, 
about  8000  sabres. 

At  Westminster  : — The  cavalry  division  of  Buford, 
about  3000  sabres. 

At  Carlisle  and  Harrisburg  : — 11,000  militia,  under 
General  W.  F.  Smith. 

At  Frederick,  Maryland : — 11,000  men,  under 
General   French. 

At  Beverly,  Western  Virginia : — The  cavalry  brigade 
of  Brig.-General  Averill. 

At  New  Creek,  Western  Virginia  : — 5000  men,  under 
General  Kelley. 

About  5000  reinforcements  from  the  garrison  of 
Washington  were  sent,  first  to  French  at  Frederick, 
and  then  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  between  July 
4  and  July  10,  bringing  its  total  effective  strength 
up  to  65,000,  exclusive  of  the  cavalry. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  reduced  to  about 
50,000  effectives,  exclusive  of  Stuart's  cavalry  force, 
lay  entrenched  on  Seminary  Ridge  at  Gettysburg. 
General  Imboden's  cavalry  brigade,  2000  strong, 
reached  the  field   from  Chambersburg  on  the   3rd, 

130 


while  the  battle  was  still  in  progress.1  On  the  same 
day  the  brigades  of  Robertson  and  Jones,  which  had 
been  ordered  up  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley  on  the 
29th,  arrived  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Fairfield,  where 
they  met  and  cut  to  pieces  a  detachment  of  Federal 
cavalry.2  Corse's  brigade  of  Pickett's  division,  about 
2000  strong,  had  marched  from  Richmond  on  June  23 
to  join  the  army  in  Pennsylvania.  There  were  no 
other  Confederate  forces  anywhere  in  the  strategic 
area. 

The  situation  of  the  Confederate  army  on  the  night 
of  July  3  was  a  very  perilous  one.  It  had  been 
unsuccessful  in  a  great  battle,  in  which  its  losses 
had  amounted  to  thirty  per  cent,  of  the  whole  army. 
It  was  separated  by  a  vast  distance  from  its  own  base, 
with  the  enemy's  forces  between  it  and  Richmond. 
It  was  encumbered  with  immense  trains,  with  4000 
prisoners,  and  with  large  numbers  of  wounded.  Most 
serious  of  all,  its  ammunition  was  almost  exhausted, 
and  there  was  no  prospect  of  obtaining  fresh  supplies 
nearer  than  Williamsport.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
enemy  had  been  so  crippled  by  the  battle  that  for 
the  time  he  was  unable  or  unwilling  to  assume  an 
active  offensive,  but  a  few  days  would  see  him  largely 
strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  fresh  troops.  Lee's 
army  seemed  doomed.  It  seemed  impossible  that 
he  could  withdraw  his  shattered  forces,  his  prisoners, 
and  his  vast  trains  in  safety  to  the  south  side  of  the 
Potomac.  Such  was  the  belief  of  President  Lincoln 
and  the  people  of  the  Northern  States.  Other  events 
contributed  to  their  feeling  of  approaching  triumph. 
Vicksburg  fell  on  July  4,  and  it  was  felt  with  reason 
that,  could  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  be  de- 
stroyed before  it  could  cross  the  Potomac,  the  rebellion 
would  be  stamped  out  at  a  blow.  For  a  time  the 
fatal    policy    of    interference    and    discouragement, 

1  Iraboden  :  "  Battles  and  Leaders."  2  Robertson,  ibid. 

131 


which  marked  the  usual  conduct  of  the  Government 
towards  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  laid  aside, 
and  Lincoln  and  Halleck  did  all  in  their  power,  by 
forwarding  reinforcements  and  supplies,  to  enable 
Meade  to  achieve  the  result  they  so  ardently  desired. 
The  extreme  danger  of  the  situation  was  clear 
enough  to  General  Lee,  but  his  quiet,  confident  bearing 
gave  no  indication  of  the  anxiety  he  must  have  felt. 
Retreat  was  of  course  inevitable,  but  for  the  sake  of 
the  morale  of  the  army  it  was  to  be  made  as  leisurely 
as  possible.  The  most  difficult  part  of  the  operation 
was  the  withdrawal  of  the  prisoners  and  trains.  The 
former  would  require  a  large  escort,  and  were  therefore 
to  march  with  the  troops  by  the  Fairfield  road  to 
Hagerstown.  The  trains  were  to  move  by  way  of 
Cashtown  to  Chambersburg,  and  thence  to  Williams- 
port.  The  duty  of  escorting  them  was  assigned  to 
Imboden,  an  energetic  and  capable  officer,  whose  bri- 
gade, not  having  been  engaged,  was  the  freshest  in  the 
army.  His  instructions  were  to  cross  South  Mountain 
by  the  Chambersburg  road,  thence  march  to  Williams- 
port  by  the  most  convenient  route,  and  without  a  halt 
till  the  Potomac  should  be  reached.  He  was  to  rest 
there  long  enough  to  feed  his  animals,  and  then  ford 
the  river  and  march  without  halting  to  Winchester.1 

2.  The  Confederate  Retreat. 

The  4th  July,  the  anniversary  of  the  Signing  of 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  broke  on  a  silent 
field.  The  opposing  armies  lay  watching  one  another 
from  the  tree-covered  slopes  of  Gettysburg,  and  in  the 
cornfields  and  woods  lay  the  wounded  and  dead  in 
thousands.  Meade  apparently  anticipated  a  further 
attack,  and  kept  his  lines  well  closed  up  and  his  troops 
under  arms.     The  day  of  rest  was  very  welcome  to 

1  Imboden  :  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 
132 


the  Confederate  Army,  which,  since  it  had  left  its 
lines  behind  the  Rappahannock  on  June  14,  had  done 
little  else  but  march  and  fight.  All  the  dead  that 
lay  inside  or  near  their  lines  were  buried,  the  wounded 
looked  after,  and  such  as  were  considered  fit  to  travel 
placed  in  the  ambulances  and  empty  wagons  for 
transportation  to  Virginia.  The  operation  of  mar- 
shalling the  huge  train  along  the  roads  ready  for  the 
start  took  much  longer  than  was  anticipated,  and  it 
was  not  until  late  in  the  afternoon  that  the  long 
column  finally  started  towards  Chambersburg.  Im- 
boden  had  under  him  Hampton's  brigade  and  four 
batteries,  in  addition  to  his  own  command,  forming  a 
total  of  3500  men  and  23  guns.  Shortly  before  the 
start  the  rain  came  down  in  torrents,  and  continued 
so  all  night.  The  violence  of  the  storm  was  intense, 
and  the  sufferings  of  the  wounded  men  in  the  jolting 
wagons  indescribable.  The  roads  were  reduced  to  a 
state  which  made  them  in  places  almost  impassable 
for  vehicles,  and  many  of  the  wagons  broke  down. 
But  Imboden's  fierce  energy  conquered  all  obstacles. 
His  orders  were  that  nothing  whatever  was  to  stop 
the  progress  of  the  column.  If  a  wagon  broke  down 
it  was  to  be  instantly  turned  off  the  road  and  aban- 
doned. These  resolute  measures  were  effective.  On 
the  morning  of  the  5th  the  head  of  the  column  reached 
Greencastle,  and  continuing  the  march  without  a  halt 
entered  Williamsport  the  same  evening,  the  remainder 
coming  in  on  the  following  day.1  Throughout  the 
retreat  no  molestation  was  received  from  the  cavalry 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  whose  movements  we 
shall  follow  presently,  but  some  damage  was  caused 
by  a  detachment  of  AverhTs  cavalry  from  Beverly, 
Western  Virginia,  which  attacked  the  train  near  Mer- 
cersburg  and  captured  some  sixty  wagons.  But  now 
Imboden's  good  fortune  seemed  to  have  ceased.    At 

1  Imboden  :  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 
133 


Williamsport  an  ominous  state  of  affairs  was  revealed. 
On  the  morning  of  the  3rd  a  detachment  of  cavalry, 
sent  out  from  Frederick  by  General  French,  had  made 
a  raid  on  the  town,  and  had  destroyed  the  bridge  by 
which  the  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Mary- 
land. This  was  not  all.  The  river,  swollen  by  the 
heavy  rains,  was  now  a  swirling  flood,  spreading  over 
its  banks,  impossible  to  ford.  The  stars  in  their 
courses  seemed  to  be  fighting  against  the  South,  and 
the  very  elements  conspiring  to  prevent  the  escape  of 
Lee's  sorely  tried  army. 

During  the  night  of  July  4,  Lee  put  his  army  in 
motion  towards  Fairfield.  Hill's  corps  led  the  column, 
then  Longstreet  escorting  the  prisoners,  and  then 
Ewell,  Early's  division  forming  the  rearguard.  The 
rear  of  the  army  did  not  get  under  way  till  near  dawn 
of  the  5th.  On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  finding  that 
the  enemy  had  disappeared,  Meade  began  to  consider 
the  question  of  pursuit.  His  most  ardent  admirers 
cannot  but  acknowledge  that  his  subsequent  move- 
ments were  leisurely  in  the  extreme.  His  army,  it  is 
true,  was  terribly  battered  and  exhausted,  but  it  had 
had  an  entire  day  to  rest  and  recuperate,  and  the  prize 
to  be  gained  was  so  immense  that  no  consideration 
whatever  should  have  been  allowed  to  stand  in  the 
way  of  a  prompt  and  energetic  pursuit.  But  Meade's 
dominant  trait  was  caution.  On  the  5th  he  sent  out 
Sedgwick's  Corps  to  follow  up  the  enemy's  line  of 
retreat,  while  part  of  his  force  was  moved  forward  to 
occupy  the  abandoned  Confederate  lines.  Sedgwick 
overtook  Lee's  rear-guard  a  short  distance  beyond 
Fairfield,  delayed  by  the  congested  trains  of  Ewell's 
Corps  passing  through  Eyler's  Gap.1  Early  took 
prompt  measures  to  form  a  line  of  battle,  and  Sedg- 
wick, after  looking  to  it,  decided  that  it  was  too  strong 
to  attack  with  his  present  force,  and  sent  back  for 

1  Early's  report. 
134 


reinforcements.  But  Meade  had  now  changed  his 
plans.  Instead  of  following  up  the  enemy's  direct 
line  of  retreat,  he  decided  to  move  south,  keeping  east 
of  South  Mountain,  and  cross  by  the  lower  gaps  into 
the  Cumberland  Valley.1  Two  reasons  influenced 
him  in  this  decision.  Firstly,  he  might  otherwise  be 
compelled  to  force  Eyler's  Gap  against  a  strong 
rear-guard,  which  would  entail  an  assault  and  possibly 
a  day's  delay ;  secondly,  by  marching  to  Frederick  he 
would  be  able  to  unite  with  the  force  there  under 
General  French,  and  with  the  reinforcements  which 
Halleck  was  sending  from  the  garrison  of  Washington. 
In  the  meantime,  General  W.  F.  Smith  had  entered 
the  Cumberland  Valley  from  Harrisburg  at  the  head 
of  11,000  militia,  and  General  Kelley,  with  5000  men, 
was  advancing  from  New  Creek,  Western  Virginia, 
on  Williamsport.  On  the  6th,  French  was  ordered  to 
re-occupy  Harper's  Ferry  with  part  of  his  force.  This 
was  done,  Kenly's  brigade  reaching  that  place  the 
same  day,  followed  by  the  brigades  of  Briggs  and 
Naglee  on  the  7th.2  This  brought  up  the  total 
strength  of  the  garrison  now  holding  the  works 
on  Maryland  Heights  to  about  6000  men. 

3.  Cavalry  Movements  and  Action  at 
Williamsport. 

General  Meade  realised  fully  the  importance  of 
sending  out  his  cavalry  as  soon  as  possible  to  harass 
the  Confederate  retreat.  The  following  orders  were 
issued  to  the  division  commanders  on  the  morning  of 
July  43  :— 

Kilpatrick's  Division : — To  march  via  Emmitts- 
burg  to  Mechanicstown,  and  cross  South  Mountain  by 
Monterey  Gap. 

Gregg's  Division  : — Huey's  brigade  to  report  to 
Kilpatrick  at  Emmittsburg. 

1  Meade's  report.     2  French's  report.     3  Pleasontoji's  report. 

135 


Irvin  Gregg's  brigade  to  march  by  Cashtown  in 
pursuit  of  the  Confederate  trains. 

Mcintosh's  brigade  to  Emmittsburg,  and  remain 
there  to  protect  the  rear  of  the  army. 

Buford's  Division  : — From  Westminster  to  Freder- 
ick, and  thence  cross  South  Mountain  by  Turner's  or 
Crampton's  Gap,  and  move  on  Williamsport. 

As  regards  the  Confederate  cavalry,  Stuart  made 
the  following  dispositions  to  secure  the  passes  leading 
across  South  Mountain  into  the  Cumberland  Valley  : 
Fitzhugh  Lee  was  ordered  to  act  as  rearguard  to  the 
column  under  Imboden's  escort  proceeding  by  way 
of  Cashtown,  Robertson  and  Jones  to  cover  the  rear 
of  Lee's  army  on  the  Fairfield  road,  while  Stuart  in 
person,  with  the  brigades  of  Jenkins  and  Chambliss, 
moved  on  the  5th  by  Emmittsburg  and  Mechanics- 
town  to  secure  the  gap  at  Monterey  further  south.1 
He  found  he  was  too  late.  Kilpatrick  had  passed 
through  the  gap  on  the  evening  of  the  4th,  twelve 
hours  in  front  of  Stuart.  At  daylight  on  July  5, 
leaving  a  small  rearguard  to  hold  the  passes,  Kil- 
patrick pushed  on  to  attack  Ewell's  trains  which  were 
passing  across  his  front  on  the  Fairfield-Hagerstown 
road.  In  spite  of  a  vigorous  resistance  on  the  part  of 
the  escort,  a  large  number  of  wagons  fell  into  his  hands, 
many  of  them  being  full  of  wounded  brought  from 
Gettysburg.  This  mishap,  which  seemed  so  unfor- 
tunate at  the  time,  proved  eventually  a  rather  lucky 
event  for  the  Confederates,  for  it  drew  away  Kil- 
patrick's  attention  from  a  far  greater  prize.  On 
the  morning  of  the  5th  Imboden's  convoy  was  filing 
slowly  along  the  road  from  Greencastle  to  Williams- 
port,  barely  seven  miles  off.  Kilpatrick  had  made  his 
capture  by  9  a.m.  Had  he  pushed  boldly  on  either  to 
Hagerstown  or  Williamsport,  he  would  have  inter- 
cepted the  convoy,  and  the  greater  part,  if  not  all,  of 

1  Stuart's  report. 
136 


Lee's  trains  must  have  fallen  into  his  hands.  But  at 
this  moment  he  acted  with  extraordinary  supineness. 
Withdrawing  his  rearguard  from  Monterey,  he  re- 
tired to  Boonsborough,1  where  he  arrived  at  10  p.m., 
at  the  same  time  that  Imboden's  convoy  was  filing 
into  Williamsport.  Stuart  now  passed  through  the 
gap,  and  uniting  his  two  brigades  with  Kobertson 
and  Jones,  moved  with  the  whole  on  Hagerstown.  In 
the  meantime  Buford  had  reached  Frederick,  where 
he  was  joined  by  Merritt's  brigade,  and  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  July  6,  he  crossed  South  Mountain  and 
advanced  on  Williamsport.2  On  the  morning  of 
the  6th,  Kilpatrick  moved  from  Boonsborough  on 
Hagerstown  to  attack  Stuart,  under  the  impression 
that  the  bulk  of  the  trains  had  not  yet  passed  that 
point.  It  would  be  unprofitable  to  try  to  follow  in 
detail  the  very  confused  fighting  which  ensued  in  the 
vicinity  of  Hagerstown,  and  which  finally  resulted  in 
the  repulse  of  Kilpatrick.  He  had  in  the  meantime 
ascertained  from  Buford  that  the  trains  were  not  at 
Hagerstown,  but  Williamsport,  and  accordingly  fell 
back  in  that  direction,  hoping  to  capture  the  place 
before  Stuart  could  come  up  to  relieve  it.3 

Imboden's  situation  was  intensely  critical.  The 
river  was  in  flood  and  the  bridge  destroyed.  His 
own  force  did  not  number  more  than  2000  men,  for 
he  had  been  obliged  to  detach  Hampton's  brigade  to 
watch  the  roads  from  the  west  in  case  Averill  should 
advance  from  that  direction.  Buford  and  Kil- 
patrick were  advancing  to  attack  him  from  the  east 
with  6000  men.  In  this  emergency  Imboden  acted 
with  an  energy  and  decision  beyond  praise.  He  aug- 
mented his  small  force  by  arming  700  or  800  of  the 
wagoners,  who  had  driven  the  teams  from  Gettysburg, 
with  rifles  taken  from  the  wounded,  and  formed  a 

1  In  his  report  Kilpatrick  says  :  "  To  save  my  prisoners,  animals, 
and  wagons,  I  returned  to  Boonsborough." 

2  Buford's  report.  3  Kilpatrick's  report. 

137 


line  on  the  hills  east  of  the  town,  placing  his  guns 
in  conspicuous  places  and  making  as  much  show  as 
possible  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  his  real  strength.1 
The  ruse  succeeded  admirably.  Buford  pushed  his 
advance  very  cautiously,  under  the  impression  that 
he  had  a  large  force  in  front  of  him.  The  action 
continued  in  a  desultory  manner  all  the  afternoon, 
until  at  sunset  a  message  arrived  from  Fitzhugh 
Lee,  urging  Imboden  to  hold  out  a  little  longer,  as 
he  would  soon  be  up  with  help.  The  news  was  at  once 
communicated  to  the  men,  and  was  received  with  a 
shout  of  exultation.  They  felt  that  their  gallant 
defence  had  not  been  in  vain,  and  began  to  push  boldly 
forward  against  the  enemy.  Stuart  was  now  pressing 
Kilpatrick  hard  in  rear,  and  the  latter,  seeing  that  the 
prize  had  slipped  from  his  hands,  gave  up  the  contest 
and  withdrew  by  his  left  flank  towards  Buford. 
Both  then  fell  back  under  cover  of  night  to  Turner's 
Gap,  having  lost  some  400  men  in  the  fighting  at 
Williamsport  and  Hagerstown.  Thus  the  whole  of 
the  vast  trains  entrusted  to  Imboden's  charge  had 
been  brought  almost  intact  from  Gettysburg  to  the 
Potomac.  This  success  was  due  partly  to  luck,  partly 
to  Imboden's  energy,  partly  to  the  enemy's  mistakes. 
Kilpatrick's  supineness  in  wasting  the  5th  in  inaction 
threw  away  the  great  chance  he  was  given  of  inter- 
cepting the  convoy,  and  the  opportunity,  once  lost, 
did  not  recur.  What  it  would  have  meant  to  Lee 
had  the  great  camp  at  Williamsport  been  captured 
it  is  difficult  to  overestimate.  In  the  straitened  and 
impoverished  condition  of  the  Confederacy  the  vast 
quantities  of  lost  stores  and  equipment  could  not 
have  been  replaced.2 

1  Imboden  :  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

2  See  Stuart's  report  for  operations  of  the  Confederate  cavalry. 
Pleasonton's  report  is  very  general,  and  gives  few  details. 
Kilpatrick's  is  extremely  confused,  and  gives  quite  a  wrong 
impression  of  several  actions,  particularly  that  at  Williamsport. 

138 


4.  Movements  on  Williams  port. 

On  July  7,  Longstreet's  Corps,  followed  by  the 
rest  of  the  army,  marched  into  Williamsport,  having 
covered  the  distance  from  Gettysburg  in  two  and  a 
half  days  with  hardly  any  molestation  from  the  Union 
cavalry.  Lee  had  succeeded  in  withdrawing  his  army 
from  a  dangerous  position  with  great  skill,  and  now 
when  complete  success  seemed  on  the  point  of  crown- 
ing the  operation,  the  sudden  rise  of  the  Potomac 
threatened  to  bring  everything  to  ruin.  The  position 
was  a  most  embarrassing  one.  The  river  showed  no 
signs  of  falling,  and  a  week  or  ten  days  must  elapse 
before  it  would  become  fordable  again.  In  the 
meantime  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  strengthened  by 
numerous  reinforcements,  was  hastening  forward  to 
intercept  his  retreat  and  drive  the  Confederates  into 
the  river.  Lee  set  his  engineers  to  work  at  once 
to  build  a  new  bridge,  a  long  and  tedious  business, 
for  all  the  materials  for  making  boats  and  roadway 
had  to  be  assembled  de  novo.  Many  of  the  wounded, 
who  declared  themselves  able  to  walk,  were  ferried 
over  the  river  in  flat  boats,  and  ordered  to  make  their 
way  independently  to  Winchester.  All  the  prisoners, 
some  4000  in  number,  were  similarly  transferred  to 
the  Virginia  shore,  and  sent  under  Imboden's  escort 
up  the  valley  to  Staunton.  In  the  meantime  a 
defensive  position  for  the  army  to  take  up  was  traced 
out  and  entrenched.  It  extended  from  Marsh  Creek 
on  the  right  flank  in  a  convex  curve  to  Conocohoochee 
Creek  on  the  left,  the  length  of  the  line  being  about 
nine  miles,  to  hold  which  Lee  had  available  some  45,000 
infantry.  This  period  of  rest  at  Williamsport  was 
of  inestimable  benefit  to  his  troops,  who  rapidly 
recovered  their  spirits  and  self-confidence,  as  day 
after  day  passed  and  their  lines  grew  in  strength, 
while  no  enemy  appeared.1 

1  Lee's  report. 
139 


As  we  have  seen,  the  Confederate  army  reached 
Williamsport  on  the  7th.  On  the  6th  Meade  had 
set  his  troops  in  motion  towards  Frederick.  On 
the  7th  his  head-quarters  were  transferred  to  that 
place,  and  his  columns  were  wheeled  to  the  right 
towards  the  lower  gaps  of  South  Mountain.  A 
junction  was  effected  at  Frederick  with  the  troops 
under  General  French,  the  latter  officer  taking  over 
the  command  of  the  Third  Corps,  left  vacant  by  the 
wounding  of  General  Sickles  at  Gettysburg.  On  the 
8th  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  were  pushed  forward 
to  occupy  Turner's  Gap,  Stuart,  with  four  brigades 
behind  Antietam  Creek,  watching  Kilpatrick  and 
Buford  on  the  other  bank.  On  the  same  date  General 
W.  F.  Smith,  moving  down  the  Cumberland  Valley, 
reached  Wraynesborough.  As  soon  as  Meade  got 
into  touch  again  with  the  enemy  his  advance  became 
astonishingly  cautious  and  slow.  On  the  9th  the  left 
wing  of  the  army  advanced  through  Crampton's 
Gap  to  the  Antietam.  On  the  10th  this  wing  crossed 
the  creek,  Stuart  having  fallen  back.  On  the  11th 
Meade  executed  a  lateral  movement  to  the  right  to 
get  into  touch  with  Smith,  who  was  approaching 
Hagerstown.  On  the  12th  the  army  advanced  on 
Williamsport,  and  took  up  a  position  from  Hagerstown 
to  Marsh  Creek  facing  the  Confederate  lines.  In 
the  meantime  General  Kelley,  with  his  mixed  com- 
mand of  5000  men,  had  reached  Hancock,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Potomac,  about  1 8  miles  west  of  Williams- 
port, where  he  was  in  a  position  to  cut  into  Lee's 
line  of  retreat. 

Meade  had  thus  taken  seven  days  to  march  a  dis- 
tance of  rather  under  50  miles,  and  five  days  to  cover 
the  last  20.  What  was  the  explanation  of  this 
extraordinary  dilatoriness  at  a  moment  when  every- 
thing depended  on  prompt  decisive  action  on  his 
part  ?  It  was  certainly  not  for  lack  of  encourage- 
ment from  Washington.     Lincoln  and  Halleck  were 

140 


incessantly  urging  him  to  go  on  and  drive  Lee  into  the 
Potomac,  sentiments  which  were  echoed  unanimously 
by  the  whole  North.  The  very  elements  seemed  to  be 
fighting  for  him.  His  army,  strengthened  and  rested, 
was  eager  to  press  on.  The  most  reasonable  explana- 
tion seems  to  be  the  impression  produced  upon 
General  Meade's  mind  by  the  fury  of  the  Confederate 
assaults  at  Gettysburg.  He  had  a  wholesome  dread 
of  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia.  We  find  him 
writing  to  Halleck  on  July  6  x  that  if  a  misfortune 
overtook  the  army,  he  hoped  that  a  sufficient  number 
of  his  force  would  reach  Washington  to  make  the 
Capital  secure  against  capture.  Such  was  the  attitude 
of  the  commanding  general  three  days  after  a  battle 
which  his  country  claimed  as  a  great  and  decisive 
victory  !  His  thoughts  were  fixed  on  the  safety  of 
his  own  army,  not  on  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's. 
His  movements  were  in  consequence  timid,  slow,  and 
half-hearted,  and  it  is  scarcely  to  be  wondered  at  that 
the  President  began  to  grow  impatient  at  a  commander 
who  hesitated  to  close  with  an  adversary,  whom  he 
claimed  to  be  beaten  and  demoralised,  and  whom 
Fate  itself  seemed  to  have  delivered  into  his  hand. 

5.  Lee  Recrosses  the  Potomac. 

Meade  had  wasted  precious  time,  but  he  was  up  at 
last,  and  the  swollen  river  still  held  Lee  fast  on  the 
Maryland  shore.  The  two  protagonists  were  once 
more  face  to  face,  but  now  the  positions  were  reversed. 
It  was  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  was  now 
obliged  to  attack.  Meade  spent  a  large  part  of  the 
12th  in  examining  Lee's  position,  pushing  forward 
small  bodies  to  feel  the  enemy,  and  entrenching  along 
his  own  front.  He  discovered  that  the  position  before 
him  was  a  most  formidable  one,  strengthened  through- 
out by  earthworks,  and  resting  on  flanks  that  could 

1  Meade  to  Halleck,  July  6,  Official  Records. 
141 


not  be  turned.1  He  had  seen  at  the  Antietam  and 
at  Friedericksburg  the  obstinacy  with  which  the 
Confederate  infantry  could  defend  a  position,  and  a 
bloody  repulse  at  Williamsport  would  be  a  disastrous 
termination  to  what  he  could  fairly  claim  to  have 
been  hitherto  a  successful  campaign.  And  yet  he 
should  not  have  hesitated  for  a  moment.  If  all  else 
was  doubtful  this  at  least  was  plain.  If  advantage 
was  to  be  taken  of  the  finest  opportunity  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  ever  destined  to  have,  of 
destroying  its  adversary  at  a  blow,  then  the  lines 
confronting  him  must  be  carried  by  assault,  no  matter 
at  what  cost  of  life.  Meade  seems  to  have  felt  the 
truth  of  this,  for  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  he 
called  a  council-of-war  of  his  corps  commanders 
and  expressed  his  intention  of  making  a  general  attack 
on  the  following  day.  All  but  one  were  strongly 
opposed  to  the  project.2  Such  a  weight  of  adverse 
opinion  was  too  heavy  to  be  disregarded,  though  a 
stronger  man  might  have  done  so,  and  Meade,  against 
his  own  judgment,  decided  to  postpone  the  assault 
until  the  enemy's  lines  could  be  more  thoroughly 
examined.  The  examination  was  made,  and  the 
original  order  promulgated  for  the  14th.  But  the 
delay  was  fatal.  Even  when  Meade  was  making  up 
his  mind,  the  prize  was  slipping  out  of  his  hands, 
and  the  chance,  for  it  was  not  more  than  a  chance, 
passed  away  unseized. 

Day  after  day  the  Potomac  had  been  falling,  and 
the  anxiety  which  Lee  had  felt  as  to  his  positon 
lessened  also.  The  work  of  constructing  a  new 
bridge  at  Falling  Waters  was  pushed  on  energetically. 
Buildings  were  pulled  down  to  obtain  timber  for 
boats,  part  of  the  old  structure  was  recovered,  and 

1  Meade's  report. 

2  Meade's  despatch  to  Halleck,  July  13,  does  not  state  who 
was  the  solitary  advocate  of  an  assault. 

142 


by  the  13th  the  bridge  was  ready.  The  river,  though 
deep,  was  reported  fordable  at  Williamsport,  and  on 
the  night  of  the  13th,  in  the  midst  of  a  violent  storm, 
Lee  commenced  his  retreat.  The  movement,  always 
a  trying  one  to  carry  out  in  the  face  of  an  enemy, 
was  conducted  in  perfect  order.  Ewell's  Corps  crossed 
by  the  ford,  Longstreet  and  Hill  by  the  bridge 
at  Falling  Waters.  The  operation,  however,  took 
longer  than  was  anticipated,  and  at  daylight  Petti- 
grew's  (late  Heth's)  division,  forming  the  rear-guard, 
was  still  on  the  northern  side,  waiting  to  cross.  By 
this  time  the  enemy  had  discovered  that  the  lines 
were  abandoned,  and  the  Federal  cavalry  came  quickly 
swarming  down  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  rear- 
guard. In  the  scuffle  that  followed,  the  gallant 
Pettigrew,  who  had  already  received  a  wound  at 
Gettysburg,  was  killed,  and  a  number  of  stragglers, 
in  all  about  500,  were  cut  off  and  captured.  Three 
guns,  which  had  stuck  in  the  mud  and  could  not  be 
extracted,  were  also  abandoned,  the  only  pieces  of 
artillery  lost  by  the  army  throughout  the  campaign. 
The  rest  of  the  force  effected  their  retreat  in  safety, 
and  the  Confederate  army  stood  once  more  on  the 
soil  of  Virginia.1 

6.  Movement  to  the  Rappahannock. 

Meade  made  no  attempt  to  pursue,  except  to  send 
part  of  Gregg's  cavalry  division  across  the  river  on  the 
15th  to  harass  the  retreat.  Gregg  accomplished 
nothing.  He  was  vigorously  attacked  by  Stuart, 
and  retreated  precipitately  over  the  Potomac  again 
with  the  loss  of  100  men.  Lee  marched  leisurely 
to  Bunker  Hill,  which  he  reached  on  the  15th,  meaning 
to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge  into  Eastern  Virginia,  but 

1  See  reports  of  Lee  and  Meade.  There  seems  no  reason  to 
doubt  the  accuracy  of  General  Lee's  description  of  these  events. 
Kilpatrick's  appears  to  be  very  much  exaggerated. 

143 


the  Shenandoah,  swollen  by  the  recent  rains,  was 
found  to  be  unfordable.  In  the  meantime,  urged  on 
by  constant  exhortations  from  Washington,  Meade 
marched  down  the  left  bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  on 
the  17th  crossed  by  pontoon  bridges  laid  at  Harper's 
Ferry  and  Berlin.  His  plan  was  to  move  rapidly 
down  the  eastern  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  seize  the 
gaps,  and  cut  Lee  off  from  his  base  at  Richmond.1 
The  Confederate  commander  now  put  his  army  in 
motion  up  the  valley  towards  Chester  Gap,  thus 
retracing  the  same  route  that  he  had  followed  a  month 
before.  At  one  moment  it  seemed  as  though  he  was 
going  to  be  out-manoeuvred,  for  the  Federal  army 
reached  Manassas  Gap  while  the  head  of  his  own 
column  was  marching  through  Front  Royal.  But 
the  danger  was  only  momentary.  Meade's  burst 
of  energy  died  away.  A  feeble  attempt  to  cut  off 
Ewell  at  Front  Royal  was  easily  repulsed,  and  on  the 
23rd  the  Confederate  army  passed  through  Chester 
Gap,  and  was  once  more  between  the  enemy  and 
Richmond.  The  march  was  continued  towards  Cul- 
pepper, Longstreet  reaching  that  place  on  the  24th, 
and  the  rest  of  the  army  by  the  29th.  Lee  then 
took  up  a  defensive  line  behind  the  Rapidan.  Meade 
marched  slowly  to  the  Rappahannock,  but,  acting 
under  instructions  from  Halleck,  made  no  attempt  to 
push  south  of  that  river.2  Thus  the  campaign  came 
to  an  end  within  a  few  miles  of  the  locality  which  had 
witnessed  its  opening  scenes  six  weeks  before.3 

1  Meade's  report. 

2  Halleck  to  Meade,  July  30  :  "  Keep  up  a  threatening  attitude, 
but  do  not  advance." 

3  The  total  casualties  in  the  Union  forces  from  June  3  to  August 
1,  exclusive  of  those  in  General  Dix's  force,  threatening  Rich- 
mond, numbered  32,043.  The  casualties  in  the  army  of  Northern 
Virginia  during  the  same  period  were  22,052.     (Official  Records.) 


144 


CHAPTER   VII. 

CRITICISM  ON  THE  BATTLE  OF 
GETTYSBURG. 

1.  The  Battle  of  July  1. 

The  battle  of  July  1  comes  under  quite  a  different 
category  to  that  of  the  two  succeeding  days,  and 
it  is  therefore  proposed  to  discuss  it  separately.  It 
forms  one  of  the  very  few  instances  on  record  of  a 
battle  brought  on  by  two  armies  meeting  on  the 
march.  All  the  characteristic  features  of  such  actions 
are  reproduced.  In  the  first  place,  the  course  that 
the  battle  took  was  beyond  the  control  of  the  com- 
manders on  either  side.  As  the  successive  rein- 
forcements came  up,  they  were  thrust  in  wherever 
their  presence  seemed  most  needed  at  the  moment. 
There  was  no  pre-arranged  plan.  The  battle  having 
been  opened  by  the  Federal  cavalry,  its  subsequent 
development  followed  a  line  of  its  own.  Secondly, 
there  was  on  the  Union  side  a  repeated  change  in  the 
command,  due  to  the  successive  arrival  of  senior 
officers  on  the  field,  Reynolds,  Doubleday,  Howard, 
and  Hancock.  This  had  the  natural  effect  of  pro- 
ducing much  confusion  in  the  issuing  of  orders  and 
counter-orders,  while  as  each  officer  arrived  on  the 
field  he  found  a  situation  which  had  already  passed 
beyond  his  control,  and  although  he  might  have  fore- 
seen the  ultimate  disaster,  he  was  powerless  to  avert 
it.  It  is  always  difficult  and  often  impossible  to  break 
off  an  action,  when  once  the  troops  have  become  closely 
k  145 


engaged.  If  we  examine  the  course  of  the  battle 
from  its  commencement,  we  shall  find  that  at  one 
period  only  did  an  opportunity  present  itself  to  with- 
draw the  Union  troops  and  discontinue  the  action. 
This  occurred  about  noon  after  the  repulse  of  Heth's 
first  attack  on  Reynolds'  Corps.  Had  Doubleday, 
who  was  left  by  the  death  of  Reynolds  in  command 
of  the  First  Corps,  then  withdrawn  his  troops  to 
Cemetery  Hill,  he  could  have  done  so  in  safety,  for 
Heth  was  for  the  moment  incapable  of  pressing  him, 
and  Rodes  was  not  yet  up.  Doubleday 's  explana- 
tion for  not  doing  so1  is,  firstly,  that  as  Reynolds 
had  selected  the  position,  he  considered  it  his  duty 
to  hold  it ;  and,  secondly,  that  General  Howard,  who 
had  reached  Cemetery  Hill,  was  the  senior  officer  on 
the  field,  and  could  have  ordered  the  retirement 
had  he  deemed  it  advisable.  Neither  reason  is  satis- 
factory. Reynolds'  action  was  dictated  by  the 
necessity  of  rescuing  Buford's  hard-pressed  cavalry. 
To  remain  in  such  an  exposed  position,  after  this 
object  had  been  successfully  accomplished,  was 
simply  madness.  Doubleday  was  aware  that  Ewell 
was  approaching  from  the  north,  and  his  arrival  on 
the  field  was  bound  to  threaten  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  First  Corps.  Doubleday's  second  excuse 
indicates  a  lamentable  incapacity  to  assume  responsi- 
bility. Howard  had  only  just  reached  the  scene. 
He  was  necessarily  unaware  how  matters  stood,  and 
by  the  time  he  could  have  satisfied  himself  of  the 
precise  state  of  affairs  in  front  of  the  First  Corps 
the  favourable  moment  would  have  passed.  The 
chief  responsibility  for  the  disaster  that  overtook 
the  Union  arms  must  therefore  rest  on  General 
Doubleday. 

But  a  part  of  the  blame  must  certainly  be  borne 
by    Buford.     It  was   he  who  gratuitously  provoked 

1  See  Doubleday' s  report. 
146 


the  action,  and  it  was  in  the  effort  to  rescue  him  from 
his  perilous  position  that  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps 
were  hurried  to  their  death.  It  has  been  asserted 
that  by  his  action  Buford  saved  Cemetery  Ridge 
from  falling  into  the  enemy's  hands,  and  thereby 
contributed  largely  to  the  ultimate  success  of  the 
Union  arms.  But  was  this  so  ?  Had  not  Buford 
been  so  hard  pressed,  Reynolds  would  have  halted  on 
Cemetery  Hill.  The  position  that  Buford  took  up 
covered  the  town  rather  than  the  ridge.  There  is 
nothing  in  his  reports  of  the  30th  and  1st  to  show  that 
he  appreciated  the  importance  of  the  latter.  Had  he 
done  so,  it  is  inconceivable  why,  at  Heth's  approach, 
he  did  not  evacuate  the  town  and  fall  back  on  Ceme- 
tery Hill,  a  position  which  afforded  admirable  facili- 
ties for  concealing  the  smallness  of  his  force,  whereas 
in  the  open  fields  north  of  Gettysburg  concealment 
was  impossible.  It  was  only  the  enemy's  ignorance 
of  the  strength  of  the  Union  forces  holding  Cemetery 
Hill  that  saved  that  position  from  falling  into 
Ewell's  hands  at  the  close  of  the  day.  The  only 
advantage  possessed  by  Buford's  position  was  that 
it  denied  the  town  to  the  enemy.  This,  in  itself, 
was  of  no  importance,  certainly  not  worth  the 
10,000  men  who  were  thrown  away  in  the  futile 
attempt  to  hold  it.  Of  Buford's  courage  and 
energy  there  can  be  no  question,  but  he  cannot  be 
acquitted  of  an  error  of  judgment  which  proved 
most  disastrous  to  the  Union  arms.  The  incident  is 
very  instructive  from  another  point  of  view,  for  it 
shows  how  a  single  independent  step  on  the  part 
of  a  subordinate  may  sometimes  force  the  hand  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  commit  him  to  a  line  of 
action,  which  up  to  that  moment  had  never  even 
entered  into  his  calculations. 

The  Confederates  were  peculiarly  favoured  by 
fortune  on  this  occasion.  The  forces  of  Hill,  Rodes, 
and  Early,  marching  from  widely  separated  points, 

147 


reached  the  field  at  precisely  the  right  time,  and  in 
positions  where  they  were  most  favourably  situated 
for  enveloping  the  enemy's  force.  This  was  not  due 
to  a  pre-arranged  scheme,  but  to  a  lucky  chance.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Confederate  commanders  deserve 
high  praise  for  the  combined  attack  about  4  p.m., 
which  finally  won  the  day.  It  will  be  noted  how  the 
isolated  attacks  of  Hill  and  Rodes  were  repulsed  in 
turn  with  great  loss,  but  when  all  the  Confederate 
forces  on  the  field  advanced  simultaneously  they 
swept  everything  before  them.  Had  they  continued 
to  press  the  pursuit  beyond  the  town,  there  can  be 
very  little  doubt  that  Cemetery  Hill  would  have 
fallen  also,  for  the  Union  troops  were  too  disorganised 
by  the  disaster  to  offer  prolonged  resistance  to  a 
determined  attack.  General  Lee's  decision  not  to 
press  the  advance  further  that  night  has  been  severely 
criticised.  By  his  over-caution  he  is  said  to  have 
thrown  away  the  fruits  of  the  success  which  Hill  and 
Ewell  had  won,  and  to  have  given  the  enemy  breathing 
time  to  establish  himself  on  a  position,  from  which 
he  was  never  afterwards  driven.  In  considering  the 
justice  of  such  criticism,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
one  must  judge  a  general's  actions,  not  by  what  we 
know  of  the  facts  now,  but  by  what  he  knew  of  them 
then.  The  charge  of  over-caution  is  not  one  to  which 
General  Lee  laid  himself  open  very  often  in  his  military 
career.  Again  and  again  he  showed  that  he  was 
prepared  to  accept  the  most  appalling  risk,  if  he  con- 
sidered the  object  to  be  gained  was  worth  it.  What 
was  the  situation  as  it  presented  itself  to  him  at  the 
moment  when  he  appeared  on  the  field  ?  After  a 
desperate  struggle,  his  troops  had  driven  the  enemy 
from  his  position  with  great  loss.  The  Federals  had 
been  rallied  on  a  second  position,  which  appeared  a 
most  formidable  one.  They  had  evidently  been 
reinforced,  but  in  what  strength  it  was  impossible  to 
tell.     His  own  troops  had  suffered  severely  in  the 

148 


action,  they  were  thrown  into  much  disorder  by  their 
rapid  advance,  and  were  encumbered  by  a  very  large 
number  of  prisoners.  The  brigades  of  Hays  and  Hoke, 
which  had  been  scarcely  engaged,  were  the  only  troops 
in  a  condition  immediately  to  advance.  Would  it 
have  been  wise  to  have  thrown  these  two  brigades  in 
an  isolated  assault  upon  the  enemy's  position  ?  The 
risk  of  their  meeting  with  a  disastrous  repulse  was 
certainly  great.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no 
situation,  in  which  it  is  more  permissible  for  a  general 
to  take  unlimited  risks,  than  when  the  enemy  is 
beaten  and  flying,  and  his  own  troops  are  advancing 
in  the  full  flush  of  victory.  That  General  Lee  fully 
realised  the  importance  of  Cemetery  Hill  is  shown  by 
his  message  to  Ewell  to  "  press  those  people,  and 
secure  the  hill,  if  possible."  But  from  his  position 
at  the  Seminary  it  was  not  possible  for  him  to  judge 
exactly  how  matters  stood  in  the  firing  line,  and  with 
his  usual  sound  habit  he  relied  upon  the  discretion  of 
the  man  on  the  spot  to  decide  whether  his  instructions 
were  feasible  or  not.  Actually  there  is  no  doubt 
that  the  Confederates  did  lose  a  priceless  opportunity 
of  securing  the  position,  which  afterwards  cost  them 
such  a  terrible  and  useless  sacrifice  of  life.  But  at  the 
same  time,  the  circumstances  were  so  doubtful,  and 
the  right  action  to  take  so  difficult  to  decide,  that  one 
must  hesitate  to  attach  blame  to  either  Lee  or  Ewell 
for  their  unfortunate  over-caution  on  this  occasion. 

The  chief  honours  of  the  day  were  undoubtedly 
won  by  the  First  Corps.  In  spite  of  the  fearful  losses 
they  suffered,  amounting  to  the  fall  of  three  men  out 
of  every  five,  no  considerable  number  of  men  left  the 
ranks  at  any  time.  Their  retreat  never  degenerated 
into  a  rout,  they  contested  every  foot  of  the  way,  and 
when  those  that  remained  were  finally  rallied  on 
Cemetery  Hill,  they  were  still  in  condition  to  offer 
a  stout  resistance  to  the  enemy's  further  advance. 
The  Confederates  themselves  acknowledged  that  their 

149 


opponents  had  never  fought  so  well  before.  By  a 
curious  irony  of  circumstances,  side  by  side  with  this 
grand  display  of  soldierly  valour,  there  was  witnessed 
the  inglorious  rout  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  the  only 
body  of  troops  which  did  not  win  honourable  laurels 
at  Gettysburg.  Since  its  disastrous  defeat  by  Jack- 
son at  Chancellorsville,  about  a  month  before,  the 
morale  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  had  left  much  to  be 
desired.  By  a  curious  chance  its  opponents  at 
Gettysburg  were  the  same  men  who  had  driven  the 
Germans  in  such  terrible  rout  through  the  Wilderness. 
So  great  was  the  feeling  of  the  rest  of  the  army  to- 
wards the  Eleventh  Corps  after  its  second  stampede 
within  a  month,  that  it  was  considered  best  to  break 
it  up  ;  this  was  done,  and  the  brigades  composing  it 
distributed  among  the  other  units  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

2.  Lee's  Decision  to  Attack  at  Gettysburg. 

Three  possible  lines  of  action  were  open  to  General 
Lee  on  the  night  of  July  1st,  when  he  found  himself 
face  to  face  with  Meade  at  Gettysburg.     They  were  : — 

1 .  To  await  the  enemy's  attack. 

2.  To  manoeuvre  the  enemy  out  of  his  position. 

3.  To  attack. 

The  first  course  was  impracticable  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly,  it  would  yield  to  Meade  the  advantage  of  the 
initiative.  This  would  have  been  fatal  to  Lee's 
campaign,  for  his  strategy  depended  for  success 
entirely  on  the  maintenance  of  an  active  offensive. 
Only  by  incessantly  attacking  could  he  draw  away  the 
enemy's  forces  from  his  lines  of  communication, 
which  he  had  deliberately  abandoned,  and  which  lay 
absolutely  open  to  attack,  from  Richmond  to  Cham- 
bersburg.  Secondly,  having  no  magazines,  he  had 
to  feed  his  army  on  the  country,  which  could  not  be 
done  if  he  remained  more  than  two  or  three  days  in 

150 


one  spot.  Meade,  having  a  good  base  at  Westminster 
at  his  back,  could  have  remained  in  occupation  of 
his  strong  position  at  Gettysburg  for  an  indefinite 
period,  until  the  difficulties  of  supply  forced  his 
opponent  to  retreat  or  attack.  Lee,  in  fact,  found 
himself  in  the  position  of  Massena  before  the  lines  of 
Torres  Vedras,  with  this  important  difference  however. 
Wellington's  lines,  resting  on  the  sea,  could  not  be 
turned,  whereas  Meade's  flanks  were  very  vulnerable. 
Would  it  have  been  possible  to  manoeuvre  him  out  of 
his  position  ?  Many  writers  have  blamed  Lee  severely 
for  not  taking  this  course,  asserting  that  he  threw 
strategy  to  the  winds,  and  ran  his  head  deliberately 
against  a  stone  wall.  There  is  no  doubt  that  had  Lee 
manoeuvred  against  Meade's  left  flank,  which  was 
strategically  the  weakest  point  of  his  line,  so  as  to 
threaten  his  opponent's  communications  with  Wash- 
ington, the  latter  would  have  abandoned  the  position 
and  retreated.  This  is  clear  from  his  own  despatches.1 
But  would  this  have  brought  Lee  any  nearer  to  a 
decisive  victory  over  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
principal  object  of  the  campaign  ?  Gettysburg  was 
not  Meade's  selected  line  of  defence  at  all.  His 
plans  would  not  have  been  deranged  in  the  least  by 
being  compelled  to  abandon  it.  His  chosen  position 
lay  behind  Pipe  Creek,  which  he  had  already  had 
partly  prepared  for  defence.  Had  he  retired  from 
Gettysburg  he  would  have  fallen  back  behind  Pipe 
Creek,  and  Lee  would  have  been  confronted  with  the 
same  problem  as  before. 

It  remains  then  to  consider  what  advantages  Lee 
might  hope  to  derive  by  adopting  the  third  alternative, 
and  attacking  Meade  at  Gettysburg.  In  the  first 
place  it  was  imperative  to  Lee  to  bring  on  a  battle 

1  Meade  to  Halleck  July  2  :  "  If  I  am  satisfied  that  the  enemy 
is  endeavouring  to  move  to  my  rear,  and  interpose  between  me 
and  Washington,  I  shall  fall  back  to  my  supplies  at  Westminster.'' 

151 


as  soon  as  possible.  Every  day's  delay  would  have 
brought  his  adversary  reinforcements  from  Washing- 
ton, from  Fortress  Monroe,  from  Pennsylvania,  while 
Lee  could  not  hope  for  a  single  additional  man. 
His  ammunition  was  none  too  abundant,  it  could  not 
be  replenished  except  from  the  enemy's  supplies  after 
a  successful  battle,  and  in  constant  skirmishing  it 
would  have  dwindled  rapidly.  Meade,  on  the  other 
hand,  could  count  on  unlimited  supplies.  Secondly,  it 
is  one  of  the  recognised  maxims  of  war  that  a  success- 
ful blow  must  be  pushed  home  at  once,  if  the  full  fruits 
of  victory  are  to  be  gained.  Ewell  and  Hill  had 
struck  a  staggering  blow  at  the  Union  army.  The 
disaster  to  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  undoubtedly 
exercised  a  discouraging  influence  on  the  Federal 
troops,  while  the  Confederates  were  correspondingly 
elated.  A  week  later  the  effect  would  have  passed  off, 
and  the  defeated  troops  would  have  recovered  much  of 
their  morale.  Thirdly,  a  rapid  renewal  of  the  attack 
promised  to  catch  the  enemy  with  part  of  his 
forces  still  in  rear,  and  the  whole  wearied  with  long 
forced  marches  and  confused  by  an  unexpected  con- 
centration on  unfamiliar  ground.  Lastly,  one  must 
take  into  account  the  temper  of  the  Confederate 
troops.  Historians  relate  that  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  never  went  into  battle  with  more  certain 
confidence  of  victory  than  at  Gettysburg.  Barksdale's 
attitude  before  the  attack  on  the  Peach  Orchard, 
chafing  and  fuming  at  the  head  of  his  command, 
and  crying  to  McLaws,  "  General,  let  me  attack,  let 
me  charge  !  "*  is  typical  of  the  whole.  It  cannot 
be  wondered  if  Lee  felt  that,  with  such  troops  and 
with  such  a  temper  animating  all  ranks,  there  was  no 
position,  however  strong,  that  their  valour  could  not 
take.  Taking  everything  into  consideration,  it  will 
probably  be  acknowledged  that  Lee  did  right  when  he 

1  White  :   "  R.  E.  Lee,"  p.  306. 
152 


determined  to  attack  Meade  at  Gettysburg,  and  that 
his  action,  if  very  bold,  was  only  on  a  par  with  his 
conduct  of  the  whole  campaign. 

Analysis  of  the  Federal  Position. 

It  is  interesting  to  examine  how  far  the  position 
occupied  by  the  Union  army  fulfils  the  conditions 
of  a  good  defensive  position,  as  laid  down  in  our 
"  Combined  Training." 

1.  The  locality  chosen  should  fulfil  the  strategic 
object. 

This  point  has  already  been  discussed.  Meade's 
strategic  object  was  to  cover  Washington,  which 
could  have  been  effected  better  from  behind  Pipe 
Creek.  The  fact  that  the  issue  of  the  campaign  was 
fought  out  at  Gettysburg  was  due  to  an  accident, 
not  in  accordance  with  any  preconceived  plan. 

2.  The  extent  of  the  position  should  be  suitable 
to  the  strength  of  the  defending  force. 

The  distance  along  the  line  from  Kound  Top  to  the 
extreme  right  on  Rock  Creek  was  about  7500  yards. 
Meade  had  available  on  July  2  to  occupy  the  line, 
67,000  infantry  or  nine  men  to  the  yard. 

3.  A  clear  field  of  fire  to  the  front. 

The  centre  of  the  line  fulfilled  this  condition  well, 
for  from  the  Cemetery  ridge  the  available  field  of  fire 
varies  from  1400  to  1800  yards  in  breadth.  But 
on  both  the  flanks  it  was  very  bad,  owing  to  the 
broken  and  wooded  ground  at  Culp's  Hill  and  Round 
Top. 

4.  The  flanks  of  the  position  should  be  strong. 
Both   flanks   rested   on   strong  natural   positions. 

At  the  same  time,  the  fact  that  Meade's  fine  of  com- 
munications, via  the  Taneytown  pike  to  Westminster, 
ran  close  behind  Round  Top  was  a  weak  point  of  the 
position.  In  other  words,  this  flank,  though  tactically 
very  strong,  was  strategically  weak. 

153 


5.  Good  cover  for  firing  line  and  supports. 
Extremely  good  cover  was  provided  on  both  flanks 

by  the  abundance  of  timber,  which  was  rapidly 
converted  into  serviceable  breastworks  of  logs,  while 
on  the  open  ridge  in  the  centre  the  rubble  walls  gave 
very  effective  protection.  Excellent  cover  was  avail- 
able for  the  supports  on  the  reverse  slope  of  the 
crest. 

6.  Good  artillery  positions. 

Good  positions  existed  in  the  centre  and  on  Cemetery 
Hill,  but  on  both  flanks  the  ground  was  too  broken 
and  wooded  for  artillery  to  be  employed  effectively. 

7.  Good  lateral  communications. 

The  Taneytown  pike,  running  in  rear  of  the  centre 
and  left,  afforded  excellent  lateral  communication. 

8.  Good  means  of  retreat. 

The  position  is  defective  in  this  respect.  If  either 
flank  had  been  successfully  turned,  to  retreat  by  the 
Taneytown  pike  would  have  almost  certainly  involved 
the  abandonment  of  the  troops  holding  Cemetery 
Hill. 

9.  No  good  positions  for  the  enemy's  artillery. 
Another  defect.     The  Seminary  ridge  affords  excel- 
lent positions,  of  which  full  advantage  was  taken. 

10.  Favourable  ground  for  the  decisive  counter- 
attack. 

The  most  serious  defect  of  the  position.  No  part 
of  the  line  affords  good  facilities  for  a  counter-attack. 
The  ground  on  the  flanks  is  too  broken  and  com- 
plicated, while  from  the  centre  an  advance  would 
have  to  be  made  for  nearly  a  mile  over  open  fields, 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  on 
Seminary  Ridge. 

To  sum  up,  the  position  was  an  excellent  one  for  a 
purely  passive  defence,  but  for  any  movements,  either 
in  advance  or  retreat,  it  had  grave  disadvantages. 
It  will  be  noted  that  the  line  formed  a  salient  angle 
at  Cemetery  Hill.     Now,  a  salient  should  generally 

154 


be  avoided  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  one  or  both 
faces  of  the  angle  may  be  exposed  to  an  enfilade 
fire  ;  secondly,  if  the  enemy  breaks  through  at  the 
angle,  then  both  the  sides  are  out-flanked.  In  the 
present  case  neither  disadvantage  existed.  Owing 
to  the  he  of  the  ground  round  Cemetery  Hill,  it  was 
not  possible  to  enfilade  either  face  of  the  salient  from 
the  Confederate  positions,  while  the  hill  itself  was  so 
strong  that  there  was  little  fear  of  its  being  captured, 
if  held  by  good  troops.1  On  the  other  hand,  these 
disadvantages  are  well  illustrated  by  the  fight  at  the 
Peach  Orchard  on  July  2.  The  line  occupied  by 
Sickles'  Corps  formed  a  salient  at  that  point.  When 
McLaws'  division  broke  through  at  the  angle,  it  out- 
flanked both  Humphreys  and  Birney,  with  the  result 
that  each  was  thrown  back  with  terrible  loss. 

3.  The  Confederate  Attacks  on  July  2  and  3. 

Lee's  attack  on  July  2  was  intended  to  be  of  an 
enveloping  nature.  He  proposed  to  roll  up  the 
enemy's  left  wing  with  Longstreet's  Corps,  while 
making  a  holding  attack  upon  his  centre  and  right. 
The  attack  was  partially  successful,  but  failed  to  be 
completely  so,  for  two  reasons:  firstly,  the  arrival  of 
Sedgwick's  Corps  on  the  Federal  left  flank ;  secondly, 
the  failure  of  Rodes'  and  Pender's  divisions  to  take 
part  in  the  attack.  Owing  to  Longstreet's  disobedi- 
ence of  orders  in  waiting  till  noon  before  he  moved 
into  position,  his  corps  did  not  advance  till  after  4  p.m. 
This  gave  time  for  Sedgwick's  Corps  to  reach  the 
field,  and  his  arrival  checked  Longstreet's  hitherto 
victorious  advance.  The  Confederate  attack  was 
ordered  to  be  made  in  echelon  of  brigades  from  the 
right.     Hood,    McLaws,    and    part    of    Anderson's 

1  It  is  true  that  the  hill  was  very  nearly  captured,  but  this 
was  due  to  the  shaken  morale  of  the  Eleventh  Corps. 

155 


division  advanced  in  the  above  order,  but  Posey's 
brigade  did  not,  nor  any  of  the  brigades  on  his  left. 
This  left  the  rest  of  Anderson's  division  without 
support,  and  he  was  unable  to  retain  the  positions 
captured  by  Wilcox  and  Wright.  Posey's  inaction 
appears  to  have  been  due  to  the  miscarriage  of  an 
order  by  some  staff  officer,  and  Pender's  to  the 
unfortunate  wounding  of  that  officer,  and  to  the  long 
delay  that  ensued  in  transferring  the  command  of  his 
division  to  the  senior  brigadier.  The  attack  on  the 
enemy's  right  wing  was  equally  mismanaged.  The 
division  commanders  were  not  notified  in  sufficient 
time  of  the  orders  that  they  were  to  carry  out.  In 
his  report  General  Rodes  states  that  he  did  not  receive 
orders  to  advance  on  Cemetery  Hill  until  after  Long- 
street  had  commenced  his  attack,  with  the  result  that 
by  the  time  he  had  drawn  his  troops  out  of  the  town 
and  was  ready  to  move  forward,  Early  had  delivered 
his  attack  and  had  been  beaten  back.  We  may  say 
then  that  the  partial  failure  of  the  Confederate  attack 
on  July  2  was  due  to  the  following  causes : — 

Longstreet's  delay  in  moving  his  corps  into  posi- 
tion. 

The  wounding  of  General  Pender. 

The  mistakes  made  by  several  officers  on  the  staffs 
of  Hill  and  Ewell. 

On  July  3  Lee  altered  his  plan  from  an  enveloping 
to  a  penetrating  attack.  He  intended  to  pierce  the 
enemy's  centre  and  so  cut  off  his  right  wing,  in  some- 
what the  same  way  that  Marlborough  pierced  the 
French  centre  and  surrounded  and  captured  the 
French  right  at  Blenheim.  On  whom  does  the 
responsibility  rest  for  the  mismanagement  of  this 
attack,  and  for  the  consequent  sacrifice  of  the  assault- 
ing troops  ?  Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  orders  given 
were  verbal  only,  it  is  most  difficult  to  arrive  at  their 
exact  wording,  but  it  is  quite  certain  that  the  attack 
as  actually  carried  out  was  not  at  all  what  General 

156 


Lee  had  intended.1  The  responsibility  is  generally  laid 
on  General  Longstreet.  He  is  accused  of  disobeying 
his  orders  in  not  employing  Hood's  and  McLaws' 
as  well  as  Pickett's  division  to  make  the  attack.  Now, 
although  Lee's  official  report  is  not  as  clear  as  might 
be  desired,  yet  we  find  that  it  expressly  rules  out 
Hood  and  McLaws  from  the  list  of  troops  to  take 
part  in  the  assault  on  the  Union  centre,  and  this 
evidence  must  be  held  to  outweigh  that  of  Colonels 
Long,  Taylor,  Venable,  etc.,  that  Lee  did  give  orders 
to  Longstreet  to  employ  his  other  two  divisions  as 
well.  The  probable  explanation  is  that  these  officers 
misunderstood  Lee's  instructions  that  McLaws  and 
Hood  should  renew  the  attack  on  their  own  fronts, 
not  on  the  Union  centre,  and  Longstreet  did  give 
orders  to  Law,  commanding  Hood's  division,  to  this 
effect.  Lee  states  in  his  report  that  the  assaulting 
column  was  to  consist  of  Pickett's,  Heth's  and  part 
of  Pender's  divisions,  while  the  rest  of  Hill's  Corps 
was  to  be  held  in  readiness  to  take  advantage  of  any 
success  that  might  be  gained.  The  responsibility 
thus  rests  not  on  Longstreet,  who  carried  out  his  part 
in  accordance  with  his  orders,  but  on  Hill,  and  more 
directly  on  Anderson,  whose  division  was  ordered 
to  support  Pickett  and  Trimble,  and  failed  to  do  so.2 
It   is   true   that   Anderson's   division   constituted 

1  Imboden  states  that  General  Lee  made  the  following  state- 
ment to  him  on  the  night  of  July  3  with  reference  to  this  question 
(see  "Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III.),:  "  I  never  saw  troops  behave 
more  magnificently  than  Pickett's  division  of  Virginians  did  to-day 
in  that  grand  charge  upon  the  enemy.  And  if  they  had  been 
supported  as  they  were  to  have  been — but  for  some  reason 
not  yet  fully  explained  to  me  were  not — we  would  have  held  the 
position  and  the  day  would  have  been  ours."  Imboden's  account 
gives  an  extraordinarily  vivid  picture  of  General  Lee  on  this 
occasion,  and  should  be  read  by  all  interested  in  the  subject. 

2  See  Anderson's  report :  "  I  received  orders  to  hold  my  division 
in  readiness  to  move  up  in  support  if  it  should  become  necessary." 
See  Appendix  C. 

157 


the  only  other  troops  holding  the  Confederate  centre, 
and  had  they  been  thrown  in  and  repulsed  with  the 
rest,  Lee's  army  would  have  been  in  a  position  of 
the  utmost  danger.  Consider  what  would  have 
happened  in  that  case,  had  Meade  followed  up  the 
defeated  troops  by  a  heavy  counter-attack  upon  the 
Confederate  centre.  Lee's  army  would  have  been 
cut  in  two,  all  the  artillery  on  Seminary  Ridge  must 
have  been  captured,  and  Longstreet's  Corps,  isolated 
and  surrounded,  would  probably  have  been  destroyed. 
The  Confederates  would  certainly  have  never  seen 
Virginia  again.  There  are  few  commanders  indeed 
who,  situated  as  Lee  was,  would  have  dared  to  expend 
their  last  reserves  in  so  hazardous  and  doubtful  a 
contest.  Napoleon  himself  refused  to  do  so  at 
Borodino.  And  yet  such  was  Lee's  boldness  that 
he  was  willing  to  take  even  this  risk  in  his  resolution 
to  win  victory  at  any  cost. 

4.  Conduct  of  the  Battle  by  Lee  and  Meade. 

It  has  been  said  that  Gettysburg  was  the  worst 
battle  Lee  ever  fought.  This  is  true.  And  yet  his 
tactical  skill,  his  eye  for  ground,  his  infinite  daring, 
were  displayed  as  strongly  here  as  on  any  field.  Where 
he  failed  was  in  trusting  too  much  to  his  lieutenants, 
and  in  neglecting  to  ensure  that  his  orders  were  under- 
stood and  carried  out.  There  was  too  much  friction 
among  his  officers.  Longstreet  in  particular  showed  a 
lack  of  hearty  co-operation  and  a  spirit  of  insubordina- 
tion, which  called  for  severe  censure.  He  deliberately 
disobeyed  his  orders  on  the  second  day,  and  thereby 
contributed  largely  to  the  miscarriage  of  the  attack. 
He  was  not  responsible  for  the  errors  committed  on 
the  third  day,  but  he  cannot  be  acquitted  of  negligence 
in  not  satisfying  himself  that  he  understood  the  plan 
of  attack.  Both  Hill  and  Ewell  showed  throughout 
the  battle  a  singular  want  of  their  customary  energy, 

158 


and  failed  to  exercise  sufficient  control  over  their 
subordinate  commanders.  Finally,  the  inefficient 
manner  in  which  the  staff  duties  of  the  army  were 
performed  was  largely  responsible  for  the  lack  of  con- 
certed action  and  the  disjointed  character  of  so  many 
of  the  attacks.  What  was  the  reason  for  this  ?  It 
was  not  due  to  lack  of  experience  among  the  officers 
of  the  staff.  Henderson  points  out *  that  in  the 
battle  of  Chancellorsville,  a  month  before,  move- 
ments of  a  far  more  complicated  character,  in  a  very 
close  and  difficult  country,  had  been  directed  by  the 
Confederate  staff  with  complete  success.  Yet  what 
was  done  so  well  among  the  tangled  thickets  of 
the  Wilderness  was  bungled  hopelessly  on  the  open 
fields  of  Gettysburg.  Only  one  explanation  seems 
adequate,  that  of  over-confidence.  The  long  series  of 
Confederate  victories  in  Virginia,  of  which  Chancel- 
lorsville was  the  last  and  greatest,  had  inspired  Lee's 
army  with  a  contempt  for  its  opponent,  which  was 
unjustified  by  the  facts.  At  Chancellorsville  it  was 
not  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  was  beaten,  but  its 
commander.  At  Gettysburg  it  retrieved  its  tarnished 
reputation,  and  taught  its  opponents  the  bloody 
lesson  that  even  the  most  heroic  courage  is  useless, 
if  the  guiding  brain  of  an  army  has  neglected  to  do  its 
work. 

General  Meade's  handling  of  his  troops  exhibits 
both  the  virtues  and  the  failings  of  his  military 
character.  He  cannot  claim  any  credit  for  having 
selected  the  position,  but  he  made  the  most  of  its 
numerous  strong  points,  and  his  dispositions  were 
mostly  judicious.  It  was  a  mistake,  however,  to 
have  left  the  Eleventh  Corps  to  hold  the  important 
position  of  Cemetery  Hill,  the  key  of  the  whole  line. 
The  morale  of  these  troops  had  been  so  shaken  by 
their  defeat  on  July  1  that  they  could  not  be  relied 

1  "  The  Science  of  War." 
159 


upon.  Considering  what  Early's  isolated  attack 
accomplished,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  he  and 
Rodes  together  would  have  carried  the  position. 
Meade  should  have  placed  his  best  troops  on  Ceme- 
tery Hill,  and  stationed  the  Eleventh  Corps  in  the 
rear.  The  neglect  to  occupy  the  Round  Tops  on 
July  2  appears  to  cast  a  grave  reflection  on  Meade. 
But,  like  his  opponent,  he  suffered  in  having  a  fractious 
lieutenant,  who  preferred  his  own  judgment  to  his 
chief's,  and  went  to  the  length  of  disobeying  his 
orders  to  give  effect  to  it.  It  would  be  unprofitable 
to  go  into  the  details  of  the  bitter  controversy  that 
afterwards  arose  between  Meade  and  Sickles  over 
this  question.1  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Sickles 
was  responsible  for  the  neglect  to  occupy  the  Round 
Tops.  He  states  in  his  defence  that  he  received  no 
orders  to  do  so,  but  what  is  to  be  said  for  the  intelli- 
gence of  a  commander  who  knows  that  an  important 
position  on  his  left,  which  enfilades  his  fine,  is  unoc- 
cupied and  yet  neglects  to  look  after  the  safety  of  his 
own  flank  ?  The  plea  of  "  no  orders  "  is  the  feeblest 
excuse  that  a  soldier  can  offer.  If  his  corps  was  too 
weak  to  detach  a  brigade  to  Round  Top,  he  should  not 
have  moved  forward  to  the  Peach  Orchard.  Meade 
must  also  bear  a  part  of  the  blame.  His  attention 
was  concentrated  on  his  right,  where  he  expected  the 
enemy's  attack  to  be  made,  and  he  certainly  failed  to 
realise  the  immense  importance  of  the  Round  Tops. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  greatest  credit  is  due  to 
General  Warren,  whose  quick  eye  and  fearless  accept- 
ance of  responsibility  saved  the  situation,  and  secured 
this  vital  point  in  the  Union  position. 

Meade  deserves  great  credit  for  the  energy  with 
which  he  stripped  certain  parts  of  his  line  to  reinforce 
others,  the  fresh  troops  coming  up  repeatedly  at  the 

1  See  "  The  Meade-Sickles  Controversy  "  in  Vol.  III.  "  Battles 
and  Leaders." 

160 


very  moment  when  their  presence  was  most  needed. 
In  this  he  was  greatly  assisted  by  the  convex  shape 
of  the  position  and  the  excellent  internal  communica- 
tions between  all  parts.  The  mixing  up  of  units  that 
resulted  therefrom  was  unavoidable,  but  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  why  Meade  made  no  attempt  sub- 
sequently to  correct  it.  Had  he  found  it  necessary  to 
evacuate  the  position,  this  disorganisation  of  units 
would  have  produced  the  most  appalling  confusion. 
It  certainly  rendered  his  army  incapable  of  an 
offensive  movement.  Where  Meade  failed  was  in  his 
neglect  to  seize  the  many  opportunities  which  his 
opponent  gave  him  of  delivering  an  effective  counter- 
stroke.1  One  has  only  to  look  at  the  plan  of  the 
battle,  and  see  how  Lee's  army,  numerically  slightly 
inferior,  encircled  that  of  Meade,  to  realise  what  a  risk 
the  Confederate  commander  was  running.  It  is  true 
that  the  Federal  position  did  not  lend  itself  to  counter- 
attack, but  this  disadvantage  would  have  been 
discounted,  had  he  delivered  it  when  the  Confederates 
were  reeling  back  in  disorder  after  their  unsuccessful 
assault.  One  has  only  to  compare  Wellington's 
counter-stroke  at  Salamanca,  or  Lee's  at  Manassas, 
with  Meade's  inaction  at  Gettysburg,  to  realise  the 
gulf  that  separates  a  mediocre  general  from  a  genius. 
It  is  a  military  maxim  that  by  offensive  action  alone 
can  decisive  results  be  obtained  in  war.  Had  Meade 
assumed  the  offensive  at  Gettysburg,  he  might  possibly 
have  ended  the  war  at  a  blow.  As  it  was,  Lee  success- 
fully effected  his  retreat,  and  the  war  was  prolonged 
for  two  more  weary  years,  at  a  cost  of  tens  of  thousands 
of  lives  and  untold  millions  of  money. 

1  But  Lee,  who  knew  Meade's  cautious  character,  must  have 
reckoned  on  this  immunity.  Against  a  commander  like  Grant 
he  never  took  such  risks.  It  is  one  of  the  marks  of  a  great 
general  that  he  always  studies  the  character  of  his  opponent. 


161 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

REVIEW  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

1.  Objects  and  Results  of  the  Campaign. 

If  we  examine  carefully  the  course  taken  by  this 
campaign,  we  shall  find  that  it  divides  itself  naturally 
into  three  periods. 

First  period. — June  3  to  June  22. — From  the  open- 
ing movements  on  the  Rappahannock  to  the  crossing 
of  the  Potomac  by  Ewell's  Corps. 

Second  period. — June  22  to  June  30. — Including 
the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  up  to  the  eve  of  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg. 

•  Third  period. — July  4  to  July  31. — From  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg  to  the  end  of  the  campaign. 

In  the  first  period  the  Confederates,  having  taken 
the  initiative,  acted  throughout  on  the  offensive.  In 
the  second,  each  side  manoeuvred  for  position,  ending 
finally  in  a  concentration  of  both  armies  on  Gettysburg, 
a  collision,  and  the  resulting  battle.  In  the  third 
period,  the  offensive  passed  to  the  Federals,  the 
Confederates  being  strictly  confined  to  effecting  their 
retreat  in  safety  to  the  Rappahannock. 

We  have  already  considered  the  reasons  which  led 
the  Confederate  Government  to  decide  upon  an  offen- 
sive campaign,  and  the  objects  they  hoped  to  attain 
thereby.  Briefly  recapitulating  these,  they  were — 
first,  to  carry  the  war  into  the  enemy's  country ; 
secondly,  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  Vicksburg  by  com- 
pelling the  Federal  Government  to  withdraw  troops 

162 


from  the  western  theatre  of  war  for  the  defence  of 
Pennsylvania  ;  thirdly,  to  end  the  war,  if  possible, 
by  a  decisive  blow  at  Washington  or  at  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  The  campaign  ended  in  failure,  for  of 
these  three  objects  the  first  was  attained  for  a  brief 
period  of  some  three  weeks  only,  and  the  second 
and  third  not  at  all.  It  can  hardly  be  said,  indeed, 
that  the  fate  of  Vicksburg  was  affected  at  all  by  the 
events  of  the  campaign,  for  even  had  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg  ended  in  a  decisive  victory  for  the  Con- 
federates, it  would  not  have  delayed  the  capitulation  of 
the  fortress,  which  was  signed  while  the  issue  of  the 
battle  still  hung  in  the  balance.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  third  objective  was  within  an  ace  of  being 
attained.  It  is  a  commonly  accepted  opinion  that  at 
Gettysburg  the  South  stood  within  a  stone's  throw  of 
Independence.  Whether  a  disaster  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  on  Northern  soil  would  have  broken  the 
dogged  determination  of  President  Lincoln  it  is 
impossible  to  say,1  but  we  can  easily  imagine  the  state 
of  panic  into  which  all  the  Eastern  States  would  have 
been  thrown,  and  the  enormous  pressure  that  would 
have  been  brought  to  bear  by  the  Peace  Party  upon 
the  President  to  end  the  war.  The  blunder  which  left 
Pickett's  division  unsupported  averted  the  disaster, 
and  gave  the  Northern  States  renewed  hopes  of  ulti- 
mate success.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Confederates 
failed  to  attain  any  of  the  hoped-for  results  of  their 
offensive  campaign,  they  could  point  to  the  fact  that 
the  loss,  both  in  men  and  material,  sustained  by  the 
enemy  in  repulsing  the  invasion,  had  been  far  greater 
than  that  which  they  had  themselves  suffered,  that 
they  had  given  the  enemy  a  taste  of  the  sufferings  of 

1  It  is  recorded  that  when  the  Confederate  invasion  was 
sweeping  all  before  it  in  Pennsylvania,  President  Lincoln  made 
use  of  the  following  prayer :  "  0  Lord,  this  is  Thy  fight,  but  your 
faithful  people  can't  stand  another  Fredericksburg  or  Chancellors- 
ville." 

163 


war  upon  his  own  soil,  and  that  his  plans  for  a  summer 
campaign  in  Virginia  had  been  effectually  upset. 

2.  General  Lee's  Strategy. 

General  Lee's  conduct  of  the  opening  moves  of  the 
invasion  was  brilliant  in  the  extreme.  It  forms  a 
most  interesting  example  of  that  form  of  strategy 
which  is  brought  into  play  when  two  armies  are 
manoeuvring  to  cut  the  other's  lines  of  communica- 
tion. In  his  "  Operations  of  War,"  Hamley  points 
out  that  in  such  a  case  the  commander  who  succeeds 
in  doing  so  first  will  invariably  force  his  opponent 
to  give  up  his  designs  against  the  enemy's  communi- 
cations, and  fall  back  to  protect  his  own.  This  is 
exactly  what  happened  in  the  present  instance.  By 
taking  the  initiative,  and  by  carefully  veiling  his 
movements  behind  a  cloud  of  cavalry,  Lee  succeeded 
in  placing  his  army  in  a  position  to  strike  at  Washing- 
ton before  Hooker  had  left  his  lines  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock. At  the  time  Hill's  isolated  corps  was  the 
only  force  standing  between  Hooker  and  Richmond. 
A  rapid  advance  on  the  Confederate  Capital  would 
have  inevitably  compelled  Lee  to  hurry  back  to  its 
defence.  But  in  the  general  atmosphere  of  panic 
and  bewilderment  only  one  thing  was  clear  to  Lincoln 
and  his  Cabinet.  It  was  that  a  Confederate  army  of 
unknown  strength  was  within  striking  distance  of 
Washington.  The  pressure  of  public  opinion  was  in  con- 
sequence so  great  as  to  compel  Hooker,  against  his  will, 
to  fall  back  to  the  defence  of  the  Capital,  and  to  abandon 
all  his  own  designs  upon  the  enemy's  communications. 
One  should  note  also  the  admirable  manner  in  which 
Lee  succeeded  in  concealing  his  ultimate  intentions. 
His  operations  form  a  model  of  secrecy  and  successful 
mystification  of  the  enemy.  No  one  knew  whether 
he  meant  to  invade  Pennsylvania,  or  make  a  dash 
upon    Washington,    or    a    flank    movement    against 

164 


Hooker,  or  simply  a  raid  in  force  on  the  part  of  his 
cavalry.  Hence  arose  the  panic  in  the  threatened 
States,  the  paralysed  movements  of  the  Federal 
armies,  and  the  utter  bewilderment  of  the  Federal 
Government. 

Turning  to  the  second  period  of  the  campaign,  that 
is  from  the  crossing  of  the  Potomac  on  the  22nd  to  the 
accidental  encounter  of  Hill  and  Reynolds  at  Gettys- 
burg on  July  1,  we  find  Lee's  strategy  marked  by 
the  most  extraordinary  boldness.  His  lines  of  com- 
munication were  practically  abandoned  to  look  after 
themselves.  With  the  exception  of  the  two  cavalry 
brigades  of  Robertson  and  Jones,  he  left  not  a  man  in 
his  rear  when  he  marched  into  Pennsylvania ;  Harper's 
Ferry,  which  lay  so  threateningly  on  the  flank  of  his 
communications,  he  ignored  entirely.  Its  possession 
by  the  Confederates  seemed  so  essential  to  a  successful 
advance  up  the  Cumberland  Valley,  that  up  to  the 
moment  of  its  evacuation  the  garrison  were  in  hourly 
expectation  of  attack.  And  yet  his  communications 
were  never  interrupted,  save  for  the  solitary  incursion 
of  French's  cavalry  from  Frederick,  when  the  pontoon 
bridge  at  WiUiamsport  was  burnt.  What  was  the 
cause  of  this  ?  Had  Lee  sound  reasons  for  counting 
on  such  extraordinary  immunity  ?  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  he  relied  upon  the  confusion  and  panic, 
spread  by  his  invading  columns,  to  sweep  all  thoughts 
of  offensive  action  out  of  the  heads  of  the  Federal 
Government.  Once  more  he  successfully  played  on 
the  fears  of  the  President  and  his  Cabinet.  Hooker, 
with  soldierly  insight,  saw  where  Lee  could  be  struck 
a  damaging  blow,  and  sought  to  obtain  permission  to 
use  French's  troops  to  cut  the  enemy's  communica- 
tions with  Virginia.  But  Lincoln  and  Halleck,  who 
could  feel  the  gusts  of  popular  clamour  more  acutely 
than  Hooker,  lost  their  heads  completely,  and  could 
think  only  of  defensive  measures  to  protect  the  Capital. 
So  great  was  this  obsession  on  their  part  that  even 

165 


after  the  repulse  of  Lee's  army  at  Gettysburg  we 
find  Halleck  still  harping  on  the  necessity  to  protect 
Washington  in  the  following  despatch,  dated  July  5 : 
"  So  long  as  your  movements  cover  Baltimore  and 
Washington  from  Lee's  main  army,  they  are  in  no 
danger  from  any  force  the  enemy  may  detach  for  a 
raid."  The  most  daring  strategy  could  be  safely 
adopted  against  so  unenterprising  an  enemy.  The 
strongest  admirers  of  President  Lincoln  will  admit 
that  in  this  instance  the  comparison  is  all  in  favour 
of  his  opponent,  Jefferson  Davis.  The  calm  courage 
displayed  by  the  Confederate  President,  when  Rich- 
mond was  threatened  by  the  forces  under  General 
Dix,  affords  a  striking  contrast  to  the  chronic  state 
of  panic,  into  which  the  Federal  Cabinet  always 
seemed  to  be  plunged. 

Unfortunately  for  the  full  success  of  Lee's  strategy, 
he  was  deprived  at  this  point  of  the  services  of  the 
most  important  branch  of  his  army,  the  independent 
cavalry  force  under  Stuart.  Stuart's  absence  had 
two  fatal  results.  Lee  could  not  obtain  information 
of  the  enemy's  movements,  while  his  own  were  plainly 
revealed.  This  would  have  been  serious  enough 
in  Virginia,  a  friendly  country.  It  was  fatal  in 
Pennsylvania,  where  every  farmer,  who  could  count 
the  troops  that  marched  through  his  village,  was 
sending  priceless  information  to  Meade.  Meade's 
rapid  forward  march  northwards  was  made  possible 
by  the  knowledge  he  possessed  that  the  whole  of  the 
Confederate  army  was  in  Pennsylvania.  Had  the 
cloud  of  cavalry  been  there  to  mask  Lee's  movements 
behind  South  Mountain,  as  they  had  been  masked 
behind  the  Blue  Ridge,  Meade  would  have  been  held 
immovable  in  front  of  the  lower  gaps,  just  as  Hooker 
had  been  held  at  Centreville,  by  the  President's 
fears  of  a  sudden  dash  upon  Washington.  In  the 
meantime  Harrisburg  must  have  fallen  to  Ewell's 
attack,  and  Philadelphia  itself  might  well  have  shared 

166 


the  same  fate.  Stuart's  absence  at  the  critical 
moment  sufficed  to  wreck  Lee's  strategy.  That  the 
disaster  was  not  still  greater  was  due  to  the  enemy's 
mistakes.  Had  Meade  kept  his  corps  well  closed 
up  as  he  marched  towards  the  enemy,  instead  of 
throwing  his  left  wing  forward  beyond  reach  of 
support,  the  disaster  that  overtook  Reynolds'  and 
Howard's  Corps  might  easily  have  fallen  instead  upon 
Hill  and  Ewell.1 

We  have  already  considered  the  reasons  that 
induced  Lee  to  give  battle  at  Gettysburg.  He 
accepted  the  challenge,  he  staked  all  upon  the  issue, 
and  he  lost.  The  position  he  found  himself  in  was  a 
desperate  one.  In  his  advance  he  had  deliberately 
left  his  communications  to  look  after  themselves.  But 
he  now  had  no  longer  behind  him  the  prestige  of 
success — the  fear  of  his  invading  columns  to  force  the 
enemy  to  adopt  a  purely  passive  defence.  Now  that 
he  was  thrown  upon  the  defensive,  there  seemed 
nothing  to  prevent  the  Federal  forces  uniting  to  throw 
themselves  across  his  line  of  retreat  to  Virginia,  and 
holding  him  back  until  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
could  come  up  to  give  the  finishing  blow.  But  at 
this  crucial  moment  Lee  secured  an  immunity,  which 
is  possessed  by  every  great  commander  who  has 
made  his  name  feared,  and  whose  reputation  compels 
caution  on  the  part  of  his  assailants.  This  is  the 
secret  of  Meade's  extraordinary  delay,  and  of  his 
slow  and  hesitating  advance  from  Frederick  to 
Williamsport.  He  was  daunted  by  the  menace  of 
his  great  opponent's  fame.  He  had  indeed  foiled  the 
lion's  spring,  but  he  hesitated  to  face  the  lion  at  bay. 

1  White,  in  his  "  Life  of  Lee,"  describes  the  latter's  intense 
anxiety,  as  he  rode  along  the  Cashtown  road  towards  the  sound 
of  Hill's  guns  at  Gettysburg.  Ignorant  as  he  was  of  the  enemy's 
movements,  the  fear  that  some  portion  of  his  own  scattered 
army  might  be  attacked  and  crushed  by  superior  numbers 
overshadowed  all  else  in  his  mind. 

167 


Just  as  the  terror  of  Napoleon's  name  enabled  him 
to  march  with  his  Guard  unmolested  through  the 
Russian  ranks  at  Krasnoi,  so  Lee,  by  the  dread  which 
he  had  inspired  in  his  opponents,  was  permitted  to 
retreat  untouched  with  his  prisoners,  his  wounded, 
and  his  trains,  from  Gettysburg  to  the  Potomac. 

3.  Federal  Conduct  of  the  Campaign. 

The  first  point  that  must  strike  any  one  who 
studies  the  history  of  this  campaign  is  the  vicious 
system  of  control  that  obtained  among  the  Union 
armies.  General  Halleck  was  nominally  in  command 
of  all  the  Union  forces  in  the  theatre  of  war,  but  his 
actual  position  was  rather  that  of  military  adviser 
to  the  President,  who  retained  in  his  own  hands  the 
power  of  directing  the  movements  of  the  armies. 
The  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
largest  and  by  far  the  most  important  force  in  the 
field,  had  nominally  no  control  whatever  over  the 
movements  of  the  other  armies  in  the  strategic  area, 
while  as  regards  his  own  command  he  was  allowed 
to  take  no  important  step  without  reference  to  Wash- 
ington. Lincoln  and  Halleck  still  clung  to  the 
ruinous  system  of  distrusting  the  man  on  the  spot, 
and  trying  to  direct  operations  from  a  distance.  In 
those  cases  where  General  Hooker  was  allowed  to 
direct  the  movements  of  armies  other  than  his 
own,  the  channel  of  command  was  so  badly  denned 
as  to  produce  the  most  extraordinary  confusion. 
What  for  instance  could  be  more  absurd  than  the 
following  ? 

Halleck  to  Hooker,  June  22. 

"  The  Department  of  Washington  will  continue 
as  heretofore,  your  orders  being  given  direct  to  General 
Heintzelman,  he  reporting  them  to  head-quarters 
before  executing  them,  where  they  conflict  with  his 
special  instructions." 

168 


The  following  despatches  are  equally  characteristic  : 

Hooker  to  Halleck,  June  25  : 

"  Subjoined  is  a  despatch  this  moment  received. 
It  speaks  for  itself.  I  request  that  General  Slough  V 
be  arrested  at  once,  and  charges  will  be  forwarded  as 
soon  as  I  have  time  to  prepare  them.  You  will 
find,  I  fear,  when  it  is  too  late,  that  the  effort  to 
preserve  department  lines  will  be  fatal  to  the  cause 
of  the  country." 

Enclosure  to  the  above  from  Brig.-General  Crawford 
to  General  Hooker : 

"  A  despatch  has  been  received  during  the  night 
from  General  Slough,  military  Governor  of  Alexandria, 
informing  me  that  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Second  Brigade,  Pennsylvania  Reserve  Corps,  has 
been  instructed  by  him  not  to  recognise  the  orders 
sent  to  him  to  prepare  to  join  the  division,  as  directed 
in  your  despatch  of  June  23." 

Halleck  to  Hooker,  June  25 : 

"  The  Second  Brigade  to  which  you  refer  in 
your  telegram  forms  no  part  of  General  Crawford's 
command,  which  was  placed  at  your  orders.  No 
other  troops  can  be  withdrawn  from  the  defence  of 
Washington." 

Hooker  to  Halleck  June  24 : 

"  Last  evening  the  colonel  commanding  at  Pooles- 
ville  responded  to  his  orders  to  march  that  he  did  not 
belong  to  my  command,  but  would  refer  his  orders  to 
General  Heintzelman.  ...  I  request  that  my 
orders  be  sent  to  me  to-day,  for  outside  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  I  don't  know  whether  I  am  standing 
on  my  head  or  feet." 

:  The  result  of  this  general  confusion  was  that  the  large 
Union  forces  in  the  field,  vastly  superior  in  numbers 
to  the  enemy,  were  dissipated  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
dozen  different  plans,  instead  of  being  all  co-ordinated 
towards  the  attainment  of  a  common  objective. 
The    Federals    possessed    a    numerical    superiority 

169 


over  the  whole  strategic  area  from  Richmond  to 
Harrisburg  of  nearly  two  to  one,  exclusive  of  the 
militia  levies  in  Pennsylvania  ;  and  yet  at  the  crisis 
of  the  campaign  on  the  ridges  of  Gettysburg  they 
were  only  able  to  put  into  line  a  force  numerically 
equal  to  that  of  their  opponents.  The  failure  is  the 
more  striking  when  we  compare  it  with  what  was 
achieved  on  the  other  side.  Almost  every  Confederate 
soldier  in  Virginia  was  in  Lee's  army.  Every  other 
point  was  stripped  bare  of  defenders,  so  that  he  might 
have  a  superiority  of  numbers  at  the  decisive  point. 

Another  factor  which  militated  greatly  against  the 
Federal  chances  of  success  was  the  strong  hostility 
that  existed  between  the  General-in-Chief  and  the 
Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  We  do 
not  propose  to  discuss  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  the 
dreary  wrangle  that  went  on  between  Halleck  and 
Hooker.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  both  in  character 
and  talent  General  Hooker  was  unfitted  for  the  high 
position  he  occupied.  He  was  a  stubborn  fighter, 
and  as  the  commander  of  a  division  had  won 
honourable  distinction  on  the  battlefield.  But  he 
was  too  loud  a  talker,  and  his  deeds  kept  too  little 
pace  with  his  words  to  win  the  confidence  of  his 
troops,  while  his  manner  towards  his  superiors  and 
subordinates  lacked  that  tact  which  is  so  essential 
to  harmonious  working.  A  very  great  responsibility 
must  rest  on  President  Lincoln  for  thus  retaining  in 
his  post  an  officer,  whom  he  knew  to  be  unfitted  for 
it,  and  at  the  same  time  refusing  to  give  him  that 
hearty  and  cordial  support  which  he  had  the  right 
to  expect.  It  is  almost  inconceivable  that  two  years 
of  continual  disaster  in  Virginia  should  have  failed 
to  teach  the  President  that  unity  of  thought  and  action 
between  the  Cabinet  and  the  Army  was  the  first 
essential  to  military  success.  Finally,  President 
Lincoln  was  driven  to  do  what  he  should  have  done 
long    before,    and   to   adopt    the   highly   dangerous 

170 


expedient  of  a  change  in  the  supreme  command  of 
the  army  within  a  week  of  the  battle,  that  was  to 
decide  the  fate  of  the  campaign. 

4.  General  Meade's  Strategy. 

In  criticising  General  Meade's  handling  of  his 
army,  one  must  bear  in  mind  the  circumstances  under 
which  he  assumed  the  command.  A  certain  amount 
of  hesitation  was  excusable  in  a  general  upon  whom 
the  supreme  command,  with  all  its  anxieties  and 
responsibility,  was  so  suddenly  thrust.  It  was  not 
to  be  expected  that  a  new  and  untried  commander 
would  at  once  embark  upon  a  bold  strategic  operation, 
which  would  have  great  results  if  successful,  but  was 
at  the  same  time  fraught  with  great  risks.  Meade 
cannot  therefore  be  fairly  blamed  if  he  missed  the 
opportunity,  offered  by  the  boldness  of  Lee's  strategy, 
of  throwing  his  army  across  the  enemy's  rear  and 
cutting  his  line  of  retreat  to  Virginia.  He  deserves 
the  highest  praise  for  keeping  his  head  when  Stuart's 
cavalry  were  passing  between  his  army  and  Washing- 
ton, and  communication  with  the  Capital  was  inter- 
rupted. His  forward  march  towards  Gettysburg  was 
prompt  and  vigorous,  and  proved  completely  success- 
ful in  its  immediate  aim,  which  was  to  draw  off  the 
hostile  forces  threatening  Harrisburg.  But  subse- 
quently Meade's  strategy  suffered  by  the  want  of  a 
definite  objective.  Instead  of  seeking  out  the  invader 
wherever  he  might  be,  and  giving  him  battle  when 
found,  he  was  above  all  things  anxious  to  avoid  having 
to  assume  the  offensive.  He  thus  missed  the  oppor- 
tunity, that  was  afforded  him  by  his  superior  informa- 
tion, of  interposing  between  Ewell  and  the  remainder 
of  Lee's  army,  and  so  defeating  his  opponent  in  detail. 
To  gain  time  and  meanwhile  to  cover  Washington 
was  his  main  pre-occupation.  He  had  already 
selected  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek  as  a  suitable  position 

171 


. .     19  miles 

. .     12 

j) 

. .     18 

?» 

. .     30 

?> 

. .     11 

?> 

in  which  to  await  the  enemy's  attack,  if  he  advanced 
against  the  Capital ;  and  he  was  manoeuvring  to  bring 
his  army  on  this  alignment,  when  the  accidental 
collision  of  his  left  wing  with  the  enemy's  forces 
at  Gettysburg  completely  upset  his  plans.  His  differ- 
ent corps  were  immediately  called  upon  to  make  a 
forced  march  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  guns.  The 
distances  they  had  to  cover  were  roughly  as  follows  : — 

Second  Corps.  From  Uniontown 

Third  Corps.      „      Taneytown 

Fifth  Corps.      „     Union  Mills 

Sixth  Corps.      ,,     Manchester 
Twelfth  Corps.      ,,     Littlestown 

We  see  in  these  frustrated  plans  and  hurried  marches 
the  evil  results  of  Meade's  false  move  when  he  thrust 
his  left  wing  forward  into  a  position,  where  he  was 
unable  to  give  it  timely  support.  The  accidental 
encounter  at  Gettysburg  on  July  1  found  Meade  with 
the  various  portions  of  his  army  spread  out  over  a 
front  of  30  miles.  He  was  suddenly  compelled  to 
change  his  whole  plan,  and  to  take  up  a  new  line  of 
defence  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  His  different 
corps  were  called  upon  to  make  a  long  fatiguing  march, 
and  arrived  on  the  field  in  driblets,  with  men  tired  and 
footsore,  and  with  numbers  seriously  diminished  by 
straggling.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  his 
opponent  was  partly  in  a  similar  position,  and  that 
circumstances,  upon  which  he  could  not  have  counted, 
delayed  the  renewal  of  the  battle  for  six  hours  longer 
than  was  necessary,  he  would  have  been  called  upon 
to  fight  with  divided  forces  against  a  united  enemy, 
and  would  probably  have  suffered  a  disastrous  defeat. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  General  Meade's  conduct 
of  the  pursuit  of  Lee's  army  redounded  greatly  to  his 
credit.  The  excuses  that  have  been  advanced  for 
his  caution  previous  to  the  battle  do  not  hold  good 
subsequently.     While  the  enemy  was  still  in  the  full 

172 


tide  of  success  caution  was  perhaps  justified.  Defeat 
avoided  was  almost  equal  to  victory  gained.  But 
when  the  enemy's  invasion  had  been  foiled,  when  he 
was  retreating,  baffled  and  presumably  dispirited, 
with  no  purpose  but  to  get  safely  away,  then  there 
was  no  excuse  whatever  for  the  neglect  to  pursue 
vigorously,  and  to  convert,  if  possible,  his  repulse  into 
a  rout.  Whether  Meade  would  have  been  successful 
had  he  attacked  Lee's  lines  at  Williamsport  is 
very  doubtful.  An  inspection  of  the  position  after 
its  evacuation  by  the  Confederates  convinced  many 
of  his  officers  that  the  assault  would  have  had  no 
chance  of  success.  But  this  does  not  excuse  Meade 
for  permitting  his  opponent  to  retreat  unmolested. 
His  lines  might  have  been  impregnable,  but  he  should 
never  have  been  allowed  time  to  make  them  so.  Had 
Meade  followed  up  the  retreat  energetically,  he  could 
hardly  have  been  more  than  twenty-four  or  thirty-six 
hours  behind,  when  he  would  have  found  a  very 
different  state  of  affairs  to  that  which  confronted  him, 
when  he  actually  appeared  on  the  scene,  six  days 
after  Lee's  arrival  at  Williamsport.  This  was  the 
view  of  the  matter  held  by  President  Lincoln.  On 
July  14  Meade  received  the  following  despatch  from 
Halleck  : — 

"  I  need  hardly  tell  you  that  the  escape  of  Lee's 
army  without  another  battle  has  created  great  dis- 
satisfaction in  the  mind  of  the  President,  and  it  will 
require  an  energetic  pursuit  on  your  part  to  remove 
the  impression  that  it  has  not  been  sufficiently  active 
heretofore." 

Meade  replied  by  requesting  to  be  relieved  immedi- 
ately of  the  command  of  the  army,  accompanying  his 
resignation  by  the  curt  statement  that  as  he  felt  the 
censure  entirely  undeserved,  there  was  no  other  course 
open  to  him  to  pursue.  But  this  would  not  have 
suited  the  Government.  The  resignation  of  the 
General-in-Command    would    have    been    a    curious 

173 


commentary  on  the  much-vaunted  success  of  the 
campaign,  and  Halleck  was  directed  to  tone  down  his 
despatch  by  declaring  that  it  was  meant,  not  as  a 
censure,  but  as  a  stimulant  to  further  action.  While 
Halleck 's  despatch  contained  nothing  but  the  truth, 
the  manner  in  which  the  censure  was  conveyed  was 
very  offensive  to  an  officer  with  General  Meade's 
high  sense  of  duty,  and  it  forms  an  example  of  the 
over-bearing  manner  that  characterised  General 
Halleck's  relations  with  his  subordinates.  Meade's 
refusal  to  permit  himself  to  be  bullied  by  Washington 
conveyed  a  much-needed  lesson,  and  had  a  most 
beneficent  effect  on  the  subsequent  relations  between 
the  Cabinet  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Regarding  the  campaign  as  a  whole,  General  Lee's 
operations  are  those  of  a  bold  and  resolute  com- 
mander, having  absolute  control  over  his  army, 
determined  to  take  any  risk  and  go  to  any  length  to 
win  the  victory.  On  the  other  hand,  we  see  in 
General  Meade  a  commander  of  sound  but  mediocre 
abilities,  new  to  his  position,  hampered  by  a  timid  and 
interfering  Government,  more  intent  on  preserving 
his  own  army  intact  than  on  destroying  that  of  his 
opponent.  While  the  staunchness  of  his  troops  and 
the  errors  of  the  enemy  gave  him  the  victory  at  Gettys- 
burg, he  failed,  owing  to  his  excessive  caution,  to 
secure  the  fruits  of  that  success  ;  while  his  opponent, 
by  his  resolution  and  the  brilliancy  of  his  genius, 
extracted  himself  from  an  almost  hopeless  position, 
and  withdrew  with  the  honours  of  war,  his  own 
reputation  and  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by  his 
army  unshaken  by  the  adverse  results  of  the  campaign. 

5.  The  Cavalry  Operations. 

The  operations  of  the  cavalry  commands  of  Stuart 
and  Pleasonton  form  a  most  interesting  study.  In 
the   course   of    a   short   campaign   of    two   months' 

174 


duration,  they  afford  examples  of  almost  every  sort  of 
task,  which  the  independent  cavalry  of  an  army  may 
be  called  upon  to  perform  ;  the  reconnaissance,  the 
cavalry  screen,  the  cavalry  battle,  the  conduct  of  a 
rear-guard,  a  pursuit,  or  an  independent  raid.  The 
forces  on  each  side  were  well  matched  both  in  numbers 
and  efficiency.  The  Federal  cavalry  had  improved 
enormously  since  the  early  days  of  the  war,  when  the 
Confederate  troopers  had  ridden  round  or  through 
them  at  pleasure.  Stuart's  cavalry  still  retained 
the  prestige  of  former  triumphs  and  the  enthusiasm 
which  their  leader  always  inspired.  But  against  this 
must  be  set  the  greater  material  resources  of  the 
Federals  in  horses  and  equipment,  whereas  the 
poverty  of  the  South  was  rendering  it  increasingly 
difficult  to  make  good  the  incessant  wear  and  tear 
upon  the  Confederate  cavalry.  The  difference  in  the 
organisation  of  the  two  forces  should  be  noted.  Each 
numbered  about  12,000  sabres,  but  Pleasonton's 
command  was  divided  into  divisions  and  brigades, 
whereas  Stuart's  force  consisted  of  six  brigades  with 
no  divisional  organisation.  The  latter  was  undoubt- 
edly the  more  suitable.  Circumstances  rendered  it 
constantly  necessary  for  Pleasonton  to  break  up 
his  divisions,  or  to  transfer  a  brigade  from  one  division 
to  another.  In  other  words,  the  organisation  was 
too  clumsy,  and  lacked  the  elasticity  afforded  by  the 
simple  brigade  system  of  Stuart's  Corps. 

We  have  already  commented  upon  the  admirable 
manner  in  which  Stuart  covered  the  movements  of 
the  Confederate  army  from  the  Rappahannock  to  the 
Potomac.  He  never  did  better  work.  It  forms  an 
object-lesson  of  the  way  in  which  the  independent 
cavalry  of  an  army  should  be  handled  as  a  defensive 
screen.  But  when  the  Confederates  crossed  into 
Maryland  the  screen  was  withdrawn,  and  Stuart 
took  three  brigades  on  his  raid  round  Meade's  flanks 
and  rear.     The  vast  damage,  which  he  inflicted  on 

175 


the  enemy,  and  the  panic  he  produced  in  Washington, 
were  but  a  poor  compensation  for  the  evils  that 
resulted  from  General  Lee's  consequent  ignorance 
of  the  enemy's  movements.  Such  raids,  specious 
and  tempting  as  they  seem,  are  generally  a  mistake. 
Hooker  paid  dearly  for  a  similar  error  during  the 
Chancellorsville  campaign,  when  he  sent  away  Stone- 
man  with  all  his  cavalry  to  attack  Lee's  communica- 
tions. Grant  repeated  the  mistake  in  '64.  Lee  has 
been  greatly  blamed  for  sending  Stuart  away  at  such 
an  important  period  of  the  campaign.  To  judge  how 
far  such  blame  is  justified,  we  must  consider  the  orders 
upon  which  Stuart  acted.  They  were  as  follows  : — 
"  General — 

"  If  General  Hooker's  army  remains  inactive 
you  can  leave  two  brigades  to  watch  him  and  with- 
draw with  the  three  others,  but  should  he  not  appear 
to  be  moving  northward  I  think  you  had  better  with- 
draw this  side  of  the  mountain  to-morrow  night, 
cross  at  Shepherdstown  next  day,  and  move  over 
to  Frederickstown.  You  will,  however,  be  able  to 
judge  whether  you  can  pass  around  their  army  without 
hindrance,  doing  them  all  the  damage  you  can,  and 
cross  the  river  east  of  the  mountains.  In  either  case, 
after  crossing  the  river  you  must  move  on  and  feel 
the  right  of  Ewell's  corps,  collecting  information, 
provisions,  etc.  Give  instructions  to  the  commander 
of  the  brigades  left  behind  to  watch  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  army,  and  in  the  event  of  the  enemy  leaving 
their  front  retire  from  the  mountains  west  of  the 
Shenandoah,  leaving  sufficient  pickets  to  guard  the 
passes  and  bringing  everything  clean  along  the  valley, 
closing  upon  the  rear  of  the  army.  As  regards  the 
movement  of  the  two  brigades  of  the  enemy  moving 
towards  Warrenton,  the  commander  of  the  briga  ds 
to  be  left  in  the  mountains  must  do  what  he  can  to 
counteract  them  ;  but  I  think  the  sooner  you  cross 
into    Maryland    after    to-morrow    the    better.     The 

176 


movements  of  Ewell's  Corps  are  as  stated  in  my  former 
letter.     Hill's  first  division  will  reach  the  Potomac 
to-day  and   Longstreet  will  follow  to-morrow.     Be 
watchful  and  circumspect  in  all  your  movements. 
"I  am,  very  respectfully  and  truly  yours, 

"  R.  E.  LEE, 

"  General." 

These  orders,  it  will  be  observed,  are  perfectly 
clear.  Stuart  was  to  leave  two  of  his  brigades  behind 
to  guard  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  to  move 
with  the  remainder  across  the  Potomac  as  soon  as 
possible  after  the  24th,  that  is,  as  soon  as  Longstreet 
and  Hill  were  across.  He  was  given  a  free  hand  to 
choose  which  point  of  passage  he  might  consider  the 
best,  and  was  to  judge  for  himself  if  it  was  possible 
to  ride  round  the  Federal  rear.  In  either  case,  as 
soon  as  he  was  across,  he  was  to  get  at  once  into 
touch  with  Ewell.  The  orders  to  the  two  brigades 
(Robertson  and  Jones)  to  be  left  behind  are  equally 
clear.  They  were  to  hold  the  gaps  as  long  as  the 
enemy  remained  south  of  the  river,  but  as  soon  as 
Hooker  commenced  to  cross  they  were  to  retire  over 
the  Shenandoah,  leaving  piquets  in  the  gaps,  move 
down  the  valley,  aud  close  in  on  the  rear  of  the  army. 
General  Lee  had  therefore  made  ample  provision  to 
retain  the  services  of  his  cavalry  with  the  army.  He 
did  not  expect  Stuart  to  be  absent  more  than  a  day 
or  two,  even  if  he  took  the  extreme  course  of  riding 
round  the  Federal  rear,  and  as  soon  as  Hooker  crossed 
the  Potomac  he  expected  to  be  informed  of  the  move- 
ment by  the  two  brigades  left  behind  in  the  valley. 
But  at  this  crisis  both  Stuart  and  Robertson  failed 
him.  Stuart  committed  an  error  of  judgment  by 
persisting  in  his  raid,  when  Hooker's  unexpected 
northward  movement  plainly  indicated  that  he  could 
not  hope  to  get  into  touch  again  for  several  days  with 
Ewell's  troops,  as  his  orders  directed.  Robertson's 
m  177 


error  was  a  graver  one.  Hooker  crossed  the  Potomac 
on  the  25th.  Robertson  did  not  start  north  till  the 
29th,  four  days  later,  and  he  did  not  actually 
cross  into  Maryland  till  July  1,  when  the  armies  had 
already  come  into  collision  at  Gettysburg.  He  there- 
fore gave  the  Union  army  a  start  of  six  days.  In 
other  words,  he  entirely  neglected  to  obey  his  instruc- 
tions to  cross  the  Potomac  as  soon  as  Hooker  did  so, 
and  then  close  in  on  the  Confederate  army.  The  fact 
that  his  command  travelled  in  two  days  from  Martins- 
burg  to  Fairfield  shows  that  there  was  no  excuse  for 
his  pottering  south  of  the  river,  which  had  the  effect 
of  leaving  Lee  at  the  most  critical  moment  of  the 
campaign  without  a  single  trooper.1 

Turning  to  the  movements  of  the  Federal  cavalry 
during  the  first  phase  of  the  campaign,  Pleasonton 
distinctly  failed  to  achieve  any  results  of  value.  His 
superior  numbers  enabled  him  to  force  Stuart  back 
to  the  Blue  Ridge,  but  he  failed  to  penetrate  the 
cavalry  screen  and  see  what  was  behind.  On  the 
other  hand,  when  Stuart  uncovered  Lee's  front  by 
going  away  on  his  raid,  the  Federal  cavalry  kept 
Meade  well  supplied  with  the  most  valuable  informa- 
tion. Buford's  division  was  indefatigable  in  this 
respect,  but  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  Kilpatrick 
and  Gregg  wasted  so  much  time  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Hanover  on  June  30  and  July  1.  They 
had  fought  Stuart  there  on  the  30th,  but  instead 
of  hanging  close  to  his  heels,  they  lost  touch  with 
him,  and  spent  all  the  following  day  trying  to  find 
him  again,  when  their  presence  would  have  been 
invaluable  at  Gettysburg.  It  is  a  significant  contrast 
in  energy  that  Stuart  went  to  York  and  Carlisle 
and  thence  to  Gettysburg  in  the  same  time  that  it 


1  Robertson's  defence  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders  "  makes  no 
attempt  to  explain  why  he  remained  so  long  in  the  Valley  in 
directdisobedience  to  his  orders. 

178 


took  Gregg  and  Kilpatrick  to  reach  the  latter  place 
from  Hanover,  only  14  miles  away.  Nor  can  it  be 
said  that  the  Federal  cavalry  took  full  advantage  of 
the  opportunities  offered  of  harassing  the  Confederate 
retreat.  It  will  be  noted  what  an  advantage  Lee  here 
derived  from  the  friendly  shelter  of  South  Mountain, 
which  protected  his  left  flank  as  he  withdrew  down  the 
Cumberland  Valley.  The  range  is  impassable  for 
cavalry  except  at  the  gaps,  and  hence  it  was  only 
necessary  to  hold  these  points  to  render  the  passage 
of  the  supply  trains  comparatively  secure.  Stuart 
was  too  late  to  close  the  Monterey  Gap,  and  by 
slipping  through  at  this  point  Kilpatrick  was  able  to 
do  a  good  deal  of  damage.  But  for  his  own  slack- 
ness on  the  8th,  when  he  fell  back  to  Boonsborough, 
he  might  have  done  a  great  deal  more.  By  making 
a  wide  detour  to  the  south,  Buford  was  able  to  pass 
through  Crampton's  Gap  and  attack  Williamsport,  but 
the  firmness  and  resource  shown  by  Imboden  saved 
both  the  situation  and  the  trains.  This  was  a  costly 
blunder  on  the  part  of  Buford,  who  was  completely 
deceived  by  the  boldness  of  Imboden's  tactics. 

In  all  these  operations  the  cavalry  on  both  sides 
combined  with  great  success  the  somewhat  conflicting 
roles  of  mounted  infantry  and  cavalry  proper.  They 
generally  dismounted  to  attack  or  hold  a  position,  but 
they  also  repeatedly  charged  with  the  sabre,  showing 
a  dash  and  elan  which  seems  to  have  suffered  nothing 
from  their  constant  fighting  on  foot.  It  is  well 
known  that  one  of  the  most  difficult  of  problems  is  to 
teach  cavalry  to  use  the  rifle  and  fight  well  dismounted, 
without  at  the  same  time  impairing  their  efficiency 
in  shock  tactics.  It  speaks  well  for  the  adaptability 
and  natural  dash  of  the  American  troopers  that  they 
did  succeed  in  combining  these  two  opposing  roles 
in  a  remarkably  efficient  manner.  Those  writers 
who  advocate  the  abolition  of  cold  steel  for  cavalry 
often  quote  the  example  of  Stuart's  squadrons  as 

179 


an  argument  confirming  their  case,  thus  giving  the 
impression  that  the  Confederates  relied  solely  on 
fire  effect.  This  is  misleading.  The  true  deduction 
to  be  drawn  is  not  that  cavalry  should  be  converted 
into  a  kind  of  glorified  mounted  infantry,  but  that 
what  has  been  done  once  can  be  done  again,  and  that, 
with  this  example  before  them,  it  is  surely  possible 
for  our  cavalry  leaders  to  make  their  men  equally 
efficient  with  both  rifle  and  cold  steel,  and  thereby 
to  emulate,  or  even  outshine,  the  record  of  the  great 
Confederate  commander. 

6.  The  Federal  Militia. 

There  is  a  lesson,  taught  by  this  campaign,  which 
has  a  special  significance  for  our  own  country.  It  is 
the  criminal  folly  of  relying  in  a  national  crisis  upon 
untrained  troops.  When  Lee's  army  crossed  the 
Potomac,  and  his  cavalry  were  riding  far  and  wide 
through  Pennsylvania,  a  proclamation  was  issued 
by  General  Couch  in  Harrisburg,  calling  upon  all 
able-bodied  men  to  enrol  themselves  in  the  militia 
for  the  defence  of  the  State.  Some  35,000  men 
answered  the  call  and  shouldered  a  rifle  to  resist  the 
invaders.  What  kind  of  service  did  they  render  ? 
The  following  extracts  from  Meade's  despatches  help 
to  supply  an  answer: — 

Meade  to  Halleck,  July  11: 

"  From  the  representations  of  General  Spinola 
that  the  nine-months'  men  (militia)  of  his  command 
could  not  be  relied  upon,  and  my  own  experience  of 
troops  under  such  circumstances,  I  have  directed 
the  regiments  of  his  brigade  to  be  posted  in  the  rear. 
Troops  of  this  character  can  be  of  little  service." 

Meade  to  Halleck,  July  13  : 

"  General  W.  F.  Smith  of  the  advanced  division  of 
General  Couch's  forces  has  arrived  here  to-day,  but 
from  the  organisation  and  condition  of  these  troops, 

180 


and  the  short  time  they  have  to  serve,  I  cannot  place 
much  reliance  upon  them." 

Halleck  to  Meade,  July  27  : 

"  It  is  supposed  that  General  Couch's  forces  being 
militia  are  about  melted  away.  They  would  be 
worthless  if  ordered  forward." 

Owing  to  the  careful  way  in  which  they  were  kept 
in  the  rear,  the  militia  had  few  opportunities  of 
showing  their  quality,  but  on  the  few  occasions  that 
they  became  under  fire  their  behaviour  was  not  good. 
The  engagement  at  Wrightsville,  Pennsylvania,  on 
June  28,  is  an  instructive  example.  A  militia  force, 
about  1200  strong,  was  posted  at  this  point  to  protect 
the  great  bridge  across  the  Susquehanna.  There 
was  every  inducement  for  these  men  to  fight  well. 
They  were  placed  in  a  strong  position,  the  post  con- 
fided to  them  to  defend  was  a  most  important  one, 
they  were  fighting  on  their  own  soil,  some  of  them 
almost  in  sight  of  their  homes,  against  a  foreign 
invader.  And  yet  when  Gordon's  brigade,  barely 
superior  to  them  in  numbers,  advanced  to  attack 
their  position,  they  fled  at  the  first  shot,  throwing 
away  their  arms  and  burning  the  bridge  they  were 
required  to  defend.  The  men  of  Stone's  brigade, 
who  fought  and  died  where  they  stood  at  Gettysburg, 
and  the  militia  at  Wrightsville,  who  so  disgracefully 
abandoned  their  post,  came  of  the  same  stock,  for 
all  were  Pennsylvanians.  What,  then,  was  the  differ- 
ence between  them  ?  The  former  had  been  trans- 
formed by  two  years  of  war  into  seasoned  soldiers, 
with  discipline  and  regimental  pride  to  give  solidity 
to  their  ranks.  The  latter  were  nothing  but  a  col- 
lection of  armed  citizens,  brave  enough  individually 
and  animated  by  the  sincerest  patriotism,  but  without 
discipline,  cohesion,  or  the  habit  of  instinctive  obedi- 
ence to  orders,  without  which  an  army  is  only  an 
incoherent  mob.  The  lesson  is  not  confined  to  this 
campaign.     It    is   taught   by    every  war   in   which 

181 


volunteer  troops  have  played  a  part.  It  was  shown 
at  Bladensburg  in  1813,  at  Belfort  in  1871,  in  South 
Africa  in  1900.  It  forms  a  very  grave  warning 
to  the  people  of  this  country.  Patriotism  without 
training  is  worse  than  useless.  It  leads  to  nothing 
but  a  criminal  slaughter  of  helpless  men.  Those 
who  take  up  arms  in  the  wild  fever  and  excitement  of 
a  war  scare  are  not  those  who  serve  their  country 
best  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  It  is  the  man,  who  in 
times  of  peace,  without  the  artificial  stimulus  of 
inflammatory  speeches  and  music-hall  songs,  sets 
himself  to  learn  the  duty  of  a  soldier  and  to  fit  himself 
to  carry  a  rifle  ;  he  is  the  man  who  proves  his  worth 
in  the  hour  of  trial,  and  reflects  honour,  not  disgrace, 
upon  his  colours. 

7.  Conclusion. 

To  sum  up.  In  appearance  the  campaign  of  Gettys- 
burg ended  in  a  draw ;  but  in  real  fact  it  proved 
decisive  of  the  war.  In  saying  this,  we  do  not  use  the 
word  in  the  sense  in  which  Austerlitz,  Jena,  or 
Waterloo,  for  example,  were  decisive  of  the  respective 
campaigns  in  which  they  figured.  In  each  of  these 
instances  a  single  overwhelming  victory  annihilated 
the  enemy's  army  in  the  field,  and  ended  the  war  at 
a  blow.  Nothing  of  this  kind  occurred  at  Gettysburg. 
Tactically,  that  action  resembles  rather  Zorndorf, 
Eylau,  or  Borodino,  battles  which,  after  a  murderous 
slaughter,  were  ended  only  by  the  mutual  exhaustion 
of  both  combatants.  In  its  strategic  results  Gettys- 
burg resembles  more  nearly  the  battle  of  the  Metaurus, 
which  decided  the  issue  of  the  Second  Punic  War ; 
or  the  defeat  of  the  Greeks  before  Syracuse,  which 
decided  the  fate  of  Athens.  The  Athenians  put  their 
whole  strength  into  one  supreme  bid  for  victory,  and 
when  the  fortune  of  war  decided  against  them  under 
the  walls  of  Syracuse,  their  ultimate  defeat  became 

182 


only  a  question  of  time.  So  it  was  with  the  Con- 
federacy. The  army  which  fought  at  Gettysburg 
was  the  strongest,  the  bravest,  and  the  best  equipped, 
that  the  South  ever  put  into  the  field.  Superhuman 
efforts  had  been  made,  every  other  point  had  been 
stripped  of  defenders,  in  order  that  Lee  might  win  a 
decisive  victory  upon  Northern  soil.  At  Gettysburg 
the  Confederate  star  rose  to  its  zenith  ;  afterwards  its 
lustre  diminished  daily.  The  subsequent  struggle 
was  long  and  bitter.  The  dreadful  slaughter  in  the 
Wilderness,  the  bloody  battles  round  Petersburg,  were 
still  to  come  ;  but  with  the  failure  of  Pickett's  gallant 
charge  the  hope  of  ultimate  victory  passed  away  from 
the  Confederate  standards,  until  two  years  later  the 
last  act  of  the  long  tragedy  came  to,  its  close  at 
Appomatox. 


FINIS 


183 


APPENDIX    A 

I.  Organisation  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  during 
the  Battle  of  Gettysburg. 

Commander — Maj.-Gen.  George  G.  Meade. 

General  Head- quarters : 

Chief  Staff  Officer— Brig. -Gen.  Butterfield. 
Provost  Marshal-General — Brig. -Gen.  Marsena  R.  Patrick. 
Chief  of  Artillery — Brig. -Gen.  Henry  J.  Hunt. 
Engineer  Brigade  * — Brig.-Gen.  Henry  W.  Benham. 

First  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  John  F.  Reynolds. 2 
First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  James  S.  Wadsworth. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Meredith. 

Second  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Cutler. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Robinson. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Paul. 

Second   Brigade — Brig.-Gen.   Baxter. 
Third  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Abner  Doubleday. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Rowley. 

Second  Brigade — Col.  Stone. 

Third  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Stannard. 
Artillery   Brigade — Col.   Wainwright. 

Second  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Winfield  S.  Hancock. 
First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Caldwell. 

First  Brigade — Col.  Cross. 

Second  Brigade — Col.  Kelly. 

Third   Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Zook. 

Fourth  Brigade — Col.  Brooke. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  John  Gibbon. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Harrow. 

Second  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.   Webb. 

Third  Brigade— Col.  Hall. 

1  Not  present  at  Gettysburg. 

*  On  General  Reynolds'  death,  the  command  of  his  corps  was  assumed 
temporarily  by  General  Doubleday.  On  July  2nd  General  Newton  took 
the  command. 

185 


Second  Army  Corps  (continued). 

Third  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  Hays. 
First  Brigade — Col.  Carroll. 
Second  Brigade — Col.  Smyth. 
Third  Brigade— Col.  Willard. 
Artillery  Brigade — Capt.  Hazard. 

Third  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Daniel  E.  Sickles.  x 
First  Division — Maj.-Gen.  David  B.  Birney. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Graham. 

Second  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Ward. 

Third  Brigade— Col.  De  Trobriand. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Andrew  A.  Humphreys. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Carr. 

Second   Brigade — Col.   Brewster. 

Third  Brigade — Col.  Burling. 
Artillery  Brigade — Capt.  Randolph. 

Fifth  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  George  Sykes. 
First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  James  Barnes. 

First  Brigade— Col.  Tilton. 

Second    Brigade — Col.    Sweitzer. 

Third   Brigade — Col.    Vincent. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Romeyn  B.  Ayres. 

First  Brigade — Col.   Day. 

Second   Brigade — Col.    Burbank. 

Third    Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Weed. 
Third  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  W.  Crawford. 

First  Brigade — Col.  McCandless. 

Third  Brigade— Col.  Fisher. 
Artillery  Brigade — Capt.  Martin. 

Sixth  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  John  Sedgwick. 
First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Horatio  C.  Wright. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Torbert. 

Second  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  Bartlett. 

Third  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Russell. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Albion  P.  Howe. 

Second  Brigade — Col.  Grant. 

Third  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Neill. 
Third  Division — Maj.-Gen.  John  Newton.  2 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Shaler. 

1  When  General  Sickles  was  wounded,  the  command  of  his  corps  passed 
to  General  Birney. 

2  When  General  Newton  assumed  command  of  the  First  Corps,  his 
division  was  commanded  by  General  Wheaton,  who  handed  over  the  Third 
Brigade  to  Col.  Nevin. 

186 


Sixth  Army  Corps — Third  Division  (continued). 
Second  Brigade — Col.  Eustis. 
Third  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Wheaton. 
Artillery  Brigade — Col.  Tompkins. 

Eleventh  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Oliver  0.  Howard. 
First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Francis  C.  Barlow. 

First  Brigade — Col.  von  Gilsa. 

Second  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Ames. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Adolph  von  Stein wehr. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Coster. 

Second    Brigade — Col.  Schimmelphennig. 
Artillery  Brigade — Maj.  Osborn. 
Third  Division — Brig.-Gen.   Shurz. 

First   Brigade — Brig.-Gen.    von    Amberg. 

Second   Brigade — Col.   Krzyzanowski. 

Twelfth  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Henry  Slocum. x 
First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Alpheus  S.  Williams. 

First   Brigade — Col.    McDougall. 

Second  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  Lockwood. 

Third  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.   Ruger. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  John  W.  Geary. 

First   Brigade — Col.    Candy. 

Second  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Kane. 

Third  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Greene. 
Artillery   Brigade — Lieut.    Muhlenberg. 

Cavalry  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Alfred  Pleasonton. 
First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  John  Buford. 

First  Brigade — Col.   Gamble. 

Second    Brigade — Col.    Devin. 

Reserve  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Merritt. 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  David  McGregg. 

First  Brigade — Col.  Mcintosh. 

Second    Brigade — Col.    Huey.  2 

Third  Brigade — Col.  Irvin  Gregg. 
Third  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Judson  Kilpatrick. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Farnsworth. 

Second  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Custer. 

Horse  Artillery. 

First  Brigade — Capt.  Robertson. 
Second  Brigade — Capt.  Tidball. 

1  General  Slocum  was  in  command  of  the  right  wing  on  July  2nd. 
General  Williams  was  then  in  temporary  command  of  the  Twelfth  Corpa, 
and  Brig.-Gen.  Ruger  of  the  First  Division. 

2  At  Westminster,  etc.,  and  not  engaged  at  Gettysburg. 

187 


Artillery  Reserve — Brig.-Gen.  Robert  0.  Tyler. 
First  Regular  Brigade — Capt.  Ransom. 
First  Volunteer  Brigade — Lieut.-Col.  McGilvery. 
Second  Volunteer  Brigade — Capt.  Taft. 
Third  Volunteer  Brigade — Capt.  Huntington 
Fourth  Volunteer  Brigade — Capt.  Fitzhugh. 

II.  Organisation    of    the    Army    of    Northern    Virginia 

DURING  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG. 

Commander — General  Robert  E.  Lee. 

Chief  of  Artillery — Brig.-Gen.  Pendleton. 
First  Army  Corps — Lieut.-Gen.  James  Longstreet. 
McLaws'  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Lafayette  McLaws. 

Kershaw's  Brigade. 

Semmes'  Brigade. 

Barksdale's  Brigade. 

Wofford's  Brigade. 

Artillery— Col.  Cabell. 
Pickett's  Division — Maj.-Gen.  George  E.  Pickett. 

Garnett's  Brigade. 

Kemper's  Brigade. 

Armistead's  Brigade. 

Corse's  1  Brigade. 

Artillery — Maj.  Dearing. 
Hood's  Division  2 — Maj.-Gen.  John  B.  Hood. 

Laws'  Brigade. 

Robertson's  Brigade. 

Anderson's  Brigade. 

Benning's  Brigade. 

Artillery — Maj.   Henry. 
Artillery  Reserve,  First  Corps — Col.  Walton. 

Alexander's  Battalion. — Col.  Alexander. 

Washington  Artillery — Maj.  Eshleman. 
Second  Army  Corps — Lieut.-Gen.  Richard  S.  Ewell. 
Early's  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Jubal  A.  Early. 

Hays'  Brigade. 

Smith's  Brigade. 

Hoke's  Brigade. 

Gordon's  Brigade. 

Artillery — Lieut.-Col.  Jones. 
Rodes'  Division — Maj.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes. 

Daniels'    Brigade. 

Iverson's  Brigade. 

1  Not  present  at  Gettysburg. 

*  Commanded  by  Law  after  the  wounding  of  Hood  on  July  2nd. 

188 


Second  Army  Corps — Rodes'  Division  (continued). 

Doles'  Brigade. 

Ramseur's  Brigade. 

O'Neal's  Brigade. 

Artillery — Lieut. -Col.  Carter. 
Johnson's  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Edward  Johnson. 

Steuart's  Brigade. 

Nicholl's  Brigade. 

Walker's  Brigade. 

Jones'  Brigade. 

Artillery — Maj.  Latimer. 
Artillery  Reserve,  Second  Corps — Col.  Brown. 

Dance's  Battalion. 

Nelson's  Battalion. 
Third  Army  Corps — Lieut. -Gen.  Ambrose  P.  Hill. 
Anderson's  Division — Maj.-Gen.  R.  H.  Anderson. 

Wilcox's  Brigade. 

Wright's  Brigade. 

Mahone's  Brigade. 

Perry's  Brigade. 

Posey's  Brigade. 

Artillery — Maj.  Lane. 
Heth's  Division1 — Maj.-Gen.  Henry  Heth. 

Pettigrew's  Brigade. 

Archer's  Brigade. 

Brockenborough's  Brigade. 

Davis's  Brigade. 

Artillery — Lieut. -Col.  Garnett. 
Pender's  Division 2 — Maj.-Gen.  William  D.  Pender. 

Perrin's  Brigade. 

Lane's  Brigade. 

Thomas'  Brigade. 

Scales'  Brigade. 

Artillery — Maj.  Poague. 
Cavalry  Division — Maj.-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart. 

First  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Wade  Hampton. 

Second  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Robertson.3 

Third  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee. 

Fourth  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  W.  H.  F.  Lee.  4 

Fifth  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.  Jenkins. 

Sixth  Brigade — Brig.-Gen.   Jones.* 

1  Commanded  by  Trimble  on  July  3rd. 

1  Commanded  by  Lane  after  the  wounding  of  Pender  on  July  2nd. 
1  Not  present  at  Gettysburg,  but  engaged  at  Fairfield  on  July  3rd. 
*  Commanded  by  Chambliss. 

189 


APPENDIX   B 

I.  Casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  the  Battle 
of  Gettysburg.1 


General  Head- quarters 

First  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Keynolds  (killed) 
Head-quarters 

First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Wadsworth 
Second  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Robinson 
Third  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Doubleday 
Artillery  Brigade— Col.  Wainwright     . . 

Total  First  Army  Corps. . 


4 

5 

2155 

1690 

2103 

106 

6059 


Second  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Hancock  (wounded). 
Head-quarters 

First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Caldwell 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Gibbon  (wounded) 
Third  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Hays 
Artillery  Brigade — Capt.  Hazard 


7 

1275 

1647 

1291 

149 

4369 


Third  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Sickles  (wounded) 
Head- quarters 

First  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Birney 
Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Humphreys 
Artillery  Brigade — Capt.  Randolph 

Total  Third  Army  Corps 


2 

2011 

2092 

106 

4211 


1  Extracted  from  the  details  given  in  Vol.  IE.  "  Battles  and  Leaders." 

190 


Fifth    Army    Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Sykes. 

First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Barnes         ..          ..          ..  904 

Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Ayres       . .          . .          . .  1029 

Third  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Crawford    . .          . .          . .  210 

Artillery  Brigade — Capt.  Martin           . .          . .          . .  44 

Total  Fifth  Army  Corps 2187 


Sixth  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Sedgwick. 

First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Wright        . .          . .          . .  18 

Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Howe       . .          . .          . .  16 

Third  Division — Maj.-Gen.  Newton 196 

Artillery  Brigade — Col.  Tompkins        . .          . .          . .  12 

Total  Sixth  Army  Corps            . .          . .  242 


Eleventh  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Howard. 

Head-quarters      . .          . .          . .          . .          . .  . .  4 

First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Barlow  (wounded)  . .  1306 

Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  von  Steinwehr  . .  . .  946 

Third  Division— Maj.-Gen.  Shurz         1476 

Artillery  Brigade — Maj.  Osborn           . .         . .  . .  69 

Total  Eleventh  Army  Corps      . .  . .  3801 


Twelfth  Army  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Slocum. 

First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Williams    . .  . .  . .  533 

Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Geary     . .  . .  . .  540 

Artillery  Brigade — Lieut.  Muhlenberg  . .  . .  9 

Total  Twelfth  Army  Corps  . .  '. .  1082 


Cavalry  Corps. — Maj.-Gen.  Pleasonton. 

First  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Buford       . .          . .          . .  418 

Second  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Gregg     . .          . .          . .  56 

Third  Division — Brig.-Gen.  Kilpatrick            . .         . .  355 

Horse  Artillery     . .          . .          . .          . .          . .          . .  23 

Total  Cavalry  Corps       852 


Artillery  Reserve — Brig.-Gen.  Tyler  . .  . .  . .       242 

191 


Recapitulation. 

General  Head- quarters   . .                     . .         . .         . .           4 

First  Army  Corps 

.     6059 

Second  "Army  Corps 

.     4369 

Third  Army  Corps 

.     4211 

Fifth  Army  Corps 

.     2187 

Sixth  Army  Corps 

.       242 

Eleventh  Army  Corps     . 

.     3801 

Twelfth  Army  Corps 

.     1082 

Cavalry  Corps 

.       852 

Artillery  Reserve . . 

.       242 

Grand  Total     . . 

.  23,049 

II.  Casualties  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at 
the  Battle  of  Gettysburg. 


First  Army  Corps. — Lieut.-Gen.  Longstreet. 
McLaws'  Division 

..     2178 

Pickett's  Division 

. .     2888 

Hood's  Division  (Hood  wounded) 
Reserve  Artillery 

. .  2289 
. .       184 

Total  First  Army  Corps. . 

. .     7539 

Second  Army  Corps. — Lieut.-Gen.  Ewell. 
Staff           

1 

Early's  Division 
Rodes'  Division 

..  1188 
. .     2853 

Johnson's  Division 

. .     1873 

Reserve  Artillery . . 

22 

Total  Second  Army  Corps 


5937 


Third  Army  Corps. — Lieut.-Gen.  Hill. 
Anderson's  Division 

Pender's  Division  (Pender  mortally  wounded) 
Heth's  Division  (Heth  wounded) 
Reserve  Artillery 

Total  Third  Army  Corp3 
192 


2115 
1690 

2850 
80 

6735 


Cavalry  Division. — Maj.-Gen.  Stuart. 

Hampton's  Brigade  (Hampton  wounded) 

92 

Fitzhugh  Lee's  Brigade  . . 

50 

W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Brigade 

41 

Jones'  Brigade  (at  Fairfield) 

58 

Jenkins'  Brigade 

.  .  not  recorded 

Horse  Artillery 

. .  not  recorded 

Total  Cavalry  Division 


240' 


Recapitulation. 


First  Army  Corps 
Second  Army  Corps 
Third  Army  Corps 
Cavalry  Division 


7539' 

5937 

6735 

240' 

Grand  Total      . .  20,451 


193 


APPENDIX    C 

Longstreet's  Conduct  at  Gettysburg. 

It  is  proposed  in  this  note  to  examine,  with  rather  more  detail 
than  is  given  in  the  text,  the  facts  connected  with  Longstreet's 
handling  of  his  corps  in  the  fighting  on  July  2  and  3  at  Gettys 
burg.  The  question  is  important,  and  cannot  be  passed  over 
unnoticed,  for  Longstreet  played  the  principal  part  on  this  occa- 
sion, and  his  action  had  a  vital  bearing  on  the  ultimate  result  of 
the  battle.  Unfortunately,  it  gave  rise  to  a  very  heated  and  bitter 
controversy  between  Longstreet  and  his  brother  officers,  so  that 
in  examining  the  statements  of  the  chief  actors  it  is  most  difficult 
to  get  at  the  facts  ;  to  separate  truth  from  exaggeration,  facts 
from  prejudice.  The  only  original  unbiassed  evidence  that  we 
possess  is  afforded  by  General  Lee's  report,  and  this  is  silent  on 
certain  essential  points. 

To  take  first  the  battle  of  July  2.  The  charge  against  Long- 
street  is,  that  he  received  his  orders  to  attack  Meade's  left  flank 
by  8  a.m.,  and  that  it  was  not  until  4  p.m.  that  he  was  in  position 
to  advance  ;  that  is  to  say,  he  took  eight  hours  to  move  his  troops 
about  four  miles  and  form  them  for  battle.  How  was  the  time 
accounted  for  ?  In  his  Reminiscences,  "  From  Manassas  to 
Appomatox,"  and  also  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders,"  Vol.  III., 
Longstreet  states  his  own  defence.  The  tone  in  each  case  is  very 
violent,  and  not  always  in  the  best  of  taste,  particularly  his 
sneer  at  the  personal  courage  of  General  Early,  with  whom  he  had 
always  been  on  bad  terms.  The  argument  is  also  very  diffuse, 
and  wanders  frequently  from  the  point,  but  put  briefly  his  expla- 
nation is  this  :  firstly,  that  on  the  night  of  July  1  his  troops  were 
more  than  20  miles  from  the  field  :  and,  secondly,  that  the  positions 
he  was  ordered  to  occupy  were  in  the  enemy's  possession.  The 
first  excuse  is  irrelevant,  for  all  his  troops,  except  Law's  brigade, 
reached  the  field  by  3  a.m.,  and  both  Hood  and  McLaws  were 
ready  to  march  at  daylight  on  the  2nd.1  Longstreet's  second 
excuse  holds  good  to  a  limited  extent,  for  the  enemy's  occupation 


1  McLaws'  report.     Of  course  Pickett's  division  was  still  in  the  rear. 

194 


of  the  Peach  Orchard  did  compel  him  to  change  his  dispositions 
and  so  delay  the  attack.  On  the  other  hand,  had  he  moved  at 
once  without  waiting  for  Law,  he  would  have  forestalled  Sickles' 
forward  movement  to  the  Peach  Orchard,  and  this  cause  of  delay 
would  never  have  arisen.  The  crux  of  the  whole  question  is  this  : 
Did  Lee's  verbal  orders  prescribe  an  early  attack  or  not  ?  The 
united  evidence  of  Wilcox,  Long,  Taylor  and  other  officers  present 
at  the  council-of-war,  is  that  the  attack  was  ordered  to  be  made 
by  Longstreet,  "  as  early  as  possible  with  the  troops  he  had  with 
him."  Therefore  Longstreet's  delay  of  four  hours,  waiting  for 
Law  to  appear,  was  in  direct  disobedience  of  these  orders,  and 
constituted  a  grave  military  offence,  which  no  secondary  circum- 
stances beyond  his  control  could  palliate.  We  have  already 
noted  the  disastrous  results  that  followed  from  this  unfortunate 
delay. 

Turning  to  July  3,  the  usual  verdict  lays  the  blame  for  the  mis- 
management of  this  assault  on  Longstreet  also.  It  is  contended 
that  he  was  ordered  to  employ  McLaws'  and  Hood's  divisions  as 
well  as  Pickett's  in  the  attack  on  the  Federal  centre,  and  that 
his  failure  to  do  so  was  the  cause  of  the  disaster.  This  is  the 
assertion  put  forward  by  General  Wilcox  and  Colonels  Long, 
Taylor,  and  Venable,  all  of  whom  were  present  at  the  conference 
when  Lee  gave  his  instructions.  Col.  Venable  goes  further,  and 
says  that  some  time  after  he  recalled  the  matter  to  General  Lee, 
who  replied,  "  I  know  it !  I  know  it !  "  Now  through  the 
mist  of  personal  prejudice  and  ill-feeling  that  envelops  this 
controversy,  the  only  safe  guiding  light  we  have  is  in  General 
Lee's  report ;  and,  as  stated  in  the  text  (see  p.  95),  this  expressly 
rules  out  Hood  and  McLaws  from  the  list  of  units  to  participate 
in  the  assault  on  the  enemy's  centre.  Furthermore,  a  brief 
examination  of  the  situation  of  these  troops  on  the  morning  of 
July  3  will  show  the  impossibility  of  such  an  operation.  Both 
divisions  were  in  close  contact  with  the  enemy.  First  to  have  with- 
drawn them,  and  then  to  have  moved  them  to  the  left  to  unite  with 
Pickett,  would  have  been  a  most  delicate  and  difficult  operation, 
while  by  revealing  the  movement  to  the  enemy  it  would  have 
destroyed  whatever  chance  there  was  of  the  assault  proving  a 
surprise.  What,  then,  were  General  Lee's  real  intentions  ?  No 
one  supposes  that  he  proposed  to  send  14,000  men  to  attack  an 
army  of  80,000  in  an  intensely  strong  position,  and  that  the  rest 
of  his  own  army  should  look  idly  on.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  quite 
clear  that  he  intended  McLaws  and  Hood  to  support  the  main 
assault  by  renewing  the  attack  on  their  own  fronts,  not  on  the 
centre  ;  and  this  would  have  been  done  had  not  these  troops 
been  so  cut  up  by  the  previous  day's  fighting  that  their  com- 

n*  195 


manders  considered  a  renewal  of  the  attack  impossible.  This 
important  fact  was  never  reported  to  Lee,  who  was  therefore 
unaware  that  the  storming  column  would  receive  no  assistance 
from  the  troops  on  its  right.  Secondly,  we  find  the  following 
important  paragraph  in  Lee's  report : — "  General  Hill  was 
directed  to  hold  his  line  with  the  rest  of  his  command,  afford 
General  Longstreet  further  assistance  if  required,  and  avail  him- 
self of  any  success  that  might  be  gained."  There  is  no  need  to  look 
further  than  this.  We  have  here  a  direct  order  to  Hill  to  support 
Longstreet's  attack,  and  if  further  evidence  is  required,  it  is 
afforded  by  Hill's  instructions  to  Anderson  to  hold  his  division 
in  readiness  to  move  up  in  support.  But  if  we  go  further,  and 
try  to  find  out  why  Anderson  failed  to  do  what  Avas  required  of 
him,  why  three  of  his  brigades  never  moved  a  yard,  and  the 
other  two  only  when  it  was  too  late,  we  are  stopped.  Neither 
Hill's  nor  Anderson's  report  gives  any  help  to  solve  the  mystery. 
Hill  and  Lee  himself  were  both  at  this  point ;  it  seems  incredible 
that  there  should  have  occurred  such  appalling  bungling 
under  the  very  eyes  of  the  General-in-Chief.  Carelessness,  over- 
confidence,  and  bad  staff  work  are  the  probable  explanation. 
To  sum  up,  therefore,  the  responsibility  for  the  failure  to  support 
the  assaulting  column  must  rest,  not  on  Longstreet,  but  on  Hill, 
and  ultimately  on  Lee  himself. 


106 


INDEX 


Alexander,  Col.  ;  commands  artil- 
lery battalion  in  Hood's  division, 
p.  86;    pp.  90,  111,  115-117. 

Anderson,  Maj.-Gen.  R.  H.  ;  com- 
mands division  in  Hill's  Corps, 
p.  85  ;  attacks  Union  centre  on 
July  2,  p.  94  ;  ordered  to  support 
Pickett  and  Pettigrew,  July  3, 
p.  110  ;  neglects  to  do  so,  p.  120  ; 
blame  attached  to  him,  p.  157  and 
App.  C. 

Anderson,    Brig. -Gen.  ;     p.    90. 

Archer,  Brig.-Gen.  ;    p.  68. 

Armistead,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  p.  119  ; 
his  heroic  death,  p.  119. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia  ;  or- 
ganization of,  p.  20  and  App.  A  ; 
strength  at  various  times,  pp.  21, 
87,  130  ;  casualties  at  Gettys- 
burg, App.  B. 

Artillery  ;  organization  of,  in  Union 
and  Confederate  armies,  pp.  20, 
21  ;  employment  of  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  70,  82,  86,  111,  112, 113. 

Averill,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  commands 
Union  cavalry  in  Western  Vir- 
ginia, pp.  130, 133. 

Ayres,  Brig-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  July  2,  p.  92. 


B 

Baltimore  ;  strong  Confederate  sym- 
pathies in,  p.  18. 

Barksdale,  Brig -Gen;  captures 
the  Peach  Orchard,  p.  91, 
mortally  wounded,  p.   93. 

Barlow,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  wounded  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  70,  73. 

Barnes,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  92,  96. 

Baxter,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  72. 

Birney,     Maj.-Gen.  ;      engaged     at 


Gettysburg,  pp.  81,  91,  92,  121. 


Blenheim,    Battle    of ;     p.    156. 

Blue  Ridge  ;  description  of,  p.  17. 

Brandy  Station,  battle  of  ;  pp.  29- 
31. 

Brockenborough,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  en- 
gaged at  Gettysburg,  p.  68. 

Brooke,  Col.  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, p.  92. 

Buford,  Brig.-Gen.  John ;  engaged 
at  Brandy  Station,  pp.  29-31, 
occupies  Gettysburg,  pp.  67,  68  ; 
sent  to  Westminster,  p.  80  ; 
attacks  Williamsport,  pp.  136- 
138  ;    criticism  of,  pp.  147,  179. 


Caldwell,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  92. 

Carlisle,  Pa ;  occupied  by  Ewell, 
p.  52,  evacuated,  p.  53  ;  occupied 
by  Stuart,  p.  62. 

Carroll,  Col.  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, p.  100. 

Cashtown,  Pa  ;  occupied  by  Hill, 
p.  64. 

Casualties  ;  at  Brandy  Station,  p.  31  ; 
cavalry  engagements,  June  16- 
21,  p.  49  ;  operations  in  Shenan- 
doah Vallev,  p.  39  ;  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  76,  95,  101,  109,  122, 
127,  App.  B  ;  at  Williamsport, 
p.  138  ;   in  the  campaign,  p.  144. 

Cavalry;  organization  of,  pp.  19,  21, 
App.  A ;  comparison  between 
Union  and  Confederate,  p.  23  ; 
battle  at  Brandy  Station,  pp. 
29-31  ;  Confederate  movements 
masked  by,  p.  50  ;  engagements, 
June  16-21,  pp.  48,  49  ;  Stuart's 
operations,  pp.  59-63  ;  Federal 
cavalry  operations,  Dp.  61,  64, 
67  ;  cavalry  battle,  pp.  125, 126  ; 
subsequent  cavalry  movements, 
pp.  135-138 ;  criticism  of 
cavalry  operations,  pp.  174-179, 


197 


Cemetery  Hill  ;  description  of,  p.77  ; 

&-"3     assault  on,  p.  99. 

Cemetery     Ridge  ;    description     of, 

p.  78 ;  assaults  on,  pp.  94, 116-121. 
Centreville,     Va ;       occupied     by 

Hooker,  p.  45. 
Chambersburg,    Pa  ;      occupied    by 

Jenkins,  p.  43  ;  by  Lee,  p.  51. 
Chambliss,   Brig.-Gen.  ;     engaged   at 

Gettysburg,  p.  125  ;  at  Monterey, 

p.  136. 
Chancellorsville,   battle   of ;     des- 
cription    of,     p.     14 ;      rout     of 

Eleventh  Corps  at,  p.  150. 
Character  ;  of  theatre  of  war,  pp.  16, 

17  ;    of  Lee,  p.  24  ;    of  Hooker, 

pp.   24,  170  ;    of  Meade,  p.   57  ; 

of  Union  and  Confederate  troops, 

pp.    22,   23  ;     of   battlefield,   pp. 

66,  78,  81,  112. 
Charlestown,   Va ;    p.    39. 
Chester  Gap,  Va  ;    pp.  34,  46,  144. 
Communications,   lines  of ;    pp.   26, 

55,  164,  165. 
Codori's  House,  p.  118. 
Confederacy,    The ;     Condition    of. 

p.    15  ;     campaign    decides    the 

fate  of,  p.  182. 
Conscription,  p.  22. 
Corse,   Brig.-Gen.  ;    pp.   21,   47. 
Convoys,  captured  by  Stuart,  p.  60  ; 

by  Averill,  p.   133. 
Coster,     Brig.-Gen.  ;      engaged     at 

Gettysburg,  p.  73. 
Crawford,   Brig.-Gen.  ;     engaged   at 

Gettysburg,  p.  96. 
Culp's   Hill  ;   description   of,  p.   78  ; 

attack  on,  pp.   99,   107-109. 
Culpepper  C.  H  ;   pp.  27,  28,  144. 
Cumberland  Valley,  pp.  54,  55, 135. 
Custer,     Brig.-Gen.  ;       engaged     at 

Gettysburg,  p.  126. 
Cutler,     Brig.-Gen.  ;       engaged     at 

Gettysburg,  pp.   68,  71,  73. 


Daniel,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.   71,  72,  73. 

Davis,  President  Jefferson  ;  pp.  47, 
166. 

Davis,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg,  pp.    68,   118. 

De  Trobriand,  Col.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  81,  90. 

Devil's  Den,  pp.  81,  90. 

Discipline,  laxity  of,  p.  24. 

Dix,  Maj.-Gen. ;  threatens,  Richmond, 
p.  47. 

Dole,  Brig.-Gen. ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, p.  73. 

Doubleday,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  in  com- 
mand of  First  Corps,  p.  68  ;  his 
action  criticized,  p.  146. 


Early,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Winchester,  pp.  37,  39  ;  captures 
York,  p.  52  ;  marches  to 
Gettysburg,  pp.  53,  62  ;  engaged 
at  Gettysburg,  pp.  72-75,  99, 
100  ;  covers  Confederate  retreat, 
p.  134. 

Edward's  Ferry  ;   pp.  54,  60. 

Eleventh  Corps  ;  pp.  45,  64  ; 
engaged  at  Gettysburg,  pp.  70-74, 
79  ;   bad  behaviour  of,  p.  150. 

Emmittsburg,  Pa  ;   pp.  64,  135,  136. 

Eyler's  Gap  ;  p.  134. 

Ewell,  Lieut.-Gen.  ;  pp.  27,  28,  32  ; 
operations  in  Shenandoah  Valley, 
pp.  32-39  ;  crosses  the  Potomac, 
p.  51  ;  occupies  Carlisle,  p.  52, 
53  ;  engaged  at  Gettysburg, 
pp.  71-75  ;   pp.  97-102. 


F 

Fairfield,  Pa  ;    cavalry  engagement 

at,  p.  131. 
Farnsworth,     Brig.-Gen.  ;      p.     61  ; 

killed  at  Gettysburg,  p.  124. 
Fifth  Corps  ;    pp.   45,   54,   63,  77  ; 

engaged   at    Gettysburg,    p.    92  ; 

casualties,  p.  95. 
First   Corps  ;    pp.   45,   54,   64  ;    en- 
gaged at  Gettysburg,  pp.  67-74, 

80  ;    its  losses,  p.  95  ;    its  heroic 

conduct,  p.  149. 
Fisher,  Col.  ;  engaged  at  Gettysburg, 

p.  96. 
Fortifications  ;   of  Washington  and 

Richmond,   p.    18  ;     of   Harper's 

Ferry,    p.    55  ;     of    Harrisburg, 

p.  53. 
Fredericksburg,    Va ;     description 

of,  p.  17. 
Frederick  City  ;    pp.  54,  135,  137, 

149. 


Gamble,  Col.  ;     engaged   at    Gettys- 
burg, p.  68. 
Garnett,         Brig.-Gen.,         mortally 

wounded  at  Gettysburg,  p.  119. 
Geary,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  p.  98. 
Gettysburg,    Pa  ;     concentration   of 

Confederate    army    on,    p.    53  ; 

occupied     by     Buford,     p.     64  ; 

battle    of    July    1,    pp.    66-76  ; 

Federal  concentration  on,  p.  77  ; 

description  of  battlefield,  p.  77  ; 

battle    of    July    2    and    3,  p.  79 

et     seq.  ;       Confederate     retreat, 

p.     132 ;      decisive     results     of 

battle,  p.  182. 
Gibbon,     Brig.-Gen.  ;      engaged     at 

Gettysburg,   p.    120  ;    his  losses, 

p.  122. 


198 


Gilsa,      Von,      Col.  ;       engaged      at 

Gettysburg,  p.  99. 
Gordon,  Brig.-Gen.  ;    defeats  militia 

at  Wright sville,  p.  52  ;    engaged 

at  Gettysburg,  pp.  73,  99. 
Graham,     Brig.-Gen.  ;      engaged     at 

Gettysburg,  pp.  81,  91. 
Greene,     Brig.-Gen.  ;      engaged     at 

Gettysburg,  pp.  99,  101. 

H 

Hagerstown,  Md.  ;  pp.  136,  137, 
140. 

Hall,  Col.  ;  engaged  at  Gettysburg, 
pp.  112,  120. 

Halleck,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  General-in- 
chief  of  Federal  forces,  p.  25  ; 
orders  the  evacuation  of  Win- 
chester, p.  33  ;  refuses  to  allow 
Hooker  to  cross  the  Bappa- 
hannock,  p.  45  ;  or  to  evacuate 
Harper's  Ferry,  p.  55  ;  friction 
with  Hooker,  p.  56  ;  censures 
Meade,  p.  173. 

Hancock,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  reaches  Gettys- 
burg, p.  75  ;  position  of  his  Corps, 
p.  112  ;  is  wounded,  p.  121. 

Harper's  Ferry,  Va  ;  description 
of,  p.  17  ;  garrison  of,  p.  32  ; 
ignored  by  Lee,  p.  55  ;  Hooker 
wishes  to  evacuate,  p.  55  ; 
evacuated  by  Meade,  p.  59  ; 
re-occupied,  p.  135. 

Harrisburg,  Pa  ;  fortifications  of, 
pp.  44,  53  ;  threatened  by  Ewell, 
p.  52. 

Hays,  Brig.-Gen.,  U.S.A.  ;  engaged 
at  Gettysburg,  pp.  112,  118  ; 
his  losses,  p.  122. 

Hays,  Brig.-Gen.,  C.S.A.  ;  engaged 
at  Gettysburg,  pp.  72,  74,  99-100. 

Heintzelmann,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  com- 
mands garrison  of  Washington, 
p.  19. 

Henderson,  Col.  ;  pp.  24,  159. 

Heth,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  advances  on 
Gettysburg,  p.  67  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  68,  72-74,  110. 

High  Water  Mark,  p.  119. 

Hill,     Lieut.-Gen.     A.      P.  ;      holds 
Confederate  lines  at   Fredericks- 
burg, p.  27  ;    his  position,  p.  44 
marches  to  Chester  Gap,  p.  46 
crosses    the     Potomac,     p.     51 
advances  on  Gettysburg,  p.  64 
engaged  July  1,  pp.   67  et  seq. 
ordered  to  reinforce  Longstreet, 
July     3,     p.     107  ;      his     action 
criticized,  p.  157. 

Hoke,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  72,  74,  99,  100. 

Hood,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  reaches  Gettys- 
burg, p.  85  ;  assaults  Bound 
Top,  p.  89. 


Hooker,  Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  ;  com- 
mands Army  of  the  Potomac, 
p.  13  ;  defeated  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  p.  14  ;  his  character,  p.  24  ; 
retreats  to  Centreville,  p.  45  ; 
occupies  Bull  Run  Mountains, 
p.  50  ;  retreats  to  Frederick, 
p.  54  ;  dispute  with  Halleck, 
p.  55  ;  resigns  his  command, 
p.  56  ;  correspondence  with 
Halleck,  pp.  168,  169  ;  his 
character,  p.  170. 

Howard,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  takes  com- 
mand at  Gettysburg,  p.  6lJ  ; 
his  dispositions,  p.  70  ;  defeated, 
p.  73. 

Humphreys,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged 
at  Gettysburg,  pp.  81,  93,  121. 

Hunt,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  reports  on  Peach 
Orchard  position,  p.  81  ;  rallies 
artillery,  p.  91  ;  places  Union 
batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill, 
pp.  112,  113,  114. 


I 

Imboden,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  pp.  21,  27, 
51,  64  ;  escorts  Confederate  trains 
to  Williamsport,  p.  133  ;  repulses 
Federal  cavalry,  p.  137  ;  escorts 
prisoners  to  Staunton,  p.  139. 

Iverson,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  72. 


Jenkins,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  pp.  27,  34,  43, 
44,  125,  136. 

Johnson,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Winchester,  pp.  36,  37,  38 ; 
reaches  Gettysburg,  p.  75  ;  en- 
gaged at  Gettysburg,  July  2, 
pp.  97,  99-101  ;  do.,  July  3, 
pp.  107-109. 

Jones,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  99,  108. 

Jena,  battle  of  ;   p.  182. 


K 

Kf.lley,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  pp.  32,  39,  55  ;  commands 
troops  in  West  Virginia,  pp.  130, 
135. 

Kemper,  Brig.-Gen.  ;     mortally 

wounded  at  Gettysburg,  p.  119. 

Kershaw,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  90,  91. 

Kilpatrick,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  joins  the 
army,  p.  49  ;  action  at  Hanover, 
p.  62  ;  engaged  at  Gettysburg, 
pp.  123,  124 ;  attacks  Con- 
federate trains,  pp.  135-138,  179, 


199 


Lane,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  101,110. 

Law,  Brig.-Gen.  ;   engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  89,06,110,  127. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.  ;  wins 
battle  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  14  ; 
his  character,  p.  25  ;  his  strategy, 
p.  27  ;  success  of  his  preliminary 
operations,  p.  39  ;  his  apparent 
rashness,  pp.  44,  45  ;  secrecy 
of  his  movements,  p.  50  ;  invades 
Pennsylvania,  p.  52  ;  concen- 
trates his  army  on  Gettysburg, 
p.  53  ;  ignores  Harper's  Ferry, 
p.  55  ;  sends  instructions  to 
Stuart,  pp.  59,  60  ;  did  not  mean 
to  fight  at  Gettysburg,  p.  64  ; 
reaches  the  battlefield,  p.  75  ; 
his  plan  of  attack,  pp.  83,  84  ; 
impatience  at  Longstreet' s  delay, 
p.  87  ;  consults  with  Longstreet, 
p.  104  ;  his  plan  of  attack, 
pp.  105-107  ;  restores  order, 
p.  122  ;  his  confidence,  p.  132  ; 
retreats  towards  Fairfield,  p.  134  ; 
reaches  the  Potomac,  p.  139  ; 
re-crosses  the  Potomac,  p.  141  ; 
marches  to  the  Rappahannock, 
p.  144  ;  criticism  of  his  actions 
at  Gettysburg,  pp.  148,  149, 
150-152,  155-158  ;  his  strategy, 
pp.  164-167  ;  his  orders  to  Stuart, 
pp.  176,  177. 

Lee,  Brig.-Gen.  Fitzhugh  ;  engaged 
at  Brandy  Station,  pp.  29-31  ; 
at  Aldie,  p.  48  ;  at  Gettysburg, 
p.  125  ;  escorts  Confederate 
trains,  p.  136  ;  rescues  Imboden, 
p.  138. 

Lee,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  H.  F.  ;  wounded 
at  Brandy  Station,  pp.  29-31. 

Lincoln,  Abraham  ;  has  no  con- 
fidence in  Hooker,  p.  15  ;  anxiety 
for  safety  of  Washington,  p.  45  ; 
Hooker's  letter  to  him,  p.  56  ; 
his  mischievous  system  of  control 
over  the  army,  p.  168  ;  his 
relations  to  Hooker,  p.  170. 

Little  Round  Top  ;  description  of, 
p.  78  ;   struggle  for,  pp.  89,  96. 

Longstreet,  Lieut. -Gen.   James  A. 
marches    to    Culpepper,    p.    27 
to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  p.  46 
crosses  the  Potomac,  p.  51  ;     his 
position  on  July  30,  p.  64  ;    urges 
Lee       to       manoeuvre      against 
Meade's  flank,  p.  83  ;    his  orders 
and  dispositions,  p.  85  ;    attacks 
Federal  left  wing,  pp.  87-93,  95, 
96  ;    consults  with  Lee,  p.   104  ; 
ordered     to     assault     Cemetery 
Ridge,     p.     105  ;      his     assault, 


pp.  113-121  ;  marches  to  Wil- 
liamsport,  p.  139  ;  criticism  of 
his  conduct,  pp.  155-157,  App.  C. 


M 


at 


55. 


Mahone,     Brig.-Gen.  ;      engaged 
Gettysburg,  pp.  110,  120. 

Manassas,  Va  ;  p.  45. 

Marsh  Creek  ;    p.  64. 

Maryland  ;    p.  18. 

Maryland  Heights  ;    pp.  17,  39, 

McIntosh,  Col.  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, p.  125  ;  ordered  to  Emmitts- 
burg,  p.  136. 

McLaws,  Ma.j. -Gen.  ;  reaches  Gettys- 
burg, p.  85  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  90-93  ;  his  casualties, 
p.  95  ;  retreats  to  Seminary 
Ridge,  p.  127. 

McCandless,  Col.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  127. 

McRennolds,  Col.  ;  commands  de- 
tached force  at  Berryville,  pp.  33, 
34  ;   his  brigade  captured,  p.  38. 

Meade,  Maj.-Gen.  George  G.  ;  ap- 
pointed to  command  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  p.  57  ;  his  charac- 
ter, p.  57  ;  his  plans,  p.  58  ; 
selects  Pipe  Creek  as  a  defensive 
position,  p.  63  ;  did  not  mean 
to  fight  at  Gettysburg,  p.  64  ; 
orders  his  army  to  concentrate 
there,  p.  76  ;  reaches  the  field, 
p.  79  ;  his  dispositions,  pp.  79-82; 
sends  Warren  to  Round  Top, 
p.  88  ;  orders  the  Twelfth  Corps 
to  evacuate  Culp's  Hill,  p.  98  ; 
holds  a  council-of-war,  p.  103  ; 
does  not  rectify  the  confusion 
in  the  army,  p.  112  ;  makes 
no  counter-attack,  p.  123  ; 
cautious  pursuit  of  Lee's  army, 
p.  140  ;  hesitates  to  attack  Lee's 
lines,  p.  142  ;  marches  to  the 
Rappahannock,  p.  144  ;  hand- 
ling of  his  army,  pp.  159-161  ; 
controversy  with  Sickles,  p.  160  ; 
his  strategy,  pp.  171.  172  ;  his 
cautious  pursuit,  p.  173  ;  com- 
parison with  Lee.  p.  174. 

Meredith,  Col.  ;  engaged  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  68,  73. 

Middleburg,  Va  ;  p.  49. 

Merritt  ;  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  123. 

Militia  ;  Pennsylvania  militia  called 
out,  p.  44  ;  garrison  of  Harris- 
burg,  p.  53  ;  at  Wrightsville, 
p.  52  ;   value  of,  pp.  180,  181. 

Milroy,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  commands  garri- 
son of  Winchester,  p.  32  ;  ignor- 
ance of  Lee's  movements,  p.  35  ; 
surrounded  by  Ewell,  p.  37  ; 
breaks  out  of  Winchester,  p.  38  ; 


200 


placed   under  arrest,   p.   41  ;   his 
actions  criticized,  p.  41. 

N 

Newton,  Maj.-Gon.  ;  assumes  com- 
mand of  First  Corps,  p.  80. 

Nicholls,  Brig. -Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,   p.    99. 


Offensive.,  the  ;  advantages  of 
assuming,  p.  46  ;  Meade's  failure 
to  assume  at  Gettysburg,  p.  161. 

Officers  ;  Union  and  Confederate 
compared,  p.  24  ;  casualties 
among,  p.  128. 

O'Neal,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,    pp.    71,    73. 

Organization  ;  of  Union  and  Con- 
federate armies,  pp.  19-21,  App. 
A. 


Paul,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  72. 

Peach  Orchard  ;  description  of, 
p.  81  ;   capture  of,  p.  91. 

Pender,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  69,  73,  85  ; 
mortally    wounded,    p.    101. 

Pennsylvania  ;  invasion  of,  p.  51. 

Perrin,  Brig.-Gen.  ;   p.  110. 

Perry,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  94. 

Pettigrew,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  68,  110,  IIS ; 
killed    at    Williamsport,    p.    143. 

Pipe  Creek,  p.  65,  77,  171. 

Pickett,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  at  Chambers- 
burg,  p.  64  ;  reaches  Gettysburg, 
p.  106  ;  assaults  Cemetery  Ridge, 
p.  117-121  ;    his  losses,  p.  122. 

Pleasonton,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  attacks 
Stuart  at  Brandy  Station,  pp. 
29-32  ;  cavalry  engagements, 
June  16-21,  pp.  48,  49  ;  pursuit 
of  Confederate  trains,  p.  135  ; 
criticism    of   above,   p.    178. 

Plum  Run  ;  p.  81. 

Potomac,  Army  of  ;  organization  of, 
pp.  18,  19  ;  strength  of,  pp.  13, 
18,  82,  130. 

Potomac,  River  ;  description  of, 
p.  16  ;  rising  of,  p.  134  ;  re- 
crossed  by  Lee,  p.  141. 

Posey,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  94. 

Positions  ;  of  Stuart  at  Culpepper, 
p.  29  ;  of  Union  troops  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  70,  79,  81,  112  ; 
of  Confederate  troops  at  Gettys- 
burg, pp.  85,  110. 


Raid;  by  Stuart,  pp.  59-62;  Lee's 
instructions  concerning,  p.  176  ; 
criticism  of  Stuart,  p.  177. 

Ramseur,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  71,  73. 

Rapidan,  R.  ;   description  of,  p.  18. 

Rappahannock,  R.  ;  description  of, 
p.  18. 

Reynolds,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  advances  to 
Gettysburg,  p.  64  ;  is  killed,  p.  69. 

Richmond  :  defences  of,  p.  18  ; 
threatened  by  Gen.  Dix,  pp.  40, 
47. 

Robertson,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Brandy  Station,  p.  30  ;  left  in 
the  Valley,  p.  60  ;  ordered  to 
Gettysburg,  p.  131  ;  moves  to 
Hagerstown,  p.  137  ;  criticism  of 
his  conduct,  pp.  177,  178. 

Rock  Creek  ;    p.  67. 

Rodes,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  enters  Shenan- 
doah Valley,  p.  34  ;  attacks 
Martinsburg,  p.  35  ;  occupies 
Carlisle,  p.  52  ;  marches  on 
Gettysburg,  p.  53  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  71-75  ;  fails  to 
co-operate  with  Early,  p.  100  ; 
reason  for  the  above,  p.  156. 

Romney,  Va  ;   pp.  27,  37. 

Round  Top,  description  of,  p.  78  ; 
captured  by  Federals,  p.  96. 

Rowley,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  70. 


Scales,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,    pp.    74,    110. 

Schenck,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  commands 
Union  forces  in  Shenandoah 
Valley,  p.  33 ;  disregards  Hal- 
leck's  orders,  p.  33  ;  places 
Milroy  in  arrest,  p.  41  ;  res- 
ponsible for  the  disaster,  p.  40. 

Second  Army  Corps  ;  marches  to 
Fairfax  C.H.,  p.  45  ;  to  Frederick 
City,  p.  54  ;  to  Frizzleburg, 
p.  61  ;  to  Gettysburg,  p.  77  ;  its 
position,  pp.  80,  112 ;  repulses 
Confederate  attack,  pp.  118-121. 

Secrecy  ;  importance  of,  pp.  39,  50. 

Sedgwick,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  at  Fredericks- 
burg, p.  28  ;  makes  forced  march 
to  Gettysburg,  p.  77. 

Seminary,  the  ;   p.  66. 

Seminary  Ridge  ;  description  of, 
p.  66 ;  Confederate  positions  on, 
pp.  85,  110. 

Semmes,  Brig.-Gen.  ;    p.  90. 

Shepherdstown,  Va  ;    p.  51. 

Shurz,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  70. 


201 


Sickles,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  reaches  Gettys- 
burg.'p.  77  ;  occupies  the  Peach 
Orchard,  p.  81  ;  is  wounded,  p. 
92  ;    dispute  with  Meade,  p.  160. 

Situations,  strategical ;  in  May,  1863, 
p.  14  ;  on  June  15,  p.  44  ;  on 
24th,  p.  50  ;  on  30th,  p.  63  ;  on 
July  3,  p.  130. 

Sixth  Army  Corps  ;  crosses  Rappa- 
hannock, p.  28  ;  marches  to 
Fairfax  C.H.,  p.  45  ;  to  Frederick, 
p.  54  ;  to  Manchester,  p.  63  ; 
makes  forced  march  to  Gettys- 
burg, p.  77  ;  pursues  the  Con- 
federates, p.  134. 

Slocum,  Maj.-Gen.  ;  reaches  Gettys- 
burg, p.  76  ;  commands  right 
wing,  pp.  79,  98. 

Smith,  Maj.-Gen.  W.  F.  ;  commands 
militia  at  Harrismith,  p.  53  ; 
advances  down  Cumberland 
Valley,  p.  135  ;  effects  junction 
with  Meade,  p.  140. 

South  Mountain  ;  p.  17,  179. 

Stannard,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  pp.  80,  118, 
121. 

Steinwehr,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  pp.  70,  74. 

Steuart,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  pp.  100,  101. 
108,  109. 

Stone,  Col.  ;  in  action  at  Gettysburg, 
pp.  70,  72,  73  ;  his  gallant 
conduct,  p.  181. 

Stuart,  Maj.-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  ;  com- 
mands Confederate  cavalry,  p. 
23  ;  defeats  Pleasonton  at 
Culpepper,  C.H.,  pp.  29-31  ; 
engagements  with  Pleasonton, 
pp.  48,  49  ;  his  admirable  conduct, 
p.  50  ;  his  instructions  from 
Lee,  p.  59  ;  rides  round  Federal 
rear,  p.  60  ;  reaches  Westminster, 
p.  61  ;]  Hanover,  p.  61  ;  York, 
Carlisle,  and  Gettysburg,  p.  62  ; 
action'^withj  Federal  cavalry,  pp. 
125,  126  ;  dispositions  to  cover 
Confederate  h  retreat,  p.  136; 
moves  to  Hagerstown,  p.  137  ; 
criticism  of  his  conduct,  p.   177. 

Susquehanna,  River  ;    p.   52. 

Sweitzer,  Col.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  p.  92. 

Swinton  ;  quotations  from,  pp.  42, 
57. 

Syracuse  ;  siege  of,  by  Athenians, 
p.  182. 

T 

Tactics  ;  of  Lee,  at  Gettysburg,  pp- 
150-152  ;   of  Meade,  pp.  160,  161. 

Taneytown,  Pa  ;    pp.  59,  61,  64,  76. 

Theatre  of  War  ;  description  of, 
pp.  16,  17. 

Third  Corps  ;  marches  to  Centre- 
ville,  p.  45  ;  to  South  Mountain, 
p.    54 ;    to   Taneytown,   p,    63 ; 


to  Gettysburg,  p.   76  ;    occupies 

the     Peach      Orchard,     p.     81  ; 

defeated  and  driven  back,  pp.  89- 

93  ;    its  losses,  p.  95. 
Thomas,  Brig.-Gen,  p.  110. 
Thoroughfare  Gap.,  p.  48. 
Tilton,  Col.  ;  engaged  at  Gettysburg, 

p.  92. 
Trimble,  Maj.-Gen.  ;    takes  command 

of    Pender's    Division,    p.    110  ; 

assaults  Cemetery  Ridge,  pp.  117- 

118. 
Twelfth  Corps  ;    marches  to  Fairfax 

C.  H.,  p.  45  ;    towards  Harper's 

Ferry,    p.    54  ;     to    Littlestown, 

p.    64  ;     to    Gettysburg,    p.    76  ; 

occupies     Culp's     Hill,     p.     79  ; 

evacuates     its     works,     p.     98  ; 

retakes  them,  pp.  107-110. 
Tyler,      Col.,      commands      Federal 

forces        at         Martinsburg,      p. 

32  ;    retreats  to  Harper's  Ferry, 

p.  35  ;  fortifies  Maryland  Heights, 

p.  55. 


Vicksburg  ;   siege  of,  p.  15  ;  surrender 

of,  p.  163. 
Vincent,     Col.  ;      killed     on     Little 

Round  Top,  p.  90. 
Virginia  ;   description   of,   p.    17. 
Von   Amberg,   Brig.-Gen.  ;     p.    70. 

W 

Wadsworth,  Brig.-Gen.  ;  engaged  at 
Gettysburg,  pp.  68,  79. 

Walker,  Brig.-Gen.  ;    pp.  99,  109. 

Ward,  Brig.-Gen.  ;   pp.  81,  90. 

Warfield's   House  ;   p.    85. 

Washington  ;  fortifications  of,  p.  18  ; 
effect  of  its  situation,  p.  17  ; 
Federal  Government's  fears  for, 
pp.  45,  166. 

Webb,  Brig.-Gen.  ;   pp.  112,  119. 

Weed,  Brig.-Gen.  ;   pp.  89,  90. 

Westminster;    pp.  59,  61. 

Wheatfield,  The  ;    pp.  92,  96. 

Wiekert's  House  ;  p.  78. 

Wilcox,  Brig.-Gen.  ;   pp.  94,  95,  121. 

Willard,  Col.  ;  killed  at  Gettysburg, 
p.  93. 

Williamsport,  pp.  51,  134,  137-140. 

Willoughby  Run  ;  p.  66. 

Winchester  ;  Union  Garrison  of, 
p.  32  ;  defences  of,  p.  33  ;  en- 
gagements round,  pp.  34,  37  ; 
evacuation  by  Federals,  p.  38  ; 
Confederate  capture  of,  p.  39. 

Wright,  Brig.-Gen.  ;    pp.  94,  95. 

Wrightsville,  Pa  ;  engagement  at, 
p.  52. 


York,  Pa  ;   occupied  by  Early,  p.  52, 


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